Burnett v. Villaneuve
| Decision Date | 30 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 34A02-9610-CV-686,34A02-9610-CV-686 |
| Citation | 685 N.E.2d 1103 |
| Parties | Lori A. BURNETT, Personal Representative of the Estate of David H. Williams, Appellant, v. Concepcion VILLANEUVE; NBD Bank, NA; Chase Manhattan Bank USA; Key Bank USA, NA; Fred Delph, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dorothy I. McKee; Bank of Wolcott & Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland Bank; Margo Tritt, Personal Representative of the Estate of Juanita A. Mahan; Angela K. Martel; Jay Glendenning; Janice Conwell, Personal Representative of the Estate of William E. Lewis; Citicorp Credit Services, MBNA America; and Roger L. Tudor, Personal Representative of the Estate of Marguerite Jane Tudor, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Douglas A. Tate, Davis & Murrell Law Firm, Kokomo, for Appellant Lori A. Burnett, Personal Representative of the Estate of David H. Williams.
Jeffrey M. Miller, Noel & Noel, Kokomo, for Appellee Key Bank National Association.
Janell D. Haney, Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., Cincinnati, for Appellee Key Bank, USA, NA.
Sally A. Sager, Lacey, O'Mahoney, Mahoney, Sager, King & McCann, Kokomo, for Appellee Estate of Dorothy McKee.
Brian L. Oaks, Button Hillis & Oaks, Kokomo, for Appellees Juanita A. Mahan Estate, Angela Martel and Jay Glendenning.
Appellant, Lori A. Burnett (Burnett), in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of David H. Williams (Williams), brings this interlocutory appeal as a result of the trial court's October 2, 1996 order denying Burnett's motion to dismiss the claims of creditors 1 against Williams' estate. We reverse.
The trial court certified the following issues for the purposes of this appeal:
1. If a creditor opens an estate on the last day of the year following the decedent's death with notice given to all known creditors and by publication pursuant to I.C. 29-1-7-7[,] are claims of creditors which are filed more than one year after the date of death of the decedent barred pursuant to I.C. 29-1-14-1[?]
2. Absent fraud or misconduct on the part of the personal representative or her counsel[,] may equity allow the tolling of the time limit set forth in I.C. 29-1-14-1 requiring claims to be filed within one (1) year of the date of death of the decedent[?]
3. If a creditor opens an estate on the last day of the year following the decedent's death[,] does the application of the one (1) year time limit set forth in I.C. 29-1-14-1 violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution[?] Record at 140-41.
The trial court issued findings and conclusions as part of its order of October 2, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The facts are essentially undisputed. Williams was an attorney in Kokomo until his death on June 6, 1995. Prior to his death, Williams prepared a will for Josephine Radiance Ingels (Ingels) naming himself as trustee in December of 1989. The trust was for the benefit of Lori Ingels (Burnett) and Randall George Ingels. Ingels died in February of 1990, and an estate was opened. In May 1990, Williams transferred $140,000.00 of the trust funds into his law office's checking account and transferred $130,000.00 from the office's account into the David Williams trust account. Williams disposed of all of the funds of the Ingels' trust other than as provided for by the terms of the trust. When Williams died, Andy M. Burnett, Burnett's husband, was named successor trustee. 2
Although Williams died on June 6, 1995 and numerous parties had claims against Williams, no one opened an estate for almost a year. 3 On June 6, 1996, Burnett petitioned the court for an order appointing her as personal representative in order to administer Williams' estate. The court granted the petition on the same day. Also on the same day, Andy Burnett filed a claim, as trustee of the Ingels' trust, against the Williams estate. Burnett, as personal representative, provided notice of the administration of the estate to all known claimants pursuant to I.C. 29-1-7-7. She also published a notice of administration in the Kokomo Tribune on June 12, 1996 and June 19, 1996 pursuant to the aforementioned statute. According to the trial court, twelve or more claims were filed against the Williams estate on or after June 7, 1996 totaling over $500,000.00. Burnett denied all of the claims upon the ground that they were filed more than one year after Williams' death and barred pursuant to I.C. 29-1-14-1.
Burnett argues that the Indiana Code bars claims which are filed more than one year after the decedent's death. I.C. 29-1-14-1, reads in relevant part:
Limitations on filing claims.--(a) Except as provided in I.C. 29-1-7-7, all claims against a decedent's estate, other than expenses of administration and claims of the United States, the state, or a subdivision of the state, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees, and legatees of the decedent, unless filed with the court in which such estate is being administered within:
(1) Five (5) months after the date of the first published notice to creditors; or
(2) Three (3) months after the court has revoked probate of a will, ... whichever is later.
....
(d) All claims barrable under subsection (a) shall be barred if not filed within one (1) year after the death of the decedent.
I.C. 29-1-14-1 (Burns Code Ed.Supp.1996).
Because the creditors in this case were known, the personal representative's notice is governed by I.C. 29-1-7-7:
Notice of appointment of personal representative--Creditors to file claims-- Form of notice.--(a) As soon as letters testamentary or of administration ... have been issued, the clerk of the court shall publish notice of the estate administration.
....
(c) The notice required under subsection (a) shall be served by mail on each ... known creditor....
(d) The personal representative ... shall serve notice on each creditor of the decedent:
...
(2) who is known or reasonably ascertainable within three (3) months after the first publication of notice under subsection (a)....
....
(e) Notice under subsection (d) shall be served within three (3) months after the first publication of notice under subsection (a) or as soon as possible after the elapse of three (3) months. If the personal representative ... fails to give notice to a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor of the decedent under subsection (d) within three (3) months after the first publication of notice under subsection (a), the period during which the creditor may submit a claim against the estate includes the period specified under I.C. 29-1-14-1 and an additional period ending two (2) months after the date notice is given to the creditor under subsection (d). However, a claim subject to this subsection may not be filed more than one (1) year after the death of the decedent. 4
....
(i) The notice shall read substantially as follows:
NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATION
....
All persons who have claims against this estate, whether or not now due, must file the claim in the office of the clerk of this court within five (5) months from the date of the first publication of this notice, or within one (1) year after the decedent's death, whichever is earlier, or the claims will be forever barred.
I.C. 29-1-7-7 (Burns Code Ed.Supp.1995).
In its conclusions, the trial court noted that the five month limitation period in I.C. 29-1-14-1(a) and the one year limitation period in I.C. 29-1-14-1(d) seemed to be in conflict. However, we do not perceive such a conflict. The statute leads us to the conclusion Additionally, the last sentence of I.C. 29-1-7-7(e) declares that a claim subject to that subsection may not be filed more than one year after the decedent's death. Further aiding in our interpretation of the statutes is the notice of administration suggested by the legislature. It clearly notes that the creditor will be able to file a claim within five months of notice or within one year of death--whichever is earlier. Henry's Probate Law and Practice also notes that I.C. 29-1-14-1(d) "bars creditors' claims regardless of whether the creditor has received notice of the estate administration." 1B HENRY, THE PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 16, § 1 at 57 (7th ed. Supp.1996).
that a claim must be brought within one year of the decedent's death, yet that time period will be shortened under (a) once the first notice is published. I.C. 29-1-14-1(d) simply notes that all claims barrable under (a) are prohibited if not filed within one year of death. 5
The various claimants argue that the above interpretation of the statutes robs the notice provisions of their value. Appellees (the Juanita Mahan Estate and Angela Martel and Jay Glendenning) eloquently argue that "[t]he rationale for notifying a creditor is to allow him the opportunity to file a claim, not to inform the claimant 'I gottcha' ". Appellee's Brief at 4. While we recognize the appeal of the argument, we are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to provide the claimants with more of an opportunity to file their respective claims. The statute allows for creditors to file claims within one year; however, that one year time limit is abbreviated by the opening of the estate and notice. The notice provisions do not extend the time during which one may file a claim. 6
It may be noted, however, that had Burnett not opened the estate when she did, none of the parties would have been able to present a claim. Any one of the claimants could have opened the estate at any time during the one year period. They had the same ability and information as Burnett, and they simply failed to exercise their rights by filing a claim. Claimants present no argument as to why Burnett's timely actions on her own behalf should relieve them of their failure to submit a timely claim.
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