Burlington Ins. Co. v. Normandy Gen. Partners, LLC, Case No. 12-60628-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida |
| Writing for the Court | JAMES I. COHN |
| Parties | THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. NORMANDY GENERAL PARTNERS, LLC, as General Partner of NORMANDY VILLAGE HOLDINGS, LLP, SHARKA WEBSTER, ILEDIEU CIREUS, DEUNITHE CIREUS, and STANLEY DERIVAL,Defendants. |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-60628-CIV-COHN/SELTZER |
| Decision Date | 06 May 2013 |
THE BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
NORMANDY GENERAL PARTNERS, LLC, as General Partner
of NORMANDY VILLAGE HOLDINGS, LLP, SHARKA WEBSTER,
ILEDIEU CIREUS, DEUNITHE CIREUS, and STANLEY DERIVAL,Defendants.
Case No. 12-60628-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
DONE AND ORDERED: May 6, 2013
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 35]. The Court has considered the Motion, Defendants Iledieu Cireus, Deunithe Cireus, and Stanley Derival's Response [DE 52], Plaintiff's Reply [DE 57], the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
On August 9, 2009, Defendant Sharka Webster was working for Defendant Normandy General Partners, LLC, as General Partner of Normandy Village Holdings, LLP ("Normandy Village"), as a security guard at the Normandy Village apartment complex in Lauderhill, Broward County, Florida. DE 36 ¶ 1; DE 51 ¶ 2; DE 37-1 at 9. That morning, Defendant Deunithe Cireus was standing outside her apartment waiting for her daughter to be dropped off from church by the bus. DE 36 ¶ 2; DE 39-1 at 10. While Mrs. Cireus was waiting for her daughter, Webster approached her in a rough
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manner and began asking her a number of questions. DE 36 ¶ 2; DE 39-1 at 10-11. At the time, Defendant Stanley Derival, Mrs. Cireus' brother, was inside the apartment. DE 36 ¶ 3. Upon hearing the commotion, he stepped outside and confronted Webster. Id.; DE 40-1 at 8-9. During this exchange, Webster punched Derival in the face, grabbed him by the shirt, and stabbed him in the stomach with a knife. DE 40-1 at 8-13. Defendant Iledieu Cireus, Mrs. Cireus' husband, was approximately 200 feet away from his wife, talking to a friend, when he heard a loud noise coming from his wife's direction. DE 38-1 at 7, 11. Mr. Cireus went over to investigate the situation, but his wife had already gone inside. Id. He asked Webster what was going on, and Webster told him that "Nothing is going on." Id. at 7. Mr. Cireus turned to walk away from Webster, and Webster subsequently stabbed him in the back and punched him repeatedly. Id. at 7,11-14. Both Derival and Mr. Cireus were treated for their wounds at a local hospital and survived the incident. Id. at 14-16; DE 40-1 at 14-18.
On August 2, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Cireus filed suit in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida against Webster and Normandy Village. See DE 52 at 2. In the Amended Complaint in that action [DE 41-1] ("the Cireus Complaint"), they brought the following nine claims: (1) negligence and negligent training, against Normandy Village; (2) negligent supervision, against Normandy Village; (3) 'respondent superior,' against Normandy Village; (4) loss of consortium services, against Normandy Village; (5) negligent failure to provide and/or maintain safe premises, against Normandy Village; (6) breach of statutory duty to provide safe rental premises, against Normandy Village; (7) unconscionable and bad faith conduct, against Normandy Village; (8) assault and battery, against Webster; and (9) loss of consortium
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services, against Webster. DE 41-1 at 1-12; DE 52 at 2. On October 27, 2010, Derival brought suit in a separate action against Webster and Normandy Village in state court. See DE 44-1. The Derival Complaint [DE 44-1] alleges that Webster, while acting within the scope of his employment by Normandy Village, stabbed him multiple times. Id. at 2. It further alleges that Normandy Village knew or should have known of Webster's violent tendencies, and negligently employed him as a security guard. Id. As a result of such negligent employment, Derival alleges he was injured, and seeks damages from Webster and Normandy Village. Id. at 2-3.
Prior to the August 9, 2009 incident, Plaintiff The Burlington Insurance Company issued a commercial general liability insurance policy, Policy No. 535B016308, to Normandy Village, for the policy period running from January 7, 2009 through January 7, 2010. See DE 1-3. That policy requires that Plaintiff defend and indemnify insured parties against any suit seeking damages for bodily injuries or property damages that are covered by the policy. DE 1-3 at 24; DE 45-2 at 3. Plaintiff is currently defending Normandy Village and Webster in the state-court suits under a reservation of rights. DE 1 at 7.
On April 9, 2012, Plaintiff brought this action for declaratory relief to establish that it is not liable under the policy to defend or indemnify Normandy Village or Webster in the Cireus and Derival suits. Both state-court cases have been abated pending the outcome of this case. See DE 52 at 3. In the instant motion, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the grounds that coverage is barred by the policy's Assault, Battery, or Other Physical Altercation Exclusion, and that the claims do not fall within any of the coverage provisions. Defendants oppose the motion.
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court may grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To discharge this burden, the movant must show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. After the movant has met its burden, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party, who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact [the Court may] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).
At the summary judgment stage, the Court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must decide which issues are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.
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This case concerns the scope of Plaintiff's coverage under its insurance policy. "Under Florida law, insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning." Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005). "[I]nsurance contracts are to be construed in a manner that is 'reasonable, practical, sensible, and just.'" U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mikes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2007) aff'd sub nom. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Freedom Vill. of Sun City Ctr., Ltd., 279 F. App'x 879 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Doctors Co. v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 943 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). Moreover, "in construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). "[I]f a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its terms whether it is a basic policy provision or an exclusionary provision." Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) (quotation and citation omitted). However, "[i]nsurance policy provisions excluding or limiting the insurer's liability are construed more strictly than coverage provisions." Doctors Co.,...
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