Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Co. v. Dey
| Decision Date | 09 February 1891 |
| Citation | 48 N.W. 98,82 Iowa 312 |
| Parties | BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS & NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee, v. PETER A. DEY et al., Railroad Commissioners of Iowa, Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Johnson District Court.--HON. S. H. FAIRALL, Judge.
THIS is an action in chancery to restrain and enjoin the defendants acting as railroad commissioners of the state, from establishing and promulgating joint rates of charges for the transportation of freight and cars over the plaintiff's railroad and other connecting lines. Upon the petition before it was filed, an injunction was allowed, which, after the filing of the petition, the defendants moved to dissolve. The motion was overruled, and from the order to that effect the defendants appeal.
Reversed.
John Y Stone, for appellants: There is no common law requiring joint rates among transportation companies. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Railroad, 110 U.S.; Express Cases in 17 U.S. It is the province of statutes to supply deficiencies and correct the provisions of the common law. No provision is made by which cars are required to be returned to the owner because that matter is left as it was before when one company remitted to another the use of its cars without making a special contract therefor. It is not denied that the legislature may impose regulations as to a single company in the matter of transportation. If the transportation business of the country may be facilitated by requiring the performance of certain joint duties, why should they not be as well required as the performance of single duties? Whatever these connecting companies may do by contract in the matter of facilitating the transportation of goods, they can be required to do by legislative enactment. The act of 1890 does not in the least disturb the common-law status of the companies in cases of joint transportation. It simply proposes to fix a joint rate for all this service and provide a means to divide it equitably among the carriers performing the service. The presumption is that the join rtate thus fixed will be the equivalent of a reasonable compensation to all these carriers for all their joint services, and to each of them for its share of the work. The joint rate law is an amendment to chapter 28, Acts of the Twenty-second General Assembly, where a provision is inserted making the commissioners' schedule prima facie evidence of their reasonableness. It is apparent that in the latter part of section 3 of the joint-rate act a like provision was unmistakably intended to be inserted, making the schedules of joint rates for the transportation of freight and cars prima facie evidence of their reasonableness. If the general assembly failed to make its meaning entirely clear, or even if it left it very obscure, it is no reason why the legislative intent may not be clearly ascertained. All the parts of an act must be given effect if possible. It will be noticed that if the word "that," where it last appears in said section, is held to mean "for," or even "of," the language of the provision becomes reasonably clear. It is perfectly proper and within the rules of construction for this court to make such a modification. State v. Myers, 10 Iowa 448; State v. Bryant, 41 Iowa 593; State v. Smith, 46 Iowa 670; Eisfield v. Kenworthy, 50 Iowa 389; Small v. Railroad, 50 Iowa 338; Oltrogge v. Schutte, 51 Iowa 279; Dilger v. Palmer, 60 Iowa 117; Williams v. Poor, 65 Iowa 410; Glass v. Cedar Rapids, 68 Iowa 2; Crabell v. Coal Co., 68 Iowa 751; Wood v. Farmer, 69 Iowa 533; Stephens v. Davenport, 36 Iowa 372. When a doubtful statute, susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the whole, and the other render inoperative a portion thereof, the former should prevail. Rheim v. Robbins, 20 Iowa 45; Rhodes v. Bank, 52 Iowa 375; Sprout v. Kelly, 37 Iowa 44; District Twp. v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa 262. A cardinal rule of construction is, that courts shall give force to every part of the statute so far as they can consistently do so. Birge v. Railroad, 65 Iowa 440; Burger v. Frakes, 67 Iowa 460. Chicago Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, is not in point. The common-law courts are open to determine the reasonableness of the fixed rates. The purpose of the act on this point is to establish a rule of evidence only, not to change a substantial right. Nothing but the burden of proof is changed, which, it is well settled, it is clearly competent to do.
A. K. Tracy, John C. Bills and A. E. Swisher, for appellee: The first section of chapter 28 of the Acts of the Twenty-second General Assembly is void for that it attempts to regulate commerce between different states, and is, therefore, in violation of section 8, of article 2, of the United States constitution. Sternberg v. Railroad, 7 S.E. 836; State v. Warehouse Commissioners, 41 N.W. 147; Pacific Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 8 F. 10; New Orleans Cotton Ex., 2 Inter-State Com. Rep. 375; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541. Sections 9 and 16 of chapter 28, Acts, Twenty-second General Assembly, are void, in that they attempt to grant to one class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all citizens. The plaintiff is a citizen, and as such it is entitled to the protection of its rights to the same extent as any private individual. Santa Clara Co. v. Railroad, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 99-204; 118 U.S. 396. Under the following authorities this section (which would be applied in the enforcement of the joint rate) is void: Wilder v. Railroad, 38 N.W. 289; Williams v. Railroad, 31 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 555; Moss v. Railroad, 20 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 555. The statute is void for uncertainty in not defining the offenses for which excessive penalties are imposed. Dwarris on Statutes, star p. 652; United States v. Sharp, 1 Peter, C. C. 122; Schooner v. Enterprise, 1 Paine, C. C. 34; Bishop on Statutory Crimes, sec. 41; Lieber, Hermeneutics, p. 157; Ex Parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158; McConville v. Mayor, 39 N. J. (10 Vroom) 38; 13 N.Y. 455; Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 19 F. 79. The punishment provision is an imposition of excessive fines and penalties such as are prohibited by the state constitution and is, therefore, void. Section 16 is void for the reasons: First, that in all actions for the enforcement of joint rates, or other orders of the railway commission, it abolishes the distinction between law and equity jurisdictions; and, second, appellee is, by said section, denied that due process of law guaranteed by the constitution. Clauson v. Lafranz, 4 Greene, 224; Cooley, Con. Law, 376. Under this statute there is no assurance that the other roads will execute the contract, or that appellee will be compensated unless the charge is made in advance, nor is there any provision made for the care of its cars while in the hands of strangers or possible rivals; nor when they are to be returned, nor who is to pay for the delay or damage to them? Cooley on Con. Limitations, 697; Shepperdson v. Railroad, 6 Wis. 578; Walker v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 615; Kentucky Bridge Co. v. Railroad, 37 F. 628; Little Ry. Co. v. Railroad, 41 F. 559. Under these statutes private property is taken for public use without just compensation; the right to protect and defend property as guaranteed by the two constitutions is denied; equal protection of the law is refused and the right of jury trial is violated; greater burdens are imposed on railway companies than on others in the obtainment of justice, and due process of law is denied them under the statute. San Mateo Co. v. Railroad, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 11; People v. Railroad, 44 N.W. 934; Fleming v. Hall, 35 N.W. 684; Santa Clara Co. v. Railroad, 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 195; Pensacola Ry. Co. v. State, 37 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 579. The statute establishes absolute rates, which are final and conclusive as to whether the same are just and reasonable. A court cannot supply omissions in a legislative act. Ripley v. Gifford, 11 Iowa 369; United States v. Railroad, 91 U.S. 85; Tyman v. Walker, 35 Cal. 642; Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 276; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418. The continuance or dissolution of a preliminary writ of injunction rests very much in the sound discretion of the court originally passing upon the question. Walker v. Stone, 70 Iowa 103; Kelley v. Briggs, 58 Iowa 332.
T. S Wright and J. W. Bythe, for appellee: Chapter 17 of the Laws of the Twenty-third General Assembly, and certain provisions of the law of which it is amendatory, are obnoxious to the constitution of the state of Iowa and of the United States. A joint through rate cannot be made by one company which will be binding on another without the latter's consent. Crossan v. Railroad, 149 Mass. 196. There must be, then, an agreement as to a joint through rate before all of the carriers interested in such rate are bound by the rate. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge Co. v. Railroad, 2 Inter-State Commerce Com'n Rep. 191; In re Application of Clark, 3 Inter-State Commerce Com'n Rep. 650; Turner v. Railroad, 3 R. & C. Traffic Cases, 79. The law seeks to compel, first, that two or more companies shall enter involuntarily into contract relations with each other at the demand of a third person; second, that one company shall surrender its cars to the possession of another, or unload the contents without compensation; third, that, at the demand of a third person, companies shall not only part with the possession of their cars, with no provision in the law as to their return or compensation for their use, but shall accept cars of other companies and carry the same over its lines without any provision for compensation. These severe requirements of the statute we hold to be...
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