Burlinski v. Top Golf USA Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-cv-06700,19-cv-06700 |
| Parties | THOMAS BURLINSKI and MATTHEW, MILLER, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs, v. TOP GOLF USA INC., TOPGOLF USA SALT CREEK, LLC, and TOPGOLF USA, NAPERVILLE, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas Burlinski and Matthew Miller have brought a proposed class action against their former employer, Topgolf, for violations of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. R. 1-1, Second Am. Compl.1 Burlinski and Miller allege that Topgolf required its employees to track their shifts using a fingerprint-scan system and that Topgolf later disclosed their fingerprint data to a third-party vendor. In October 2019, Topgolf removed the case to federal court, R. 1, Notice of Removal, and then filed a motion to dismiss the claims, R. 19. The next day, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court. R. 21. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to remand is denied in part and granted in part, and the motion to dismiss is denied.
For purposes of these motions, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Topgolf is a company that operates driving range and bar facilities across the country. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Thomas Burlinksi worked as a bartender at Topgolf for a few months in 2017, while Matthew Miller worked in a variety of positions at Topgolf from 2017 through 2019. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Both Burlinksi and Miller were paid by the hour. Id.
During this period, Topgolf required its hourly employees to track their time using a biometric fingerprint-scan system. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Specifically, hourly employees were asked to scan their fingerprints each time they began a shift, stopped to take a break, returned from a break, and finished working a shift. Id. ¶ 5. According to the Plaintiffs, Topgolf's rationale for using a biometric timecard system, as opposed to identification numbers or badges, was to prevent one employee from clocking in for a different employee. Id. ¶ 7.
The Plaintiffs allege that Topgolf, by implementing the biometric time clock system, "captured, collected, and stored" their fingerprint data. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 30. What's more, Topgolf allegedly "disseminated and disclosed" that fingerprint data to a third-party time-keeping vendor. Id. ¶ 31. Burlinski asserts that Topgolf never provided him any written disclosures about the collection, retention, destruction, use, or dissemination of his fingerprint data. Id. ¶ 32. Similarly, Miller claims that Topgolf never provided him written disclosures until nearly two years into his employment. Id. ¶ 33. And disclosure aside, both Burlinski and Miller allegethat Topgolf never obtained their consent before collecting their fingerprints in the first place. Id. ¶ 34.
Based on these allegations, Burlinski and Miller filed suit against Topgolf in Illinois state court, alleging certain violations of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, which has come to be known as BIPA for short. See Second Am. Compl. Specifically, Burlinski and Miller brought claims under three separate sections of BIPA:
In addition, Burlinski and Miller seek to represent a class of Illinois Topgolf employees who were required to scan their fingerprints into the biometric time-clock system. Id. ¶ 35. The proposed class, according to the Plaintiffs, includes more than 40 members. Id. ¶ 37.
In October 2019, Topgolf removed the case to federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Notice of Removal. Specifically, Topgolf alleged that complete diversity exists among the parties2 and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. ¶¶ 6-13. On the amount-in-controversy question, Topgolf calculated that Burlinski and Miller were each alleging five BIPA violations and seeking statutory damages of $5,000 per reckless violation, plus attorney's fees (which totaled $26,000 at the time that the notice was filed). Id. ¶ 14. In other words: 2 plaintiffs x 5 violations per plaintiff x $5,000 per violation = $50,000, and then $50,000 + $26,000 in fees = $76,000. Id.
In addition to the individual claims, Topgolf also argued that, in light of the proposed class action, there was federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Specifically, Topgolf argued that the amount in controversy for the class-action claims exceeds CAFA's $5,000,000 statutory requirement. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 16-19. Here, Topgolf counted 205 potential class members x 5 alleged violations per individual x $5,000 per violation = $5,125,000. Id. ¶ 19. With the addition of attorneys' fees, argues Topgolf, the amount in controversy is well over the CAFA minimum. Id. Shortly after removing the case, Topgolf filed a motion to dismiss all of the BIPA claims. R. 19.
One day later, Burlinski and Miller filed a motion to remand the case to state court. Their main argument is that the amount in controversy requirements have not been met. For one, Plaintiffs argue that Topgolf improperly aggregated the value of the claims of both Burlinski and Miller to reach the $75,000 threshold under 28U.S.C. § 1332(a). Mot. Remand at 1. Moreover, the Plaintiffs argue that the CAFA removal is also deficient because Topgolf included the value of claims for which the proposed class members lack Article III standing. Id.
On the motion to remand, the general rule is that a defendant may remove an action filed in state court to federal court in any case in which the plaintiff could have filed the case in federal court in the first place. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The party seeking removal bears the burden of demonstrating federal jurisdiction, "and federal courts should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum in state court." Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009). Where, as here, defendants invoke diversity jurisdiction, the defendants must demonstrate complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Alternatively, for the proposed class action, defendants must allege minimal diversity and an amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
As for the sufficiency of the complaint, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleanedup).3 The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). "A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
First up is the motion to remand. As mentioned earlier, only the amount-in-controversy requirement is in dispute. Specifically, Topgolf must demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 for purposes of the individual claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and that the amount of controversy exceeds $5,000,000 for purposes of the proposed class action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).Here, the Plaintiffs argue that Topgolf has failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirements for both so-called "traditional" diversity jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction under CAFA. R. 22 at 3. Specifically, they point out that Topgolf has impermissibly aggregated the value of the individual claims for both Burlinski and Miller to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Id. at 4. In addition, on the $5,000,000 CAFA requirement, the Plaintiffs argue that Topgolf incorrectly included the value of claims for which the proposed class members lack Article III standing. Id. at 3.
1. Article III Standing for CAFA Claims
Addressing the class allegations first, the Plaintiffs initially argued that there is no diversity jurisdiction under CAFA because, in reaching the $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy threshold, Topgolf incorrectly included the value of claims for which the proposed class members do not have Article III standing. R. 22 at 3. As a reminder, Topgolf counted five separate BIPA violations for purposes of the amount-in-controversy calculation: one Section 15(a...
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