Burlington Ins. Co. v. Greenwood Rollerdrome, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-00586-RGJ
• Citation: 420 F.Supp.3d 632
• Parties: The BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. GREENWOOD ROLLERDROME, INC., Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

420 F.Supp.3d 632

The BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff

v.GREENWOOD ROLLERDROME, INC., Defendant

Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-00586-RGJ

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, LOUISVILLE DIVISION.

Signed September 30, 2019

As Amended October 2, 2019

Margaret Jane Brannon, Jackson Kelly, PLLC, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff.

James C. Wade, William B. Orberson, Jr., Phillips, Parker, Orberson & Arnett, PLC, Louisville, KY, for Defendant.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ¹

Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. [DE 26]. Briefing is complete. [DE 27; DE 28]. The Court issued a sua sponte order requesting additional briefing on the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. [DE 33]. The parties filed the requested briefs and responses. [DE 34; DE 35; DE 36; DE 37]. The matter is ripe. For the reasons below, the Court will exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain this declaratory judgment, and GRANT Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 26].

I. BACKGROUND

Greenwood Rollerdrome, Inc. ("Greenwood") operated a bingo hall in Louisville. [DE 1 at 1–2, ¶ 3]. Stephanie Walker ("Walker"), a Greenwood patron, filed suit in Jefferson County Circuit Court alleging that Greenwood negligently failed to install and maintain reasonable and necessary safety features in its parking lot (the "Kentucky suit"). [DE 15-3 at 167, ¶ 11]. According to the Complaint, Walker was in the bingo hall parking lot one evening when "an unidentified man approached her and shoved a firearm into her head, forcing her over into the passenger seat as he drove the car away from the parking lot [where he] proceeded to carjack, kidnap, sexually assault, and sodomize [her]." [DE 15-3 at 167, ¶¶ 8–9].

Greenwood held a Commercial General Liability insurance policy (the "Policy") from The Burlington Insurance Company ("TBIC") for the period at issue. [DE 1 at 2, ¶ 6]. Greenwood notified TBIC of the Kentucky suit and TBIC undertook Greenwood's defense under a reservation of rights. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 13–14. TBIC then brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kentucky suit cannot support liability for TBIC under the Policy. Id. at 6, ¶ 24. TBIC moved for summary judgment. [DE 26].

TBIC argues that it need not defend Greenwood under Coverage A ("Bodily Injury") and Coverage B ("Personal and Advertising Injury") because the Policy contained an "Exclusion for Assault, Battery or Other Physical Altercation" (the "Assault and Battery Exclusion"), which precludes liability on TBIC's part. [DE 26-1 at 201–11]. Greenwood, conversely, argues that the Policy covers at least some claims in the Kentucky suit. Greenwood asserts that coverage should not be denied even if the Assault and Battery Exclusion applies, under the doctrines of reasonable expectations and illusory coverage. [DE 27 at 218–22].

Before addressing TBIC's summary judgment motion, the Court must determine whether to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. TBIC moves the Court to retain jurisdiction. [DE 34 at 250]. Greenwood moves the Court to reject it. [DE 35 at 255].

II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).² While the Act authorizes district courts to exercise jurisdiction, it does not mandate or impose a duty to do so. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J & L Lumber Co., Inc. , 373 F.3d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 2004). The Act confers on the "federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants." Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277, 286, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).

This court considers five factors (the " Grand Trunk factors") to determine whether the exercise of Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction is appropriate. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co. v.Consol. Rail Co. , 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must balance the five factors and "[t]he relative weight of the underlying considerations of efficiency, fairness, and federalism will depend on facts of the case." Id. at 563 ; W. World Ins. Co. v. Hoey , 773 F.3d 755, 759 (6th Cir. 2014).

1. Whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy and clarify the legal relations.

The first two Grand Trunk factors assess "(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy" and "(2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue." Grand Trunk , 746 F.2d at 326. Because "it is almost always the case that if a declaratory judgment will settle the controversy, ... it will clarify the legal relations in issue," the inquiries required by these two factors often overlap substantially. United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Cole's Place, Inc. , 936 F.3d 386, 397 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers , 513 F.3d 546, 557 (6th Cir. 2008) ; Bituminous , 373 F.3d at 814 ; and Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. , 327 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) ).

There are two lines of cases in the Sixth Circuit. United Specialty Insurance Company v. Cole's Place, Inc. , 2018 WL 1914731 at *4 (W.D. Ky. April 23, 2018) (citing Flowers , 513 F. 3d at 555 ). "One line of cases approved of declaratory actions because they can ‘settle the insurance coverage controversy,’ while a second line of cases disapproved of declaratory actions because while they ‘might clarify the legal relationship between the insurer and the insured, they do not settle the ultimate controversy.’ " Id. (quoting Flowers , 513 F.3d at 555 ).

The parties agree this matter falls into the first line of cases [DE 34 at 4; DE 35 at 2], that is, "a technical or legal issue is [ ] at the heart of the coverage controversy, and to the extent the facts of the underlying case matter, they are undisputed." Emplrs. Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc. , 2011 WL 2119360, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2011). It is undisputed that the plaintiff in the Kentucky suit was assaulted in the bingo hall parking lot. It is also undisputed that whether assault occurred is not before the state court. Rather, the plaintiff in the Kentucky suit has sued Greenwood for alleged failure to install and maintain reasonable and necessary safety features. Thus, the issue there is whether Greenwood negligently failed to protect the patron plaintiffs, not (as in the present suit), whether some claims in the Kentucky suit arose out of a "carjacking and kidnapping." [DE 15-3 at 167, ¶ 9].

In this action, liability is established under the Personal and Advertising Injury Coverage portion of the Policy because kidnapping is a type of detention. This issue is not present in the Kentucky suit, but only here between the insured and insurer. As a result, this declaratory judgment action will "settle the controversy," as it resolves the dispute between the insurer and insured over who will pay for the state-court litigation. See, e.g. , W. World Ins. Co. v. Hoey , 773 F.3d 755, 760–61 (6th Cir. 2014). The first two factors therefore support jurisdiction.

2. Whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of procedural fencing or to provide an arena for a race for res judicata.

The third factor considers "whether the use of the declaratory judgment action is motivated by ‘procedural fencing’ or [is] likely to create a race for res judicata." Flowers , 513 F.3d at 558. The Sixth Circuit seldom finds procedural fencing if the declaratory-plaintiff filed after the start of litigation in state court. Cole's Place , 936 F.3d at 399. The Kentucky suit was filed on August 17, 2017. [DE 15-3]. This action was filed on September 25, 2017. [DE 1]. "[W]hen the plaintiff has filed his claim after the state court litigation has begun, [the Sixth Circuit] ha[s] generally given the plaintiff ‘the benefit of the doubt that no improper motive fueled the filing of [the] action.’ " Id. (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Bituminous , 373 F.3d at 814 ). This factor supports jurisdiction.

3. Whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction.

The fourth Grand Trunk factor addresses "whether accepting jurisdiction would increase friction between federal and state courts" and is broken into three sub-factors. Flowers , 513 F.3d at 559.

The first sub-part "focuses on whether the state court's resolution of the factual issues in the case is necessary for the district court's resolution of the declaratory judgment action." Flowers , 513 F.3d at 560. As discussed above, any factual determinations the Court may have to make about the Policy's Assault and Battery Exclusion will not overlap with those at issue in the Kentucky suit. The first sub-factor therefore supports jurisdiction.

a. Whether the State Trial Court is in a Better Position to Evaluate Those Factual Issues than is the Federal Court.

The second sub-part examines "which court, federal or state, is in a better position to resolve the issues in the declaratory action." Id. The Sixth Circuit has "found that ‘issues of insurance contract interpretation are questions of state law with which the Kentucky state courts are more familiar and, therefore, better able to resolve.’ " Id. (quoting Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bowling Green Prof. Assoc. , 495 F.3d 266, 273 (6th Cir. 2007) ). The questions that would arise here do not, however, do not involve novel issues of Kentucky law. See Cole's Place , 2018 WL 1914731, at *8.

Determining whether TBIC has an obligation to Greenwood under the Policy requires addressing whether a violent kidnapping by a third-party qualifies as a "[f]alse arrest, detention or imprisonment" under the Personal and Advertising Injury Coverage clause; and, if so, whether the illusory coverage...