Burley v. State, 107

• Decision Date: 20 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 107,107
• Citation: 5 Md.App. 469,248 A.2d 404
• Parties: James Edward Leonard BURLEY, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 469

5 Md.App. 469

248 A.2d 404

James Edward Leonard BURLEY, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 107.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 20, 1968.

Certiorari Denied April 9, 1969.

[248 A.2d 406] Joseph G. Koutz, Baltimore, for appellant.

Donald Needle, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., and Peter G. Ward, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, respectively, on brief for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

THE DETERMINATION OF THE COMPLICITY OF A WITNESS

An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common criminal intent with the principal offender, unites with him in the commission of the crime either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact. Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549. ¹ An accomplice is a competent witness; his testimony is admissible even though he has been found guilty, confessed his guilt or testifies under a promise of immunity. See Kitt v. State, 2 Md.App. 306, 234 A.2d 621. His credibility and the weight to be given his testimony is a matter for the trier of fact as with other witnesses. But '(i)t is a firmly established rule in this State that a person accused of crime may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.' Watson v. State, supra, 208 Md. at 217, 117 A.2d at 552. There must be corroborative evidence supporting the testimony of the accomplice as to some of the material facts, tending to show that the accused was either identified with the perpetrators of the crime or had participated in the commission of the crime itself. Boone v. State, 3 Md.App. 11, 19-20, 237 A.2d 787. It therefore becomes material whether, in a particular case, a witness is an accomplice and, if so, whether there was sufficient corroboration. The generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have been convicted for the offense, either as principal or accessory before the fact. ² 2 Wharton's

                Criminal Evidence (12th Ed. Anderson) § 448, p. 230.  The fact that a witness is an accomplice must be shown by proof, like any other fact, but the burden of proving that a witness is an accomplice is on the defendant who asserts it.  Campbell v. State, 221 Md. 80, 85, 156 A.2d 217; Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 201, 141 A.2d 893, 74 A.L.R.2d 695.  All competent evidence tending to connect the witness with the commission of the crime in such a manner as to constitute him an accomplice is admissible to prove that fact, including the testimony of the accused.  23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 796, pp. 18-19.  In the absence of statutory provisions (there are none in Maryland) it is generally accepted that only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to prove that a witness for the prosecution is an accomplice; it is not necessary to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt to invoke the rule requiring corroboration.  When the evidence relating to whether or not a witness is an accomplice is capable of being determined either way  
                and justifies different inferences in respect thereto, the question is for the determination of the trier of fact and in a jury case should be submitted to the jury with proper instructions.  2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, supra, § 446, pp. 225-226.  See cases cited in 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 796c, p. 20, notes 31-34.  So when a witness connected with the crime committed testifies to facts exculpating him or by his testimony endeavors to show his innocent intention or denies criminal complicity, his relation to the crime becomes a question for the determination of the trier of fact.  3  Therefore, our function on appellate review, when the question is properly before us, is a matter of the sufficiency of the evidence.  In a case tried by the court sitting as a jury, we determine whether the court was clearly wrong in its judgment on the evidence, Md.Rule 1086; in a case tried by a jury, we determine whether the court erred in submitting the evidence to the jury, Md.Rule 755.  Cases in this jurisdiction support what we have said as to the determination of the complicity of a witness and as to our function on appeal.  In Watson v. State, supra, a case tried by the court, where the contention was that the witness was an accomplice and that her testimony was not corroborated, the Court of Appeals, upholding the finding of the lower court, found that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the witness was a principal or accessory before the fact and thus not an accomplice, citing Rule 7(c), now Rule 1086.  4  In Lusby v. State, supra, the Court held that there was no proof that the witness was an accomplice.  It is clear that the rationale of the opinion was that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the participation of the witness in the crime was not voluntary; therefore she could not have been convicted of the offense of which the defendant was charged.  See Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412, 420, 143 A.2d 70.  In Jefferson v. State, 218 Md. 397, 147 A.2d 204, a trial by the court, the Court thought there was evidence that would support a  
                finding that the prosecuting witness was not an accomplice, and held that the verdict was not clearly erroneous.  5  In Campbell v. State, supra, the defendant, convicted by the court, contended on appeal that a witness was an accomplice and that her testimony could not be used to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice who had pleaded guilty to the crime.  The Court noted hat the point had not been raised [248 A.2d 408] below or in brief but was suggested in argument on appeal.  Stating that the burden of proving a witness is an accomplice is on the defendant who asserts it, the Court found that not only did the defendant not attempt to prove that the witness was an accomplice but his testimony and the testimony of the accomplice showed otherwise and it said that the State had never sought to charge her with the crime but specifically conceded she was not a participant.  6  In Harriday v. State, 228 Md. 593, 182 A.2d 40, a court trial, the trial court found on the evidence before it that the sole witness to a larceny was a receiver of the stolen goods and therefore not an accomplice.  The Court of Appeals found that the lower court was clearly erroneous in that the evidence was sufficient to show that the witness aided and abetted in the commission of the larceny and thus came within the definition of accomplice.  7  It reversed the judgment as to one defendant because the conviction was based on the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice 
                but affirmed the judgment as to another defendant because the corpus delicti and his criminal agency were proved independently of the accomplice's testimony.  In Grimes v. State, 4 Md.App. 607, 244 A.2d 456, it was contended that a witness was an accomplice of the defendant in a grand larceny as the evidence showed the witness was in possession of recently stolen goods and the inference ws that he was also the thief.  We rejected the contention on the ground that the witness had an explanation for the possession which the trial court believed.  We said that therefore we must hold that the explanation was reasonable, citing Md.Rule 1086, and as the possession of the recently stolen goods was reasonably explained, there was no inference under the rule.  In Johnson v. State, 4 Md.App. 648, 244 A.2d 632, we found that the jury, from the evidence before it, could properly find that a witness was not an accomplice and therefore his testimony did not have to be corroborated
                

THE INSTANT CASE

The appellant here was convicted of grand larceny by the Criminal Court of Baltimore and sentenced to 3 years. It is not disputed that the corpus delicti of the crime was proved. A large number of articles were stolen from the apartment of Samuel Smith. He reported the theft to his landlord. The next evening his landlord came to the apartment with his nephew Joseph Bell and Bell gave Smith a pair of cuff links and two pair of pants that had been stolen. Bell testified that he had obtained the articles from the appellant, who came up while Bell was sitting in front of his house. The appellant gave Bell the cuff links but indicated he would pick the pants up later. A record player and two sweaters, which had been stolen from Smith, were recovered from Ethel Parker. She testified that on the day of the larceny she was sitting on the front steps of her home 'with a gang of people' when the appellant came down the street 'with a hand full of articles * * * about twenty albums, soap, pants, record player, fan * * * He asked did anybody want to buy anything.' She bought the fan and the record player and also obtained two sweaters for which she was going to pay him later. The police recovered the record player and sweaters from her about five days after the theft. She had given the fan to her sister and the police recovered that item from the sister. There was no evidence as to the amount she had paid for the articles. On cross-examination she said she learned that Smith's apartment had been 'burglarized' the day before the police came. About a week after the theft the police obtained an arrest warrant for the appellant on information received from Bell and Ethel Parker.

The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, denied that he had 'burglarized' Smith's apartment, denied that he had stolen the articles, denied that he gave the cuff links and pants to Bell or that he ever had possession of them and denied that he sold any goods to Ethel Parker. He admitted to prior convictions for larceny and burglary. He knew Bell-'See him, speak to him, keep going about my business.'

The testimony of Bell and Parker was sufficient to show that the appellant was in possession of recently stolen property. The general rule is that the exclusive possession of recently stolen goods, absent a...