Burkette v. H.R. III, L.L.C., Civil Action No. 2:02 CV 403 MHT (WO).

Decision Date19 January 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:02 CV 403 MHT (WO).
Citation410 F.Supp.2d 1117
PartiesLinda BURKETTE, Plaintiff, v. H.R. III, L.L.C. d/b/a Hardee's, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, Kevin Wade Jent, Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantanzis, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Allen Hagelman Martin & Associates PC, Austin, TX, Robert S. Lamar, Jr., Lamar, Miller, Norris, Haggard & Christie, PC, Birmingham, AL, Stephen D. Christie, Lamar, Miller, Norris & Feldman PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

The question presented is whether, when a court has had to excuse a black juror from a selected jury for personal reasons, the court should then excuse a white juror so as to maintain the racial balance of the jury. The answer is simple: no.

In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Linda Burkette, an American woman of African descent, alleges that defendant H.R. III, d/b/a Hardee's, discharged her as manager at one of its restaurants because of her race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e17, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. On January 9, 2006, the court oversaw the selection of the jury that will decide this case. The jury selection process resulted in a 10-member jury, with six of the jurors being white and four being black.

At the time the jury was empaneled, this case was set to be tried on Wednesday, January 11. Because another trial ran longer than expected, this trial was reset to Wednesday, January 18. Upon learning of the new trial date, one of the jurors, a black woman who is a physician, asked the court to be excused from the panel. She had rescheduled over 80 patients who suffer from hypertension, diabetes, and other health problems from January 11 and 12 to January 18 to accommodate the original trial setting. Based on the new trial date, she would have to re-reschedule those patients, which would delay for more than a week needed medical tests and treatment for those patients and could place the health of some of those patients at serious risk.

Following an on-the-record conference, the court excused the juror. Although Burkette agreed that the juror should be excused, she asked the court to excuse a white juror to maintain the racial balance of the jury panel. The court declined. This opinion now explains the basis for that ruling.

In the latter part of the last century, the laws governing jury selection developed considerably. The most important and laudatory of the changes were those that sought to rid the jury selection process of all race and sex discrimination. See United States v. Johnson, 790 F.Supp. 269, 272 (M.D.Ala.1992) (Thompson, J.).1 This goal has profound significance because, for many years, courts systematically excluded blacks and others from serving on juries.

At its most basic level, this laudatory goal can be broken into two distinct propositions. First, the law ensures that all citizens, without regard to factors that have nothing to do with a person's character, have an equal opportunity to be part of the group from which juries and jurors are later selected for particular cases. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 619, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404, 410-15, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). To this end, each district court in the federal system must adopt a plan for locating and summoning to the court eligible prospective jurors.... This plan, as with all other trial court procedures, must implement statutory policies of random juror selection from a fair cross section of the community ... and non-exclusion on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622, 111 S.Ct. 2077. Burkette did not challenge this court's plan for locating and summoning of eligible prospective citizens for jury service, so the first factor is not at issue here.2

Second, the law ensures that once that the group from which juries and jurors are to be selected has been established (that is, the "jury wheels" have been randomly created), the process that then leads to the selection of a particular jury in a particular case must not permit any of the participants — lawyer, party, and even the court itself — to exclude a juror because of an impermissible factor, such as race. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619, 111 S.Ct. 2077. This proposition has an important corollary: the makeup of a particular panel is shaped only by the non-discriminatory factors of chance, dismissals for cause, and peremptory strikes based on permissive reasons. Burkette does not contend that Hardee's struck any jurors based on their race, but rather argues that this court should dismiss a white juror to maintain the racial balance of the panel now that a black juror has been dismissed. This argument implicates the corollary and must...

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