Burns v. Alcala 8212 1708, No. 73

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: POWELL
• Citation: 95 S.Ct. 1180,43 L.Ed.2d 469,420 U.S. 575
• Parties: Kevin J. BURNS, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Linda ALCALA et al. —1708
• Docket Number: No. 73
• Decision Date: 18 March 1975

420 U.S. 575 95 S.Ct. 1180 43 L.Ed.2d 469 Kevin J. BURNS, etc., et al., Petitioners,

v.

Linda ALCALA et al.

No. 73—1708. Argued Jan. 22, 1975. Decided March 18, 1975.

Syllabus

For the purposes of eligibility for benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, § 406(a) of the Social Security Act defines 'dependent child' as 'a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,' or certain other designated relatives, and (2) who is under the age of 18, or under the age of 21 and a student. Held: The term 'dependent child,' as so defined, does not include unborn children, and hence States receiving federal financial aid under the AFDC program are not required to offer welfare benefits to pregnant women for their unborn children. Pp. 578-586.

(a) Under the axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning absent persuasive reasons to the contrary, and reading the definition of 'dependent child' in its statutory context, it is apparent that Congress used the word 'child' to refer to an individual already born, with an existence separate from its mother. Pp. 580-581.

(b) This conclusion is also supported by the limited purpose of the AFDC program to substitute for the practice of removing needy children from their homes, and to free widowed and divorced mothers from the necessity of working, so that they could remain home to supervise their children, and by the fact that the Social Security Act also provides federal funding for prenatal and postnatal health services to mothers and infants, explicitly designed to reduce infant and maternal mortality, rather than for 'maternity benefits' to support expectant mothers. Pp. 581-584.

(c) The doctrine that accords weight to consistent administrative interpretation of a statute does not apply to a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) regulation allowing States the option of paying AFDC benefits to pregnant women on

Page 576

behalf of unborn children, where HEW says that the regulation is not based on a construction of the term 'dependent child' but on HEW's general authority to make rules for efficient administration of the Act, and where legislative history tends to rebut the claim that Congress by silence has acquiesced in the view that unborn children qualify for AFDC payments. Pp. 584-586.

494 F.2d 743, 8 Cir., reversed and remanded.

Richard C. Turner, Des Moines, Iowa, for petitioners.

Robert Bartels, Iowa City, Iowa, for respondents.

Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this case is whether States receiving federal financial aid under the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) must

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offer welfare benefits to pregnant women for their unborn children. As the case comes to this Court, the issue is solely one of statutory interpretation.

I

Respondents, residents of Iowa, were pregnant at the time they filed this action. Their circumstances were such that their children would be eligible for AFDC benefits upon birth. They applied for welfare assistance but were refused on the ground that they had no 'dependent children' eligible for the AFDC program. Respondents then filed this action against petitioners, Iowa welfare officials. On behalf of themselves and other women similarly situated, respondents contended that the Iowa policy of denying benefits to unborn children conflicted with the federal standard of eligibility under § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a), and resulted in a denial of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. ¹ The District Court certified the class and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. The court held that unborn children are 'dependent children' within the meaning of § 406(a) and that by denying them AFDC benefits Iowa had departed impermissibly from the federal standard of eligibility. The District Court did not reach respondents' constitutional claims. 362 F.Supp. 180 (SD Iowa 1973). The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed. 494 F.2d 743 (1974). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the federal courts that have considered the question.² 419 U.S. 823, 95 S.Ct. 39, 42 L.Ed.2d 47. We

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conclude that the statutory term 'dependent child' does not include unborn children, and we reverse.

II

The Court has held that under § 402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10), federal participation in state AFDC programs is conditioned on the State's offering benefits to all persons who are eligible under federal standards. The State must provide benefits to all individuals who meet the federal definition of 'dependent child' and who are 'needy' under state standards, unless they are excluded or aid is made optional by another provision of the Act. New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421—422, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 2516—2517, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). The definition of 'dependent child' appears in § 406(a) of the Act:

'The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment . . ..' 42 U.S.C. § 606(a).

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The section makes no mention of pregnant women or unborn children as such.

Respondents contend, citing dictionary definitions,³ that the word 'child' can be used to include unborn children. This is enough, they say, to make the statute ambiguous and to justify construing the term 'dependent child' in light of legislative purposes and administrative interpretation.⁴ They argue that both factors support their position in this case. First, paying benefits to needy pregnant women would further the purpose of the AFDC program because it would enable them to safeguard the health of their children through prenatal care and adequate nutrition. Second, for over 30 years the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has offered States an option to claim federal matching funds for AFDC payments to pregnant women.⁵

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A

Several of the courts that have faced this issue have read King, Townsend, and Carleson, supra, to establish a special rule of construction applicable to Social Security Act provisions governing AFDC eligibility. They have held that persons who are arguably included in the federal eligibility standard must be deemed eligible unless the Act or its legislative history clearly exhibits an intent to exclude them from coverage in effect creating a presumption of coverage when the statute is ambiguous. See Carver v. Hooker, 369 F.Supp. 204, 210—215 (NH 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1244 (CA1 1974); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F.Supp. 1343, 1345 (ND Ohio 1973); Green v. Stanton, 364 F.Supp. 123, 125—126 (ND Ind.1973), aff'd sub nom. Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (CA7 1974). But see Mixon v. Keller, 372 F.Supp. 51, 55 (MD Fla.1974). This departure from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation is not supported by the Court's prior decisions. King, Townsend, and Carleson establish only that once the federal standard of eligibility is defined, a participating State may not deny aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a clear indication that Congress meant the coverage to be optional. The method of analysis used to define the federal standard of eligibility is no different from that used in solving any other problem of statutory construction.

Our analysis of the Social Security Act does not support a conclusion that the legislative definition of 'dependent child' includes unborn children. Following the axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons

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to the contrary, Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 390 U.S. 459, 465, 88 S.Ct. 1140, 1144, 20 L.Ed.2d 30 (1968); Minor v. Mechanics Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46, 64, 7 L.Ed. 47 (1828), and reading the definition of 'dependent child' in its statutory context, we conclude that Congress used the word 'child' to refer to an individual already born, with an existence separate from its mother.

As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act made no provision for the needs of the adult taking care of a 'dependent child.' It authorized aid only for the child and offered none to support the mother.⁶ C. 531, § 406, 49 Stat. 629. The Act expressly contemplated that the first eligible child in a family would receive greater benefits than succeeding children, recognizing the lower per capita cost of support in families with more than one child, § 403(a), but the Act included no similar provision recognizing the incremental cost to a pregnant woman of supporting her 'child.' The Act also spoke of children 'living with' designated relatives, § 406(a), and referred to residency requirements dependent on the child's place of birth. At § 402(b). These provisions would apply awkwardly, if at all, to...