Burns v. Dep't of Pub. Safety

Decision Date27 September 2013
Docket NumberCiv. No. 3:10CV02053(AWT).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesChristopher BURNS, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Steven Fields, Christopher Guari, John Turner, and Frank Griffin, Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Todd D. Steigman, William G. Madsen, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Antoria D. Howard, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALVIN W. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Christopher Burns (Burns) has asserted claims against the Connecticut Departmentof Public Safety (DPS),1 Steven Fields (Fields), Christopher Guari (Guari), John Turner (Turner), and Frank Griffin (Griffin) for violations of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–51q (Count One); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a–60(a)(11) (Count Two); and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a–51 et seq. (“CFEPA”) (Count Three). He has also asserted a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants Fields, Guari, Turner, and Griffin for violation of his First Amendment Rights (Count Four). The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is being denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Burns is employed by DPS as a detective. He has been employed by DPS since 2001, and has been assigned to the Eastern District Major Crime Unit (“EDMC”) since 2006. In June 2006, Burns was assigned to EDMC Troop C, which is located in Tolland, Connecticut, where Burns resides. From December 2006 to January 2008, Troop C lacked a sergeant to supervise the detectives, although Troop C detectives could contact sergeants in other troops for emergencies.

At times relevant to the complaint, Fields, Guari, Turner, and Griffin were also employed by DPS. Fields was employed as a lieutenant colonel prior to his retirement; Guari was employed as a sergeant at Troop C; Turner was employed as a sergeant with DPS's van unit; and Griffin was employed as a major at the Eastern District Headquarters.

In the summer of 2008, DPS requested DNA samples from some employees. In November 2008, David Rice, a lieutenant at DPS, issued a memorandum indicating that, at that time, DPS was continuing its efforts to collect DNA samples from members of Major Crime Units. DPS has no written policies concerning the collection, storage, retention, and/or testing of DNA submitted by DPS employees.

The Connecticut State Police Union issued a memorandum to its members, dated January 15, 2009 regarding DNA collection. The memorandum stated that DPS “has begun asking members to submit to a DNA sample” and that the Union's position was that its members “not volunteer to provide a DNA sample to the agency.” (Memorandum from Steven Rief, President, Connecticut State Police Union, to All Union Members (Jan. 15, 2009), attached as Defts.' Ex. 14.) Burns was aware of this memorandum.

Later in January 2009, DPS employees made several statements to Troop C detectives regarding collection of DPS detectives' DNA. On or around January 27, 2009, following a digital photography class, a representative of DPS's Forensic Science Lab gave a presentation to Troop C detectives regarding the collection of DNA samples. At that meeting, Fields made a statement regarding DNA contamination at crime scenes. On January 28, 2009, Guari met with Troop C detectives, and told them he thought that, in the future, assignments to crime scenes would be determined by whether DNA samples had been submitted for contamination elimination purposes.

On January 28, 2009, Burns had several conversations regarding his concerns about the collection of DNA samples by DPS. First, Burns spoke with two other DPS detectives—Tanya Morin (“Morin”) and Mark Devine (“Devine”). Burns expressed the opinions that, while he understood the reason the agency needed the DNA samples, he felt that a written policy should be in place regarding the collection, storage, disposal, and testing of DNA; that DPS should be working with the union to develop that policy; and that DNA collection would likely eventually be expanded to include first responders at crime scenes. Devine discussed the DNA collection issue with members of Troop K, and Guari learned that he had done so.

Second, Burns contacted Detective Deslandes (“Deslandes”), his union steward. Burns told Deslandes “that there were efforts being made within the Eastern district to collect [their] DNA” and “that [at] the digital photography class the previous day ... Major Fields had stated ... if [detectives] didn't submit [their] DNA, [they] may not be allowed at crime scenes.” (Burns Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 79.) Burns also told Deslandes that he opposed DPS's DNA collection efforts “as the Union itself had opposed such collection” in the January 15 memorandum. (Pl.'s Responses and/or Objections to Defts.' Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 7, attached as Ex. P to Burns Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A.)

Third, Burns spoke with Guari regarding the collection of DPS detectives' DNA. Sometime after Burns spoke with Deslandes, Guari called Burns into Guari's office. Guari had learned that Burns had spoken with someone at the union, and Burns confirmed to Guari that Burns had spoken with Deslandes. Guari told Burns that Fields had heard that Guari was saying that people who had not provided DNA would not be allowed at crime scenes. Burns told Guari that he was concerned about DPS collecting DNA samples from detectives. In particular, Burns told Guari that he “was concerned about the lack of a policy” regarding storage of DNA samples and the possibility that they were going to start collecting more samples after the patrol troopers.” (Burns Dep., Pl.'s Ex. A, at 148.) Guari was angry with Burns and ordered Burns to “un-fuck the situation.” (L.R. 56(a) Stmts. ¶ 35.) Burns never directly told Fields, Griffin, or Turner about his concerns regarding DNA collection.

The parties dispute why Guari was angry. Burns contends that Guari was angry that Burns had gone to the union about the collection of DNA samples. The defendants contend that Guari was angry because he assumed Burns had told the union that DPS detectives would not be allowed to process crime scenes unless they had submitted a DNA sample. Guari testified that he “was disappointed that what was stated to the union was that no one would be able to process a crime scene unless they submitted to DNA sampling. And that was a false statement.” (Guari Dep., Pl.'s Ex. B, at 51.)

Following the conversation with Guari, Burns spoke again to Deslandes. Burns told Deslandes that he had “felt compelled to tell Sergeant Guari that ... [he] had gone to the union,” that Guari was angry, and that “using [the] union steward now had adverse consequences for” Burns. (Burns Dep., Pl's Ex. A, at 82.) 2

Following these conversations, the defendants took steps that Burns contends were in retaliation for his speech regarding the DNA collection. Guari wrote Turner (in Turner's role as an Executive Officerof EDMC) a memorandum, dated February 16, 2009, complaining about Burns. In the memorandum, Guari indicated that he was unable to reach Burns by phone on February 6, 2009 and that Burns did not follow proper procedures in attempting to swap work days on February 13, 2009. Burns contends that Guari's reaction to those two situations was driven by retaliatory animus. In addition to those two situations, the memorandum addressed Burns's demeanor, failure to follow directions from Guari, sub-par performance in investigations in 2008, and filing of late reports.

On or about February 17, 2009, Turner contacted Burns and told Burns to report to the Eastern District Headquarters. Throughout the day, Burns met with Turner, Fields, Griffin, and Guari in various groupings. Prior to and between the meetings with Burns present, Turner, Fields, Griffin, and Guari held discussions regarding Burns. It is not clear based on the present record whether they discussed Burns's opposition to DNA collection at these meetings. At the final meeting with Burns, Fields gave Burns an ultimatum: (a) transfer out of the Major Crime Unit and return to working on the road or (b) stay in the Major Crime Unit and have an Internal Affairs (“IA”) investigation initiated against him.

Burns decided to stay in the Major Crime Unit. He was reassigned to Troop D, which is further from his residence than Troop C.

On February 24, 2009, Guari filed an IA complaint against Burns. The complaint, which attached Guari's memo to Turner, was based on allegations of insubordination towards Guari, performance issues, and being unreachable while off-duty.

On April 6, 2009, Burns received an annual Performance Evaluation Report from Guari. The Performance Evaluation Report gave Burns an overall evaluation of “needs improvement.” (Guari Dep. Ex. 8.) Burns filed a grievance with respect to the Performance Evaluation Report. Burns won the grievance and Guari changed the overall evaluation to “satisfactory.” (Guari Dep. 110, Ex. 8.)

On June 1, 2009, an IA Investigation Report was issued. The IA Investigative Report recommended not sustaining the complaint relating to insubordination. The Report did, however, recommend sustaining the complaint relating to Burns's not being reachable when off-duty, display of demeanor, and failure to perform duties. Burns contends that the IA investigation conclusions, as well as Guari's memorandum to Turner, included material misrepresentations and conclusions not supported by the evidence. On June 8, 2010, a disciplinary hearing was held. Following the hearing, Burns was sent a letter of reprimand as discipline. The letter of reprimand indicates that it was to be placed in Burns's personnel file for 18 months following the completion of the IA investigation, i.e., that it was to be removed by December 9, 2010. Burns contends that, because of the actions taken by the...

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    ...that the Court's function on summary judgment is confined to “issue-finding” not “issue-resolution[.]” Burns v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 973 F.Supp.2d 141, 148 (D.Conn.2013). But, as just discussed, before it need “discern [ ] whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried[,......

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