Burns v. Campbell

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Burns v. Campbell, 131 Fla. 630, 180 So. 46 (Fla. 1938)
• Decision Date: 03 March 1938
• Parties: BURNS et al. v. CAMPBELL.

180 So. 46

131 Fla. 630

BURNS et al. v. CAMPBELL.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

March 3, 1938

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1938.

Suit to foreclose lien of tax certificates by Minerva Campbell, a widow, against Vernona Burns and others. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Sarasota County; W T. Harrison, judge.

COUNSEL

John B Singeltary and Singeltary, Kirk & Cornwell, all of Bradenton for appellants.

Charles M. Williams and Paul C. Albritton, both of Sarasota, for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before the court on an appeal from final decree entered by Hon. W. T. Harrison, judge of the circuit court of Sarasota county, Fla., on September 1, 1936. The decree appealed from was in behalf of the plaintiff below based upon tax certificates numbered 1783, 1956, 909, and 7866, in which the court held that there was due the sum of $2,782.15 as principal, and an additional sum of interest, attorney's fees, and costs of foreclosure. A second lien for special assessment on the same property was decreed in behalf of the City of Sarasota. Twelve different assignments based on the final decree are argued here for reversal. This case is here for the second time. See Burns et ux. v Campbell, 120 Fla. 60, 162 So. 155.

It is contended that the land as described in the certificates, supra, is insufficient in law to support a decree, and it is as follows:

'Unplatted portion South and adjoining Lots 2 and 4, Block 1-B, Plat of Sarasota, Section 19, Township 36 South, Range 18 East.'

The controlling rule about description of land is, if the description of the land conveyed is such that a surveyor, by applying the rules of surveying, can locate the same, such description is sufficient, and the deed will be sustained if it is possible from the whole description to ascertain and identify the land intended to be conveyed. See Walker v. Lee, 51 Fla. 360, 40 So. 881; Maynard v. Miller, Fla., 182 So. 220; Ansley v. Graham, 73 Fla. 388, 74 So. 505; Day v. Benesh, 104 Fla. 58, 139 So. 448.

The plaintiff below offered Richard M. Cantey, a registered engineer, who identified the property, and stated that he had surveyed the property two or three times. 'Q. Can you definitely state that the property described therein can be definitely and certainly located? A. Certainly. This little point is all of the land unplatted in the original plat of Sarasota South of Lots 2 and 4, Block 1-B.' The witness identified a map which was offered in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. J. Paul Gaines, a civil engineer, was offered as a witness, and testified that he was acquainted with the lands in question and that as tax assessor of said county he prepared the description as contained in the certificates, supra.

'Q. Mr. Gaines, as a civil engineer with thirty-five years of experience, would you say that a surveyor or engineer would have any difficulty in locating the property described in these certificates? A. I see no reason why he would.

'Q. Would the surveyor or engineer have to use other than the ordinary rules of surveying? A. I would say it could be done without using other than the ordinary rules of surveying.'

There was no evidence offered on the part of the defendants to the effect that the lands could not be located from the description appearing in the tax certificates. The court below held that the description as a matter of law was sufficient. We think there is ample evidence to sustain the findings of the court below. See Helland v. Evans, 113 Fla. 839, 152 So. 623, when this court said:

'The case presents a question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the chancellor's findings. A rule which this court has observed from its earliest history is that a chancellor's finding and conclusion on facts will not be disturbed unless the evidence shows clearly that such finding and conclusions are erroneous. See Waterman v. Higgins, 28 Fla. 660, 10 So. 97; Fuller v. Fuller, 23 Fla. 236, 2 So. 426; Lewter v. Price, 25 Fla. 574, 6 So. 439; Bothamly v. Queal, 58 Fla. 396, 50 So. 415; Viser v. Willard, 60 Fla. 395, 53 So. 501; Theisen v. Whiddon, 60 Fla. 372, 53 So. 642; Bank of Jasper v. Tuten, 62 Fla. 423, 57 So. 238; Dixon Lumber Co. v. Jennings, 63 Fla. 405, 57 So. 615; Terra Ceia Estates v. Taylor, 68 Fla. 261, 67 So. 169; McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479, 71 So. 836; Farrell v. Forest Inv. Co., 73 Fla. 191, 74 So. 216, 1 A.L.R. 25; Hill v. Beacham, 79 Fla. 430, 85 So. 147; Sandlin v. Hunter Co., 70 Fla. 514, 70 So. 553; Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla. 324, 76 So. 897; Edney v. Stinson, 90 Fla. 335, 105 So. 821.

'Where the evidence is conflicting, the finding of the chancellor will not be disturbed unless such finding is clearly shown to be erroneous, is a mere corollary to the rule announced above, because the chancellor must consider the evidence, weigh its probative value, and determine from the spoken words of the witnesses and such documents as are offered in evidence the truth of the given proposition under consideration by him. If the finding which he makes from the conflicting statements of witnesses is to be disturbed, it must be because the evidence considered in its...