Burkhart v. Wilkie
| Decision Date | 03 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | 16-1334 |
| Parties | Sally A. Burkhart, Appellant, v. Robert L. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals For Veterans Claims |
Argued October 24, 2018
On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals
Sean S. Twomey, of Los Angeles, California, for the appellant.
Mark D. Gore, with whom James M. Byrne, General Counsel; Mary Ann Flynn, Chief Counsel; and Richard A. Daley, Deputy Chief Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee.
Before BARTLEY, GREENBERG, and ALLEN, Judges.
This appeal, which is timely and over which the Court has jurisdiction, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a), had its genesis when VA issued a certificate of eligibility (COE) for home loan guaranty benefits to the appellant, a veteran's surviving spouse, and retracted it years later, citing her actual ineligibility for that congressionally authorized benefit. The appellant raises three questions of law in asking us to reverse the Board of Veterans' Appeals's (Board's) March 21, 2016 decision denying eligibility for these home loan guaranty benefits. First, we address whether a veteran's surviving spouse who is entitled to dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 is also thereby entitled to ancillary home loan guaranty benefits under title 38, chapter 37. Second, we consider whether 38 U.S.C. § 3721 () bars VA from contesting a surviving spouse's eligibility once the Agency has issued a COE before a loan is issued. Finally, we address whether the Court may use equitable principles to grant these home loan guaranty benefits and order VA to guarantee a loan by employing equitable estoppel, waiver laches, or injunctive relief.
We hold that (1) neither section 1151 nor chapter 37 confers eligibility for home loan guaranty benefits on section 1151 beneficiaries such as the appellant; (2) the incontestability provision does not affect VA's ability to contest a person's eligibility for the home loan guaranty program before a loan is issued; and (3) equitable principles are not appropriate to grant the appellant relief in this case. Therefore, the Court will affirm the March 21, 2016, Board decision.
The operative facts in this appeal are straightforward and uncontested. The appellant is the surviving spouse of U.S. Army veteran David Burkhart, who served the Nation honorably on active duty from August 1952 to July 1954 in the Korean Conflict. Record (R.) at 3, 33. Mr. Burkhart was awarded two Bronze Stars. R. at 33. He was not service connected for any disabilities during his life.
The veteran's health began to deteriorate in the late 1990s. See, e.g., R. at 846-47. In September 2003, he was admitted to a VA inpatient nursing facility. R. at 362-63. The veteran died the following month while still under VA care. R. at 473-74.
After her husband's death, the appellant filed a claim for DIC benefits. R. 748-52. Her claim was based on 38 U.S.C. § 1151, which provides for compensation in connection with the death or injury of a veteran in certain circumstances while the veteran was under VA care. R. at 748. VA granted the appellant's claim in an August 2007 rating decision because it determined that the veteran's "death [while in VA care] was due to an event not reasonably foreseeable." R. at 287; see 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(B). There is no indication that the cause of his death was related to a service-connected disability or that the appellant claimed service connection in connection with her husband's death.
Now we reach a critical turning point in the facts leading to this appeal. The appellant sought a COE for home loan guaranty benefits in 2007. R. at 240. These benefits are available under chapter 37 of title 38 of the U.S. Code. VA issued her a COE that same year. R. at 91, 240. She did not subsequently enter into a loan transaction with respect to the COE.
In December 2013, she again requested a determination of eligibility for a loan guaranty. R. at 90. This time, VA notified the appellant that she was not eligible for those benefits. R. at 88-89. It informed her that the 2007 COE had been "issued in error." R. at 87. The appellant notified VA of her disagreement in December 2014. R. at 74-75. VA issued a Statement of the Case in August 2015 continuing to deny home loan guaranty benefits under chapter 37. R. at 84-86.
The appellant perfected her appeal to the Board in September 2015. R. at 54-55. The Board found, in its March 2016 decision, that the veteran had no service-connected disabilities during his lifetime. R. at 4. Nor did he die of a service-connected disability. R. at 3. Additionally, it found that the "[t]he [a]ppellant is not in receipt of [DIC] under 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1310 or 1318." Id. Her entitlement to DIC benefits flowed solely from section 1151. R. at 5-6. Based on these facts, the Board denied the appellant eligibility for VA home loan guaranty benefits. R. at 7. This appeal followed.
The appellant challenges the Board's decision denying her eligibility for home loan guaranty benefits, basing her principal arguments on her reading of certain provisions of title 38 of the U.S. Code. Appellant's Substitute Brief (Br.) at 6-18. As a last resort, she invokes the Court's equitable powers as grounds to reverse the Board's decision. Id. at 19-24. Ultimately, her arguments are not persuasive. We begin by addressing the questions of statutory interpretation and then turn to matters of equity.
Statutory interpretation is a pure question of law that we review de novo. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed Cir. 2018). First, the Court considers a statute's plain language. Frederick v. Shinseki, 684 F.3d 1263, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Using the ordinary tools of statutory construction, the Court determines whether a provision's meaning is clear. Id. In addition, "the plain meaning of any statutory provision must be determined in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, the specific context in which the word or provision at issue is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Hornick v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 50, 52 (2010). Finally, when considering benefits conferred as a result of section 1151, the caselaw suggests that legislative history may often be an important consideration in making this assessment no matter the apparent clarity of the statutory provisions. See, e.g., Alleman v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1368, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (); see also Kilpatrick v. Principi, 327 F.3d 1375, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ().
Our first task is to consider whether Congress bestowed on persons in the appellant's position the home loan guaranty benefits at issue in this appeal. We begin by addressing whether it has done so under section 1151. Next, we assess whether anything in chapter 37 confers the benefit on the appellant. And finally, we explore whether the legislative history concerning these provisions supports the appellant's position.
Turning first to section 1151, that section provides that "[c]ompensation under this chapter [11] and dependency and indemnity compensation under chapter 13 of this title shall be awarded for a qualifying additional disability or a qualifying death of a veteran in the same manner as if such additional disability or death were service-connected." 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a). The keys to section 1151(a) for purposes of this case are its language "in the same manner as if . . . service-connected" and its enumeration of chapters in title 38 for which this "as if" service-connected status applies. Contrary to the appellant's arguments, section 1151(a)'s "as if" language does not redefine "service-connected" to include disabilities and deaths resulting from postservice VA medical treatment; nor does it "accord service-connected status." Alleman, 349 F.3d at 1370-71. Section 1151 beneficiaries may receive compensation under the enumerated chapters as they would if they were service connected, but they are not service connected. See id.; Hornick, 24 Vet.App. at 55 (); Mintz v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 277, 282-83 (1994). "Clearly, a veteran who has been awarded benefits under [section 1151] is not considered to have been awarded service connection for purposes of receiving all ancillary benefits offered for veterans with service-connected disabilities." Alleman v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 253, 256 (2002), aff'd, 349 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Because of this well-settled interpretation, the appellant's arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
As for the enumerated chapters, the text in subsection (a) refers only to chapters 11 and 13. Thus, based on the plain language of subsection (a), Congress has limited section 1151 beneficiaries' entitlement to benefits to these chapters. Mintz, 6 Vet.App. at 282. Unless there is some separate, express congressional action extending other benefits to section 1151 beneficiaries, a person in the appellant's position is limited to benefits under chapters 11 and 13. See Alleman, 349 F.3d at 1371-72. The Court does not assume the inverse, that Congress extended benefits to section 1151 beneficiaries unless it manifests an express intent to exclude them. See id. at 1372.
But there is more to consider in section 1151. Subsection (c) lists two additional chapters, 21 and 39, for purposes of which "[a] qualifying additional disability under this...
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