Burks v. Coastal Ala. Cmty. Coll.
| Decision Date | 19 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION: 1:20-00069-KD-C |
| Parties | LAURA BURKS, Plaintiff, v. COASTAL ALABAMA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This matter is before the Court on Burks' motion to amend her complaint (Doc. 13) with proposed amended complaint (Doc. 13 at 7-23) and Coastal's response (Doc. 15). Also before the Court is Coastal's motion to dismiss (Doc. 5), Burks' response (Doc. 9), and Coastal's reply. (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff Laura Burks (Burks) began working for non-party Faulkner State Community College (Faulkner) in 1993 primarily in the Human Resources office. (Doc. 1 at 3). In the fall of 2016, Faulkner was consolidated with two other community colleges and together these colleges became Defendant Coastal Alabama Community College (Coastal). (Id. at 4). Thereafter, in January 2017, Burks became the Vice President of Human Resources. (Id.). On November 27, 2017, Burks discovered that her only child tragically died. (Id.). Thereafter, Burks experienced medical problems and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id.). Burks sought workplace accommodations as a result. (Id.). Eventually, on November 6, 2018, Burks was terminated.
On February 6, 2020, Burks initiated this discrimination action against Coastal, alleging five (5) counts as follows: Rehabilitation Act discrimination (Count One— 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 794); Rehabilitation Act retaliation (Count Two— 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 794); ADA discrimination (Count Three—42 U.S.C. § 12102); FMLA interference and retaliation (Count Four—29 U.S.C. § 2601); and violations of her Fourteenth and First Amendment rights under Section 1983 (Count Five—42 U.S.C. § 1983). (Doc. 1 at 1-20). On March 5, 2020, in response and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Coastal moved to dismiss Burks' ADA, FMLA and Section 1983 claims against it on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity and for failure to state a claim; and to dismiss Burks' punitive damages demand for Rehabilitation Act violations. (Doc. 5). As grounds, Defendant explains that as an Alabama community college, it is a governmental entity and arm of the State of Alabama, and thus is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
On April 1, 2020, after conducting a hearing on Coastal's partial motion to dismiss, Magistrate Judge Cassady ruled that Burks shall have opportunity to file a motion for leave to amend the Complaint prior to entry of a Report and Recommendation. (Docs. 12, 14). As such, Burks' motion for leave to amend her complaint was filed in response to the Court's instruction for same.1
Burks seeks to amend her complaint to add as new individual Defendants: 1) President Craig Pouncey, in his official capacity as President of Coastal, and in his individual capacity; 2) Patty Hughston, in her official capacity as Interim President of Coastal A, and in her individual capacity; and 3) Keith Brown, in his official capacity as Acting President of Coastal, and in his individual capacity. Specifically, to add claims against these new individual Defendants (Doc. 13 at 7-19 (). Moreover, Burks seeks to amend her complaint to remove her ADA and FMLA claims against Coastal (Counts Three and Four). (Doc. 13 at 1, 4).
In response, Coastal does not oppose the amendment as to Burks' removal of her ADA and FMLA claims (Doc. 15 at 1). However, Coastal opposes Burks' amending the complaint to add new defendants, and to maintain her Section 1983 claims against any defendants.
At the outset, Burks' motion to amend was not filed with Coastal's consent. And Coastal only consents partially, namely to Burks' removal of her ADA and FMLA claims. As to remaining proposed amendments, Coastal claims futility and Rule 12(b)(6) grounds to argue for denial of same.
Leave should be freely given "when justice so requires," except in the presence of countervailing factors such as undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the amendment.See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Bartronics, Inc. v. Power-One, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Therefore, "unless a substantial reason exists to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial[.]" City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1286 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Courts "may consider several factors when deciding whether to grant a motion to amend, including 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive [on the part of the movant], repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment." Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1340-1341 (11th Cir. 2014) ().
The record does not indicate any instance of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive and/or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by prior amendments by Burks. And Coastal does not claim undue prejudice. Coastal contends only that the remaining amendments are futile.
The Court "may deny leave to amend a complaint if it concludes that the proposed amendment would be futile, meaning that the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss." Christman v. Walsh, 416 Fed.Appx. 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2011); Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (); Hatcher v. Alabama Dep't of Human Services, 2018 WL 4151171, *2 (11th Cir. 2018) ()(citations omitted). To reach a decision, the Court must accept "the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Nunez v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2016 WL 1612832, *1 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011) ). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face' and must 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 555 (2007)).
Coastal contends that it is futile to permit Burks to amend her complaint to add individual capacity claims under the Rehabilitation Act against Defendants Pouncey, Hughston and Brown, because as a matter of law these defendants "will not survive a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6)[.]" (Doc. 15 at 1, 3). Per Coastal, "such claims are futile because "the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for individual liability." (Id. at 3). Coastal is correct. The Eleventh Circuit has held that "there is no individual capacity liability under....the ...RA." Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 Fed. Appx. 208, 211 (11th Cir. 2005). See also Buford v. Alabama Dept of Corr., 2020 WL 1901070, *2 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2020) (same). As such, that portion of Burks' motion to amend seeking to add individual capacity claims under the Rehabilitation Act against Pouncey, Hughston and Brown is futile, and is accordingly DENIED.
To the extent Burks also seeks to amend her complaint to assert Rehabilitation Act claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities, such amendment is also due to bedenied as futile. Official capacity suits are suits against the state agencies—not suits against the individuals through whom agencies act. The Eleventh Circuit explained:
The Supreme Court has said that official capacity suits represent "only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," and a victory against a named individual in an official capacity suit is "a victory against the entity that employs him." [Kentucky v.] Graham, [473 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985) ]. Thus, to impose official liability on a government entity amenable to suit, a plaintiff need do no more than name the government entity defendant; it is unnecessary also to name specific agents.
Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1993); Ginwright v. Department of Revenue of Alabama, 2013 WL 1187943, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (citing Hobbs, 999 F.2d at 1530). Because Burks also named Coastal in her Rehabilitation Act claims, the same claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities would be duplicative. Ginwright, 2013 WL 1187943 at *3 (). And see Simpson v. State, 2016 WL 820946, 8 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (citing Ginwright, 2013 WL 1187943, at *3-4) (same). Thus, Burks' motion to amend her complaint to assert Rehabilitation Act claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities are futile and accordingly DENIED.
Pursuant to Section 1983, Burks alleges "defendants"2 violated two provisions of the...
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