Burnett v. Springfield Twp.

Decision Date08 July 2014
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION No. 13-1646
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
PartiesRONALD HARRISON BURNETT Plaintiff, v. SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP, et al. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM

L. Felipe Restrepo, J.

Ronald Harrison Burnett brings this discrimination suit against Springfield Township, Springfield Township's town manager, Montgomery County, and various members of the Springfield Township and Montgomery County police departments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986; the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and Pennsylvania tort law. Burnett alleges that the defendants denied him law enforcement protection and redress because of his race and gender. He further alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress by all defendants.

The defendants have moved to dismiss Burnett's First Amended Complaint. For the reasons that follow, I will grant the motion, although I will also grant Burnett leave to amend.

I. FACTS ALLEGED

Taking Burnett's factual allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the relevant events are as follows.

Burnett is of Native American descent, and he resides in Springfield Township, Montgomery County. First Am. Compl. (hereinafter "Compl."), ECF Doc. 2, ¶¶ 6-7, 16, 26, 30. Very few Native Americans live in Montgomery County. Id. ¶ 26. During their interactions with Burnett, some defendants have referred to him as black or African-American. Id. ¶ 29.

On March 13, 2011, Burnett requested assistance from the Springfield Township police department to remove his "hostile and belligerent Caucasian ex-girlfriend" from his residence. Id. ¶ 30. Eight days later, he contacted the Township police again to report that his ex-girlfriend was "skulking around the neighborhood" and possibly stalking him. Id. ¶ 32. The Township police took no action in response to that call. Id. ¶ 33.

On March 28, 2011, Burnett's ex-girlfriend and two other Caucasians allegedly broke into Burnett's home, causing him financial loss in excess of $16,000. Id. ¶¶ 37, 55. Several of Burnett's neighbors witnessed the incident. Id. ¶ 37. On discovering that his home had been burglarized, Burnett immediately contacted the Springfield Township police. Id. ¶ 40. Detective Robert Chiarlanza (identified in the Complaint as "Sean Lanza") was dispatched to the scene, where he investigated, dusted doors for fingerprints, and told Burnett that he would be in touch within a few days. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. On further investigation, Chiarlanza allegedly discovered that one of the perpetrators had admitted to breaking into the home with two other people. Id. ¶ 45. He made no arrests, however. Id. ¶ 49. When Burnett called him on April 7, 2011 to ask why, Chiarlanza informed Burnett that he viewed the matter as a civil dispute, and that Burnett could file a civil complaint or a private criminal complaint against the perpetrators. Id. ¶ 50.

Burnett "was referred to" Montgomery County Detective Richard Peffall (identified in the Complaint as "Rich Peffle"). Id. ¶ 56. Peffall, in turn, informed Burnett that Montgomery County would not prosecute his ex-girlfriend because there were "over 10 domestic complaints" already on file in the county between Burnett and his ex-girlfriend - which, according to Burnett, was not true. Id. ¶ 57. In June of 2011, Burnett submitted "a lengthy written" document to Springfield Township Chief of Police Randall Hummel, clarifying that he was not a "'black male' with a long history of domestic issues with a 'live-in' Caucasian 'girl friend,'" and askingHummel to investigate the "crimes of violence perpetrated against" him. Id. ¶¶ 61-65. Hummel took no action. Id. ¶ 63. In July of 2011, Burnett filed a private criminal complaint with Detective Fred Bailey of Montgomery County, but Bailey "refused to process the complaint." Id. ¶¶ 65-66. Bailey is African-American. Id. ¶ 14.

Throughout this course of events Burnett made "numerous pleas" to Donald Berger, the town manager of Springfield Township, for a more rigorous investigation of the burglary. Id. ¶ 69. Burnett alleges that Berger "always responded in a racially hostile and deliberately indifferent manner." Id. ¶ 69. The only specific example the Complaint offers, however, is that, in an August 12, 2011 email, Berger responded, "I did not find fault with the actions taken by the police, but do appreciate the overall difficult situation." Id. ¶ 71.

In August and September of 2011, Burnett asked two other Montgomery County detectives, Detective Richard Marsh and Detective Stanley G. Kadelski, Jr., to investigate the burglary. Id. ¶¶ 73-76. Both declined. Id. Burnett then wrote to Montgomery County Deputy District Attorney Chris Maloney, asking why his office had refused to process Burnett's private criminal complaint, but received no response. Id. ¶ 82-83.

On September 11, 2011, Burnett attempted to file a private criminal complaint with "Montgomery County Magisterial Office 38-1-08." Id. ¶85. He was rebuffed and directed to a department in the Court of Common Pleas, despite the fact that on an earlier occasion (in July of 2010) the Magisterial Office had prosecuted Burnett himself for disorderly conduct. Id. ¶¶ 85-86. This prior prosecution was initiated after Burnett called the Springfield Township police to his residence to remove his "violent and belligerent Caucasian ex-girlfriend," and was instead arrested himself. Id. ¶¶ 85-86.

Burnett filed this federal lawsuit in March of 2013. His First Amended Complaint contains five counts: (1) race and gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against all defendants); (2) conspiracy to violate equal protection, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985(3) (against all defendants);1 (3) failure to train and supervise in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (against the municipal defendants); (4) failure to intervene to prevent deprivations of equal protection, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1986, 1985(3) and 1983 (against Berger, Hummel and Kadelski); and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against all defendants).

The defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that Burnett has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, as clarified at oral argument and by supplemental briefing, the defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis that Burnett has no standing to assert a constitutional claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-61 (1992) (explaining that standing is jurisdictional).

II. JURISDICTION

As a general matter, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Burnett's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over Burnett's state-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The intentional infliction of emotional distress count is closely related to the other four counts, such that it forms "part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

There is no Article III case or controversy, however, unless Burnett has alleged facts sufficient to show that he has standing to challenge the actions at issue. "[T]he irreducibleconstitutional minimum of standing contains three elements," Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560: (1) The plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" that (2) is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party," and (3) is capable of being redressed by the court. Id. at 560-61 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). An "injury in fact" is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

According to the defendants, Burnett's primary complaint is that they did not adequately investigate and prosecute his ex-girlfriend for the alleged burglary of his home - an omission that is not, itself, a legally cognizable injury to Burnett. As the Supreme Court held in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), "a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution," because no citizen has "a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Id. at 619. Burnett contends that he had at least a right to the investigation of the crime, but he has provided no authority establishing that right, and I have identified none. Cf. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) ("There is no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation."). Finally, Burnett styles the defendants' inaction as a denial of his First Amendment right of access to courts, but has alleged no fact suggesting that he was excluded from an official proceeding to which the right of access applies. See, e.g., Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513-14 (3d Cir. 2013) (surveying case law on the First Amendment right of access). The burglary itself, meanwhile, is clearly an "injury in fact" - but is not "fairly traceable" to the defendants' actions, and is the "result of the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id. at 561.

In truth, however, the injury that Burnett alleges is not merely what he regards as ineffective law enforcement; it is the defendants' (alleged) discrimination against him on the basis of his race and gender. Burnett may have no legally protected interest in police responsiveness, but equal protection does entitle him to receive whatever services the police provide on the same terms as his...

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