Burns v. CHICAGO, M., ST. P. & PR CO.
Decision Date | 05 February 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 6320.,6320. |
Citation | 100 F. Supp. 405 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Parties | BURNS et al. v. CHICAGO, M., ST. P. & P. R. CO. |
Clay C. Rogers, Lyman Field, Reed O. Gentry and Jack B. Robertson, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.
Robert L. Hecker, William M. Symon, Jr., Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
On motion of defendant for summary judgment, premised on the ground that the freight claim loss here sued on is barred by the provisions of Section 20(11), Title 49 U.S.C.A., and by the terms of the bill of lading applicable to the shipment of certain live stock from Two Dot, Montana, to Clearing Stock Yards, Illinois, on October 4, 1947, the following undisputed facts appear of record herein. After arrival of such live stock at Clearing Stock Yards, plaintiffs, on October 17, 1947, made claim against defendant, through their duly authorized agent, Chicago Live Stock Exchange, for damages occurring thereto, in the sum of $3,128.97. After consideration of said claim, defendant, acting through its Freight Claim Agent, on December 1, 1947, sent the following letter to the Chicago Live Stock Exchange:
December 23, 1947, the Chicago Live Stock Exchange acknowledged receipt of the above letter, as follows:
The "Uniform Live Stock Contract" relating to the shipment in question contains the following provisions:
In April of 1948, counsel for plaintiffs opened correspondence with defendant's Freight Claim Agent, informing defendant they had been "instructed to institute suit (on plaintiffs' claim) but before doing so, (they) would be pleased to discuss (the) matter with a representative of defendant in an attempt to avoid needless litigation." Thereafter, a conference was held between said counsel and a representative of defendant. August 6, 1948, defendant's Freight Claim Agent sent the following letter to said counsel:
Subsequent to the writing of the lastmentioned letter, and prior to December, 1949, several other conferences were held, and further correspondence passed between counsel for plaintiffs and the Freight Claim Agent of defendant, looking to a compromise of said claim. January 10, 1949, counsel for plaintiffs had a telephone conversation with defendant's Freight Claim Agent, after which the latter wired said counsel: "Re Burns claim necessary to handle law department will advise further as soon as possible." March 2, 1950, defendant's law department informed plaintiffs' counsel that in light of the fact that on December 1, 1947, it had "allowed (plaintiffs') claim in the sum of $450.00 and the balance was disallowed without any equivocation," they were of the opinion that the period of limitation having run so as to then bar plaintiffs' claim, defendant was powerless to make any settlement of said claim because of the mandate of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 3, etc. Thereafter, complaint was filed herein on March 31, 1950, seeking recovery against defendant on the above-referred-to claim.
The matter to be resolved under the foregoing state of facts is whether the limitation period within which suit could be brought on the instant freight claim began to run as of December 1, 1947, or from August 6, 1948, in light of the written notices so given and the provisions of Section 20(11), Title 49 U.S.C.A., and the above-set-forth terms of the "Uniform Live Stock Contract," controlling the shipment in question. If the earlier date governs then the claim here sued on was barred at the time of the filing of the complaint herein. If the latter, then plaintiffs may maintain this action. To avoid the consequences of the running of the limitation period herein, plaintiffs contend that the letter of December 1, 1947, stating as it does that defendant considered "the amount due on the claim something like $450.00," and that "the balance of the loss being respectfully disallowed," was not tantamount to a final declination of the claim plaintiffs made against defendant, under the above-referred-to statute and contract, so as to satisfy the requirement of notice thereof as therein provided and commence the running of said limitation period. Plaintiffs further assert that use by defendant of the term "loss" instead of the word "claim" in said letter also makes manifest that the defendant did not intend said letter to be a final declination of its claim.
The parties are in agreement that under the provisions of Section 20(11), Title 49 U.S.C.A., and the terms of the Uniform Live Stock Contract, su...
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