Burkhardt v. Lindsay

• Decision Date: 19 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–CV–93 (JFB)(AKT).,09–CV–93 (JFB)(AKT).
• Citation: 811 F.Supp.2d 632
• Parties: Linda BURKHARDT, Plaintiff, v. William LINDSAY, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Presiding Officer of the Suffolk County Legislature and in His Personal Capacity and as an Agent of the County of Suffolk and as Aider and Abettor, and County of Suffolk, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

811 F.Supp.2d 632

Linda BURKHARDT, Plaintiff,

v.William LINDSAY, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Presiding Officer of the Suffolk County Legislature and in His Personal Capacity and as an Agent of the County of Suffolk and as Aider and Abettor, and County of Suffolk, Defendants.

No. 09–CV–93 (JFB)(AKT).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Sept. 19, 2011.

Wayne J. Schaefer, Law Offices of Wayne J. Schaefer, LLC, Smithtown, NY, for Plaintiff.

John Richard Petrowski, Brian P. Callahan, and Jennifer K. Siegel of the Suffolk County Attorney's Office, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Linda Burkhardt (“plaintiff” or “Burkhardt”) brought this action against defendants William Lindsay (“Lindsay”), in his official capacity as Presiding Officer of the Suffolk County Legislature and in his personal capacity, and the County of Suffolk (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that defendants terminated her from her position as a legislative aide to the Presiding Officer because of her political affiliation and age in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Plaintiff and defendants have cross-moved for summary judgment on each of plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth herein, defendants' motion is granted in its entirety.

I. Background

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits and respective Local 56.1 statements of facts.¹ Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005).

Plaintiff's claims stem from her termination as a legislative aide for the Presiding Officer of the Suffolk County Legislature, a position which plaintiff held at various levels for twenty-two years. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 1–3.) Specifically, plaintiff, a self-described active member of the Republican Party (Burkhardt Depo. at 131:12–14), contends that, in January 2008, Presiding Officer William Lindsay, a Democrat, fired plaintiff and another non-Democrat legislative aide, Francis Siems (“Siems”), in order to fill their positions with Democrats who had lost their jobs. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 1–2; Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3.) At the time of their termination, both plaintiff and Siems were over fifty-five years of age and were eligible to receive a service retirement benefit. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) However, a third legislative aide—a Republican between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine—was not terminated. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action, alleging that she was terminated both because of her political affiliation and because of her age.

By way of background, the Suffolk County Legislature (the “Legislature”) holds an organizational meeting each year at the beginning of January, at which the Legislature elects a Presiding Officer from its own members. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 20; Defs.' Ex. J ² (Rules of the Legislature adopted Jan. 2, 2008).) Pursuant to the Rules of the Legislature, which are adopted each year, the Presiding Officer has the power and duty “[t]o appoint and designate or terminate, within budgetary appropriations, all officers and employees of the Legislature not required to be selected by these Rules,” except for three legislative aides and secretaries which are assigned by each individual legislator to work at the legislator's district office. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 20; Defs.' Ex J (Rule 3.A.10).)

Plaintiff was first hired as a legislative aide for then-Presiding Officer Gregory Blass in 1986. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3; Burkhardt Depo. at 11:23–12:5, 13:4–16.) Although plaintiff initially was hired as a secretary, she was promoted after approximately three months to the position of “Legislative Aide II.” (Burkhardt Depo. at 10:12–11:25.) It is undisputed that, as established by the Legislature and the Suffolk County Department of Civil Service, there are four levels of “legislative aide” (referred to as levels I, II, III, and IV), with the highest level (level IV) referring to a legislator's Chief of Staff. ³ (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 9.) As to the distinction between levels I to III, defendant Lindsay testified that an aide is classified on the basis of experience rather than on the basis of the aide's specific job responsibilities:

[T]he legislative aides one, two, and three really have to do with experience. It isn't that there's a set designation that only a [level] one can handle a constituent call, or [level] a two could only work on a committee. It's, it's [sic] a designation that goes really with experience.(Lindsay Depo. at 22:11–15.)

During her deposition, plaintiff testified extensively regarding both the work performed by legislative aides generally and the work that she performed in particular. For example, plaintiff acknowledged that legislative aides would “sometimes” have contact with elected officials, other legislators, the County Executive's Office, and the County Executive Budget Office. (Burkhardt Depo. at 15:4–16:20; 99:24–100:12; 123:9–12.) In fact, plaintiff testified that some aides would lobby legislators on behalf of, and at the direction of, the Presiding Officer, and others would “interface” with the county executive on legislative matters for the Presiding Officer. ( Id. at 115:25–116:7.) Plaintiff also acknowledged that legislative aides would sometimes have contact with constituents, although plaintiff stressed that whether an aide had such contact would “depend on the aide and the responsibilities they were given.” ( Id. at 16:21–25.) Nevertheless, plaintiff clearly conceded that some legislative aides worked on and would attempt to resolve constituent issues, and that there were issues that a legislative aide might be able to resolve under his or her own discretion and then later advise the Presiding Officer regarding their resolution. ( Id. at 108:19–109:21.)

In addition, regarding committee assignments, it is undisputed that some aides would: (1) act as a liaison between committees, departments, agencies, boards, and commissions; (2) supply committees with information and reports pertaining to departments, agencies, boards, and commissions; (3) conduct investigatory studies of departments, agencies, boards, and commissions; and (4) carry out research pertaining to resolutions. ( Id. at 96:25–97:16.) As described by plaintiff, the County Executive established “probably close to a hundred” boards or commissions at which legislative aides would represents their legislator or the Presiding Officer. ( Id. at 105:17–21.) Some aides would have voting authority at these commissions and some would speak for the Presiding Officer. ( Id. at 106:3–11.) In addition, some aides worked on the “reapportionment project” after the completion of the federal census, as part of which staff members, including legislative aides, “would sit down with maps and census data and census software to try to make some recommendations to the presiding officer, sometimes individual legislators on changes in their district.” ( Id. at 118:21–119:9.)

Regarding access to confidential information, plaintiff testified that some aides would attend “executive sessions” of legislative sessions, where confidential information would be discussed, and others would attend caucus meetings, where information would be discussed regarding the caucus position on various legislation. ( Id. at 104:5–20.) In particular, at the caucus meetings, the caucus would discuss information that it would not want to share with the opposite party, and, as such, the legislative aides invited to attend such meetings belonged to the same party as the caucus. ( Id. at 130:5–131:5.) Lindsay confirmed that several different legislative aides would accompany him to caucuses and would represent him on the rare occasions when Lindsay did not attend the caucus in person. (Lindsay Depo. at 55:23–57:17.)

As to her personal responsibilities, plaintiff testified that, when she first started as a Legislative Aide II,⁴ she “drafted proclamations,” “drafted responses to constituent letters,” and “sometimes” took phone calls from constituents, and had contact with other elected officials and legislators. ( Id. at 13:4–25.) Plaintiff also testified that she sometimes had contact with the legislative counsel's office, which was responsible for drafting legislation, and with the County Executive's Office. ( Id. at 18:7–19:13; 14:3–15:3) She also acknowledged that she had “technical knowledge of the rules and procedures of the Suffolk County Legislat [ure].” ( Id. at 17:22–19:13.) Moreover, in a memo plaintiff wrote to then-incoming Presiding Officer Paul Tonna in or around January 2000 ⁵ (the “Tonna memo”), plaintiff described in detail the “varied responsibilities” she had for different Presiding Officers up until that time. For example, plaintiff explained that, inter alia, she: (1) represented the Presiding Officer at a number of committee meetings and took “notes on controversial issues and legislative concerns”; (2) supervised the internship program for a number of years; (3) managed some of the daily work of the staff for Presiding Officers Blass, Blydenburgh, and Rizzo; (4) “worked on numerous types of constituent problems”; (5) “[w]orked to help in other legislator['s] district offices”; (6) “[l]obbied legislators on behalf of the Presiding Officer”; and (7) “[i]nterfaced with the county [executive's] staff on legislative matters for the Presiding Officer and “[i]nterfaced with various other elected officials and government agencies on behalf of the Presiding Officer.” (Defs.' Ex. F.) Plaintiff acknowledged that, while this memorandum described only her personal responsibilities and “not necessarily all legislative aides' responsibilities,” some legislative aides other than plaintiff would also have had similar responsibilities. ( Id. at...