Burlington Sch. Dist. v. Provost
| Decision Date | 06 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-025,2019-025 |
| Citation | 2019 VT 87 |
| Parties | Burlington School District v. Adam Provost and Seven Days |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
On Appeal from Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division
Joseph A. Farnham and Kevin J. Coyle of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, P.C., Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Craig Weatherly, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant Provost.
Thomas A. Little of Little & Cicchetti, PC, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Da Capo Publishing, Inc. d/b/a Seven Days.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ., and Dooley, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. In this declaratory judgment action, defendant Adam Provost appeals the civil division's determination that plaintiff Burlington School District could disclose, in response to a newspaper's public records request, an unredacted copy of a Resignation Agreement reached by the District and Provost concerning his employment with the District. Provost argues that the civil division: (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the District's request for declaratory relief regarding a matter within the exclusive purview of the Public Records Act (PRA); and (2) erred by granting the District's request for declaratory relief based on its conclusion that Provost had waived any objection to release of the agreement, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the request. We affirm.
¶ 2. By terms of a written agreement, Provost resigned from his employment at the Burlington School District, effective January 2, 2018. In relevant part, the agreement provided that "any action taken by the District to comply with its legal obligations shall not be a violation of this Resignation Agreement," and that if the District believed it was required to release the agreement to the public, the District would notify Provost's attorney. The agreement further stated that the District is a public entity subject to the PRA and that, upon request for the Resignation Agreement, "the District will determine whether it must release the requested document[] under the provisions of applicable law."
¶ 3. On June 18, 2018, a reporter from defendant Seven Days made a PRA request for, among other documents, a copy of any separation agreement between Provost and the District that existed. Within days, the District's attorney informed Provost's attorney of its intent to release the agreement to Seven Days. The two attorneys exchanged emails1 concerning the Seven Days records request, but ultimately the District disagreed with Provost's position that disclosure of an unredacted copy of the agreement would violate both the terms of the agreement and the PRA.
¶ 4. On June 25, 2018, the District commenced the instant declaratory judgment action, naming both Provost and Seven Days as defendants. The complaint, which was submitted underseal along with both unredacted and redacted versions of the Resignation Agreement, summarized the email exchange between the parties' counsel. The complaint set forth the District's position that Provost's proposed redactions were unwarranted under Vermont law and recounted Provost's threat of litigation against the District. The District asked the court to review in camera the unredacted and redacted versions of the agreement and to declare that the agreement should be provided to Seven Days. The District also requested a speedy hearing in furtherance of obtaining a declaratory judgment. See V.R.C.P. 57 ().
¶ 5. In his answer, under the heading "affirmative defenses," Provost argued that: (1) the District failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it did not "plead sufficiently the existence of a justiciable controversy" establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA); (2) the District should be denied its requested relief because its conduct towards, and response to, Seven Days constituted a breach of its contractual obligations to Provost and demonstrated its unclean hands; and (3) the District disregarded its obligations under the PRA to protect Provost's personal documents from disclosure, thereby injuring him. Provost also objected to the District's request for in camera review, contending that the request was premature until the court determined that there was a justiciable controversy, that the PRA did not protect the agreement from disclosure in its entirety, and that in camera review was necessary to determine the scope of any declaratory relief available to the District.
¶ 6. Following a July 31, 2018 status conference with the parties' attorneys, the civil division issued the following order:
Seven Days has until 8/10/18 to file an answer/counterclaim. Adam Provost has until 9/15 to complete discovery, and until 9/28 to file his opposition to disclosure of his "Resignation Agreement" with [the District]. [The District] and Seven Days have until 10/18 to reply to Provost's opposition. The matter will then be under advisement.
On August 9, in compliance with the court's scheduling order, Seven Days filed an amended answer and asserted a counterclaim against the District seeking production of an unredacted copy of the resignation agreement, as well as attorney's fees.2
¶ 7. On October 10, 2018, two weeks after the September 28 deadline for Provost's opposition to disclosure of an unredacted copy of the agreement had come and gone without any filing from Provost, the civil division deemed any objection by Provost waived and authorized release of the Resignation Agreement to Seven Days. Provost filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that he had stated his objections in his answer and that the July 31 scheduling order did not require him to repeat those objections. He asked the court to vacate its October 10 order and "proceed to dispose of this case under the provisions of" the DJA. The civil division denied the motion for reconsideration, noting that Provost's answer had been filed three weeks before the July 31 scheduling order, indicating that the court was expecting Provost to make a legal argument supporting his stated defenses. The court noted, for the record, that it had reviewed the relevant documents in camera before issuing its October 10 ruling. Accordingly, the court dismissed the counterclaim and entered judgment in the District's favor after stating that it had ruled on the merits of the case.
¶ 8. On appeal, Provost argues that the civil division: (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the District's complaint; and (2) erred by entering judgment in favor of the District without addressing the merits of the District's complaint based on its determination that Provost had waived his objections to the complaint. We conclude that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the District could invoke the DJA to seek resolution of the parties'dispute concerning disclosure of the Resignation Agreement. Hence, given Provost's failure to raise specific legal arguments in support of his position that the PRA prohibited disclosure of the agreement, the civil division did not err in entering judgment in favor of the District and allowing disclosure of an unredacted copy of the agreement to Seven Days.
¶ 9. As an initial matter, we emphasize that Provost's "jurisdictional" argument does not concern subject matter jurisdiction but rather challenges the authority of the civil division to adjudicate the District's request for declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case. We have required preservation of challenges such as this that do not concern "the power of a court to hear and determine a general class or category of cases." Lamell Lumber Corp. v. Newstress Int'l., Inc., 2007 VT 83, ¶ 6, 182 Vt. 282, 938 A.2d 1215. That includes challenges concerning whether the court can exercise its authority to adjudicate matters pursuant to specific statutory criteria or the particular circumstances of the case. See State v. Thompson, 2011 VT 98, ¶ 9, 190 Vt. 605, 30 A.3d 671 (mem.) ( that "erroneous exercise of jurisdiction is not the type of fundamental jurisdictional defect that would compel this Court, absent a timely objection on jurisdictional grounds, to vacate any order pursuant to the exercise of that jurisdiction").
¶ 10. Without question, the civil division possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the general type of controversy brought before it in this case. The civil division has "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all original civil actions," apart from exceptions not relevant to this case. 4 V.S.A. § 31(1). Moreover, within that general jurisdiction, the divisions of the superior court have the power under the DJA "to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." 12 V.S.A. § 4711; see also id. § 4713 (). Hence, the civil division "presumptively" had jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action in this case, pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 4711. Negotiations Comm. of Caledonia Cent. Supervisory Union v. Caledonia Cent. Educ. Ass'n, 2018 VT 18, ¶ 10, 206 Vt. 636, 184 A.3d 236 (). In short, Provost was required to preserve, by raising before the civil division, his contention that the court lacked authority under the...
To continue reading
Request your trial