Burns v. Dilley County Line Independent School Dist.

Decision Date04 June 1927
Docket Number(No. 791-4792.)
Citation295 S.W. 1091
PartiesBURNS v. DILLEY COUNTY LINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Action by Thomas E. Burns against the Dilley County Line Independent School District and others. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals (290 S. W. 279), and plaintiff brings error. Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and that of district court affirmed.

Denman, Franklin & Denman, of San Antonio, for plaintiff in error.

Jno. L. Pranglin, of Pearsall, and U. S. Algee and J. D. Dodson, both of San Antonio, for defendants in error.

SHORT, J.

The plaintiff in error, as plaintiff, brought this suit in the district court of Frio county against the defendants in error, as defendants, praying for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from levying and collecting certain taxes from him as owner of certain property claimed to be liable for taxes in the so-called Dilley county line independent school district, operating under a special act of the Legislature, entitled chapter 214, House Bill 663 of the Special Laws of the Thirty-Ninth Legislature, and also to restrain defendants from the issuing and selling of certain bonds.

Upon a trial of the case, the district court perpetuated the injunction, holding the attempted levy and collection of the taxes to be illegal as well as the threatened issuance and sale of the bonds. Upon an appeal from that judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals at San Antonio, that court reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered the case in favor of the defendants in error. 290 S. W. 279.

The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals states the facts in the case very fully, in consequence of which it will not be necessary for us to make an extensive statement of the case. The special act of the Legislature, purporting to create the independent school district by virtue of which the defendants assert the right to levy and collect the taxes against the plaintiff in error and to issue and sell the bonds, embraces all of common school district No. 13, duly organized on the 14th day of February, 1906, and also additional territory. The plaintiff in error has property located in the original boundaries of common school district No. 13, and also has property located in the territory outside of common school district No. 13, but within the boundaries of the territory embraced in the new district sought to be created by the special act.

At the time of the passage of the special law, common school district No. 13 had a bonded indebtedness maturing in the future of $10,000 and other indebtedness amounting to $500. This common school district No. 13 had also duly authorized the levy and collection of a tax of 90 cents on the $100 valuation of property; 15 cents of which was to provide for the interest on the bonds and a sinking fund to pay the principal, and the remaining 75 cents was to provide a maintenance fund for the school of that district, but it had no actual fund on hand available for the discharge of its future obligations.

Common school district No. 13 contained a total of 35,577 acres and the purported independent school district contained a total of 55,183 acres. The purported independent school district levied an ad valorem property tax of 90 cents on the $100 valuation of property against all the property in that territory; 15 cents being for the purpose of paying current interest on the $10,000 of bonds issued by common school district No. 13 and for the purpose of providing a sinking fund sufficient to meet said bonds at maturity, and 75 cents of said tax being for the purpose of general maintenance. The purported independent school district also, by an election held, proposed to issue and sell bonds to the extent of $55,000 for the purpose of building a new school building. The original suit sought an injunction against the issuance and sale of these bonds, as well as the levy and collection of taxes. No election has been held for the purpose of determining whether the outstanding bonds and indebtedness of common school district No. 13 should be assumed by the so-called independent district, nor whether the maintenance tax existing against the common school district should be continued and levied against the property of the so-called independent district. In fact, no election whatever has been held in said new territory with reference to any tax being levied or any bonds being issued except the election relating to the issuance and sale of the $55,000 of bonds.

The effect of the special act of the Legislature, if valid, is to annul the existence of common school district No. 13 and to destroy the machinery by which it was being operated. The further effect, if valid, was to create a new corporation embracing new territory, and to empower the new corporation to act for the old, as well as to place upon the new the obligations of the old by virtue alone of the terms of the act. No provision was made in the act for any election by the inhabitants of the new territory to determine whether they would assume the obligations of the old corporation. The plaintiff in error contends that the following provisions of the act of the Legislature are not only unconstitutional, but these unconstitutional provisions are of such a nature as to render the whole act void by reason thereof:

"Sec. 13. It is hereby expressly provided that any and all outstanding indebtedness and bonds of said Dilly common school district No. 13, in Frio county, Texas, be, and the same is, hereby validated and all such indebtedness and all bonds outstanding of said Dilly common school district No. 13, shall be assumed by and are hereby made binding obligations of the said Dilly county line independent school district, as the same is created by this act.

"Sec. 14. The local maintenance tax heretofore established and now existing in Dilly common school district No. 13, in Frio county, Texas, is hereby validated and continued in the independent school district hereby created, until such time as a majority of the qualified taxpaying voters of this district shall change the same as provided under the general statutes of this state, with reference to such matters in connection with independent school districts organized under the general laws of the state.

"Sec. 15. The title to all property vested in said Dilly common school district No. 13, in Frio county, Texas, shall be and is hereby vested in said Dilly county line independent school district, hereby created."

Plaintiff in error says that section 13 violates section 3, art. 7, of the Constitution, by placing obligations upon said new district, without permitting the qualified taxpaying voters of the district to vote upon the question whether they would assume the outstanding indebtedness of common school district No. 13, and would levy likewise upon the property of the new district the annual ad valorem property tax previously voted by the voters of the old district to meet the current interest and principal on said debts at maturity. He further claims that section 14 of the special act is unconstitutional, in that it violates the same section of the Constitution by placing upon the new district the local ad valorem property maintenance tax of 90 cents previously voted by the voters of common school district No. 13, without providing for a vote by the voters of the new district upon the question of said tax, as required by the Constitution. Plaintiff in error further alleges that section 15 of the special act is unconstitutional because in violation of section 16, art. 1, of the Constitution, for the reason that it vests the title in all property of the old district in the new district without providing any legal means for the payment of the indebtedness of the old district; the only means provided by the Legislature being unconstitutional. And, finally, the plaintiff in error contends that the unconstitutionality of each of said sections renders the entire act unconstitutional, alleging that none of said three sections can be separated from the remainder of the act so as to leave the remainder effectual as a valid act. The trial court upheld all of these contentions, and perpetuated an injunction, while the Court of Civil Appeals reached the opposite conclusion.

The application for the writ of error, granted by the Supreme Court, calls into question the correctness of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in reversing the judgment of the trial court by presenting many assignments of error and supporting these assignments with legal propositions, which assignments and propositions we will not discuss separately, for the reason that to do so would extend this opinion to an unnecessary length, and for the additional reason that we have reached the conclusion that there is only one vital question to be decided, and that is whether the Legislature has the authority by special act creating a new school district out of territory partly embraced within an old one, where the latter has a bonded indebtedness and has provided for the levy of annual taxes, to place upon the new district thus attempted to be created the obligation to pay the indebtedness of the old district, and to continue in effect the levy of taxes previously ordered by the old district, without providing for an election to determine whether the new district will assume the indebtedness of the old district and also to determine whether the new district will levy and collect a tax similar to that provided for by the old district.

The conclusion of law filed by the district court with which the Court of Civil Appeals disagreed, assigned as error in the application, and upon which the Supreme Court granted the writ, is as follows:

"I find that section 13 of the special act creating the Dilly county line independent school...

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