Burkhart v. Burkhart, WD

Decision Date29 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. WD,WD
Citation876 S.W.2d 675
PartiesRichard D. BURKHART, Appellant, v. Elisabeth A. BURKHART, Respondent. 48229.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

William E. Simmons, Clinton, for appellant.

Harold L. Caskey, Butler, for respondent.

Before SMART, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and FENNER, JJ.

FENNER, Judge.

Appellant, Richard D. Burkhart (Richard), appeals the order of the trial court dissolving his marriage from respondent, Elisabeth A. Burkhart (Lisa). Richard complains specifically of the court's award of custody and attorney fees.

Richard and Lisa were married on February 22, 1992. On March 29, 1992, a son, Joshua, was born to the parties. Seven months after their marriage, on October 18, 1992, Richard and Lisa separated. In its Amended Judgment and Decree of Dissolution filed August 10, 1993, the trial court dissolved the marriage of the parties and awarded joint legal and physical custody of Joshua to Richard and Lisa. Joint physical custody was to be exercised by one of the parties having actual physical custody of Joshua for a period of three months and then the other party having actual physical custody for three months, and alternating thereafter until Joshua is enrolled in preschool or kindergarten at which time Lisa is to assume actual physical custody during the school year with Richard having actual physical custody for eight weeks in the summer. Among other matters, the trial court awarded judgment in favor of Lisa and against Richard in the amount of $3,500 as and for partial payment of her attorney fees.

Richard argues first that the trial court erred in awarding joint legal and physical custody. Richard argues that the trial court's order in this regard is not in Joshua's best interest and is against the weight of the evidence. Richard argues that the evidence reflects that Lisa is not suited to have actual physical custody, that she is immature, could not hold down a job, and that she is emotionally and mentally unstable. Richard argues further that he is better suited to have actual physical custody of Joshua and that the trial court made an impermissible presumption that children of tender years are best placed in the physical custody of the mother.

In reviewing a court-tried dissolution case, the appellate court must sustain the trial court's decree unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Gulley v. Gulley, 852 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Mo.App.1993). An award of child custody should not be disturbed unless the appellate court is firmly convinced that the welfare of the child requires some other disposition. Gulley v. Gulley, 852 S.W.2d at 876. Accordingly, in child custody proceedings the determination of the trial court is given greater deference than in any other type of case. Id.

Furthermore, a trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. T.B.G. v. C.A.G., 772 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Mo. banc 1989). When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will accept as true the evidence and inferences from the evidence that are favorable to the trial court's judgment and disregard all contrary evidence. Id.

On appeal, it is presumed that the trial court reviewed all the evidence and awarded custody in light of the best interest of the child. Hartig v. Hartig, 738 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Mo.App.1987). "This presumption is based upon the trial court's better position to judge not only the credibility of the witnesses and parties directly but also their sincerity, character, and other trial intangibles which might not be completely revealed by the record." Id.

PHYSICAL CUSTODY 1

The record reflects that at the time of their marriage, Lisa was 19 years old and Richard was 21 years old. Lisa was eight months pregnant at the time of their marriage. The marriage was of short duration and ended with Richard telling Lisa that he did not love her any longer and wished to end their marriage.

After graduating from high school and during the marriage, Lisa changed jobs several times and always held positions paying minimum wage. Richard on the other hand remained fairly steadily employed. Prior to her marriage to Richard and as a result of the dissolution of the marriage of her parents, Lisa suffered from depression and at one point received in-patient therapy for a period of approximately 30 days. However, there was expert testimony presented from Dr. Jerry Morris, a clinical psychologist, which established that the depression Lisa suffered from the breakup of the marriage of her parents was a transient situational depression from which she had recovered. Dr. Morris further testified that Lisa had a normal personality profile, that she suffered from no mental disorders, and that she was not in need of treatment. Dr. Morris testified that Lisa was a strong person and that she had been able to handle significant stress from the breakup of her marriage. Dr. Morris found nothing in Lisa's mental or emotional state that would place Joshua in jeopardy by being under her control.

Richard complains that Lisa lied under oath and that her morals and values do not recommend placement of Joshua with her. Richard totally ignores the fact that there was evidence from which the trial court could find that he too lied under oath on more than one occasion, that prior to his marriage to Lisa he impregnated another girl for whom he paid for an abortion, that at the time of his marriage to Lisa she was eight months pregnant, that during his short marriage to Lisa he was romantically involved with Lisa's best friend, who was married to a friend of Richard's, and that Richard failed to report his income accurately to the Internal Revenue Service.

Richard bases his argument that the trial court made an impermissible presumption that children of tender years are best placed with the mother on the fact that in its decree the trial court stated as follows:

The Court in giving consideration to the recently published document on gender bias in the Courts and court system does order that the attorney fees of Respondent in the sum of $3500.00 shall be paid by the Petitioner for which judgment is hereby given against the Petitioner. The ability to pay of Petitioner is substantially greater than that of Respondent.

The significance of this statement of the court is discussed subsequently in this opinion. Nonetheless, regardless of what the court meant in referring to the "document on gender bias," the statement does not support Richard's argument of an impermissible tender years presumption.

The record does not support Richard's argument that he is better suited than Lisa to have actual physical custody of Joshua.

Next, in regard to physical custody, Richard argues that the trial court erred by alternating actual physical custody on a three month basis because such frequent changes are not in Joshua's best interest.

Section 452.375, RSMo Supp.1993, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

1. As used in this section, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

(1) "Joint legal custody" means that the parents share the decision-making rights, responsibilities, and authority relating to the health, education and welfare of the child, and, unless allocated, apportioned, or decreed, the parents shall confer with one another in the exercise of decision-making rights, responsibilities, and authority;

(2) "Joint physical custody" means an order awarding each of the parents significant periods of time during which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision of each of the parents. Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

* * * * * *

3. The general assembly finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure children frequent and meaningful contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and that it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share decision-making rights and responsibilities of child rearing. In order to effectuate this policy, the court shall determine the custody arrangement which will best assure that parents share such decision-making responsibility and authority and such frequent and meaningful contact between the child and each parent, as is indicated in the best interests of the child under all relevant circumstances.

4. Prior to awarding the appropriate custody arrangement in the...

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31 cases
  • In re Marriage of Hansen
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Junio 2007
    ...care is reduced when there is a bitter parental relationship and one party objects to the shared arrangement. Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (allegations of infidelity and breach of trust); Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 102......
  • Simon-Harris v. Harris
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 13 Julio 2004
    ...v. Alt, 947 S.W.2d 433, 434-35 (Mo.App. W.D.1997) (affirming award of custody that alternated every two weeks); Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Mo.App. W.D.1994) (custody alternated on a three-month basis). "Where parents live apart there is no way to provide for joint physical c......
  • J.L.S. v. D.K.S., s. 68859
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 11 Marzo 1997
    ...permits the appellate court to give judgment as the trial court ought to have given under the circumstances. See Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo.App.1994). In the interests of judicial economy, we reverse the trial court's finding of joint legal custody and award mother sole l......
  • Lueckenotte v. Lueckenotte
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 9 Enero 2001
    ...Exhibit 2. "[A] trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness." Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo. App. 1994). The trial court based its decision on the evidence presented to it at trial. State ex rel. Langiano v. Langiano, 3 S.W......
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3 books & journal articles
  • Section 26.25 Modification of Physical or Legal Custody (New Title)
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Family Law Deskbook Chapter 26 Modification of Decrees
    • Invalid date
    ...would not be in the children’s best interest. See also Anderson v. Anderson, 854 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993); Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App. W.D....
  • Section 9.2 Legal Custody
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Family Law (2014 Supp) Chapter 9 Child Custody and Visitation Rights
    • Invalid date
    ...of the parties’ inability to function as a parental unit in making decisions for the benefit of the child. See also Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994), in which the trial court erred in awarding joint legal custody when the parties could not even agree on appropriate ......
  • Section 26.25 Change in Custody
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Family Law (2014 Supp) Chapter 26 Modification of Decrees
    • Invalid date
    ...would not be in the children’s best interest. See also Anderson v. Anderson, 854 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993); Burkhart v. Burkhart, 876 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). For cases discussing the issue of burden of proof on child custody modifications, see Moore v. Moore, 849 S.W.2d 652 (M......

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