Burns v. Alexander

Decision Date04 March 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 10–522.
Citation776 F.Supp.2d 57
PartiesMelissa M. BURNS, Plaintiff,v.Gary D. ALEXANDER, Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, in his official capacity, and Raymond S. Hart, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Frederich E. Liechti, Oakdale, PA, for Plaintiff.Scott A. Bradley, Office of the Attorney General, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORA BARRY FISCHER, District Judge.I. Introduction

This action involves a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) [23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6301 et seq.]. Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), subsections (1) 1 and (6).2 Docket No. 20. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Background 3

Plaintiff Melissa M. Burns (Burns) is an adult individual residing in North Fayette Township, Pennsylvania. Docket No. 17 at ¶ 1. She is the owner and operator of the Helping Hands Childcare and Learning Center (“Helping Hands”), which is a child-care facility located in Imperial, Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 2. Helping Hands earned a three-star rating from Pennsylvania's Keystone STARS program prior to the events in question.4 Id. To achieve such a rating, a facility must satisfy criteria exceeding the normal licensing requirements for all such facilities operating in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 42. As a three-star facility, Helping Hands received grants to sustain additional educational programs. Id.

Defendant Gary D. Alexander (the Secretary) is Pennsylvania's Acting Secretary of Public Welfare.5 Id. at ¶ 3. At all times relevant to this case, Defendant Raymond S. Hart (Hart) was employed by Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”) as a Regional Program Representative. Id. at ¶ 4. He worked out of the Western Regional Children, Youth and Families Office, which is located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Id.

The CPSL requires certain individuals to report known cases of child abuse to the DPW or the appropriate county agencies.6 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6311(a)- (b). In addition to those statutorily required to furnish such reports to the appropriate authorities, “any person may make such a report if that person has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is an abused child.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312. A report submitted by an individual having a statutory duty of disclosure “shall be made immediately by telephone and in writing within 48 hours after the oral report.” 7 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6313(a). Pursuant to the terms of the CPSL, the DPW maintains both a “Statewide central register” consisting of “founded and indicated reports” of child abuse and “a single Statewide toll-free telephone number that all persons, whether mandated by law or not, may use to report cases of suspected child abuse.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6331(2), 6332(a).

After receiving a “report of suspected child abuse,” a county agency must “commence an appropriate investigation” and meet with the child alleged to have been abused within 24 hours. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6368(a). Before interviewing the alleged perpetrator of the abuse, the county agency is required to orally notify the accused individual of both the existence of the report and the rights that he or she enjoys under the CPSL. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6368(a). After providing such oral notice, the county agency has 72 hours to supply the alleged perpetrator with a written notice containing the same information. Id.

Once a “report of suspected child abuse” has been received, a county agency must determine within 60 days whether to classify the report as a “founded report,” an “indicated report,” or an “unfounded report.” 8 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6368(c). A report constitutes a “founded report” where there has been a “judicial adjudication based on a finding that a child who is a subject of the report has been abused, including the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or a finding of guilt to a criminal charge involving the same factual circumstances involved in the allegation of child abuse.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6303(a). A report constitutes an “indicated report” if an investigation by the DPW or a county agency reveals that “substantial evidence of the alleged abuse exists” based on [a]vailable medical evidence,” [t]he child protective service investigation,” or [a]n admission of the acts of abuse by the perpetrator.” Id. “Substantial evidence” is defined as [e]vidence which outweighs inconsistent evidence and which a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Where a report of suspected child abuse is neither a “founded report” nor an “indicated report,” it is automatically classified as an “unfounded report.” Id. The failure of a county agency to make a finding within the statutory 60–day period results in a determination that the relevant report is “unfounded.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6337(b).

When it receives “a complaint of suspected child abuse,” the DPW is required to “maintain a record of the complaint ... in the pending complaint file.” 23 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 6334(c). The CPSL provides that [w]hen a report of suspected child abuse ... is determined by the appropriate county agency to be a founded report or an indicated report, the information concerning that report ... shall be expunged immediately from the pending complaint file, and an appropriate entry shall be made in the Statewide central register.” 23 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 6338(a). Notice of such a determination must be given to the perpetrator of the abuse. Id. This notice must inform the individual that his or her “ability to obtain employment in a child-care facility or program ... may be adversely affected by [the] entry of the report in the Statewide central register.” Id.

“Any person named as a perpetrator ... in an indicated report of child abuse may, within 45 days of being notified of the status of the report,” request that the Secretary “amend or expunge” the report on the ground that it is “inaccurate.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6341(a)(2). If the request is granted, the county agency may file an administrative appeal within 45 days. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6341(b). If the Secretary either denies the request or fails to act on it within 30 days, the alleged perpetrator has 45 days from the date of the letter denying the request to demand a hearing. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6341(c). At such a hearing, the “appropriate county agency” bears the burden of proving that “substantial evidence of the abuse exists.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6303(a), 6341(c). In any case in which a report of child abuse is initially found to be an “indicated report,” the statutorily-required notice of the determination must inform the individual of his or her right to appeal the determination “within 45 days after being notified of the status of the report,” and of his or her “right to a hearing if the [appeal] is denied.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6338(a).

An administrator of a “child-care service” must require each prospective employee to submit a “certification” from the DPW revealing whether he or she has been “named in the central register as the perpetrator of a founded report of child abuse,” or as the perpetrator of an “indicated report of child abuse,” within the preceding year. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6344(b)(2). An applicant who is “named in the central register as the perpetrator of a founded report of child abuse committed within the five-year period immediately preceding verification” may not be hired. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6344(c)(1). As the owner and operator of Helping Hands, Burns was required to comply with this statutory mandate. Docket No. 17 at ¶ 44; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6344(e), (f).

In May 2008, Helping Hands began to provide daily child-care and educational services to a three-year-old girl named “DM” and her five-year-old sister. 9 Id. at ¶ 46. Both of the girls had been placed in therapeutic foster care and were under the supervision of a foster family. Id. at ¶ 47. DM was known to be suffering from socialization problems and elevated levels of lead in her blood. Id. at ¶¶ 48–49.

At approximately 9:15 A.M. on November 17, 2008, DM and her sister were transported to Helping Hands by their foster father. Id. at ¶ 50. Fifteen minutes later, DM began to complain of pain in her arm. Id. at ¶ 51. These complaints persisted for over an hour. Id. Burns unsuccessfully tried to contact DM's foster father at 10:30 A.M. Id. Shortly thereafter, DM started to engage in aggressive behavior. Id. at ¶ 52. She began to throw toys and fight with other children. Id. Burns responded by escorting DM into the facility's kitchen and lifting her into a high chair. Id. at ¶ 55. A 30–foot wall separated the kitchen from the area in which DM had been playing, making it impossible for the other children to view Burns' interactions with DM. Id. at ¶ 54. DM did not cry or otherwise indicate that she was in distress. Id. at ¶ 55. She was not within the view of her sister, who was roughly 40 to 50 feet away. Id. at ¶ 57. DM was subsequently taken out of the high chair and allowed to resume her interactions with the other children. Id. at ¶ 58. At 11:30 A.M., DM's foster father telephoned Helping Hands personnel and informed them that he would check her arm when he arrived to take her sister to a kindergarten class. Id. at ¶ 59. He arrived at Helping Hands 45 minutes later, at which point DM began to cry because of her inability to put on a coat. Id. at ¶ 60. DM's foster father became agitated and tried to force her arm into the sleeve of the coat. Id. at ¶ 61. DM continued to cry. Id. Burns suggested that DM be permitted to stay at the facility longer in order to take a nap. Id. DM's foster father agreed to this arrangement and left the facility with DM's sister. Id. He later returned to pick DM...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • Diamond v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • July 8, 2019
    ...that Commonwealth Defendants have enforced or continue to enforce Section 575 in an unconstitutional manner. See Burns v. Alexander, 776 F. Supp. 2d 57, 74 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (describing ongoing violations of federal law as "the continued enforcement of statutory provisions alleged to be uncon......
  • KM Enters., Inc. v. McDonald
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • September 25, 2012
    ...because the plaintiffs were not seeking to "enjoin the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute"). Cf. Burns v. Alexander, 776 F. Supp. 2d 57, 74 (W.D. Pa.2011) (determining that the amended complaint did state an ongoing violation of federal law because "[a]s the language in Yo......
  • Ameriprise Bank, FSB v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • November 26, 2012
    ...the defendant; and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a decision rendered in his or her favor." Burns v. Alexander, 776 F.Supp.2d 57, 74 (W.D.Pa. 2011), citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). PNC argues that A......
  • PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • October 9, 2012
    ...by private individuals unless it has consented to such suits either expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’ ” Burns v. Alexander, 776 F.Supp.2d 57, 72 (W.D.Pa.2011), quoting Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578. The States' act of ratifying the Constitution did not constitute a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT