Burns v. Heyns
| Decision Date | 15 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:14-cv-733 |
| Parties | PAUL BURNS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. DANIEL H. HEYNS et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. It has also denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed. The claims arising under federal law will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The claims arising under state law will be dismissed because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to certify the case as a class action (docket #11) and a request for appointment of counsel (Am. Compl., docket #9, Page ID#115). Plaintiff's motion and his request for appointment of counsel will be denied.
Plaintiff, Paul Burns, Jr., is incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). In this action, he sues MDOC Director Daniel H. Heyns and various unnamed MDOC officials who are identified as "Executive Management Team, Administrative Management Team, Wardens . . . Local Functionaries, Librarians, [and] Staff Member Designees." (Am. Compl., docket #9, Page ID#48.)
Plaintiff contends that he is a disabled prisoner with a history of "traumatic brain injury," which resulted in "learning [and] memory deficit, confusion, contextual difficulties, and [difficulties in] ability to reason." (Id. at Page ID##49.) Plaintiff asserts that he experienced a brain injury in 2011, after which he fell into a coma for 18 days. (Id. at Page ID#106.) When he regained consciousness, he found that he "could not walk, lost balance, lost memory, ability to form new memory, suffered confusion, contextual difficulties, and inability to reason appropriately . . . ." (Id. at Page ID#107.) He has apparently recovered somewhat since that time, judging from the extensive allegations and numerous claims set forth in his 70-page complaint, but he alleges that he continues to suffer some degree of "anomia" ("difficulty using words or processing what words mean"), "ataxia" ("lack of coordination"), "apraxia" ("difficulty [doing] common task[s]"), "quadriparesis" ("fatigue and weakness in all four limbs"), headaches, depression, and personality changes. (Id. at Page ID#108.) Plaintiff asserts that he has difficulty caring for himself, concentrating, processing information, remembering the location of physical objects, performing tasks that require sustained concentration and memory of time, walking (if it requires navigation of directions; also, it makes him tired within 1 to 2 hours), learning, reasoning, and forming new memories. (Id. at Page ID#109.)
Plaintiff's action primarily concerns "Director's Office Memorandum 2014-31," which was issued by Defendant Heyns on June 27, 2014 ("DOM 2014-31"). (See DOM 2014-31, docket #9-1, Page ID#118.) According to the memorandum, the MDOC has implemented an electronic law library ("ELL") for prisoners in the general prison population to use for their legal research, in addition to hard copy materials. Because usage of the ELL "dramatically increased the speed and ease" by which prisoners are able to conduct legal research, Director Heyns determined that the policy governing law library access by prisoners, MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.115, could be changed. (Id.) Prior to the DOM, the policy provided that prisoners housed in the general population would be afforded a minimum of "at least six hours per week of law library use, in sessions of not less than two hours each . . . ." MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.115 ¶ L (effective Nov. 1, 2010). DOM 2014-31 reduced the minimum requirements to four hours per week in the law library, in sessions of at least one hour. (DOM 2014-31, docket #3-1.) However, prisoners would be allowed to use the library in longer sessions "if resources permit," or as set forth in Policy Directive 05.03.115 ¶ O. (Id.) The latter provides:
A prisoner who has direct access to the main law library and has a court deadline requiring additional time in the law library may request additional time from the librarian or designee. The prisoner may be required to present documentation supporting the need for the additional time. Additional time shall be granted if there is a demonstrated need for the additional time. The additional hours are to be scheduled outside the prisoner's assignment hours when possible.
MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.115 ¶ O (Nov. 1, 2010).
In addition, the DOM 2014-31 states that the MDOC will be removing "hard copy publications" and that prisoners "who are still not adept at using the ELL" will learn how to use it with the assistance of law library staff and prisoner law library clerks. (See docket #3-1.)
While Plaintiff's action was pending in this Court, DOM 2014-31 was superceded by DOM 2015-23 (effective Jan. 1, 2015). The latter contains much of the same language as DOM 2014-31, including the reduction in library time, but provides that "hard copy" materials will be retained during implementation of the ELL and will not be updated, "except for those publications received from LexisNexis that are provided under the ELL contract."1 DOM 2015-23.
Several of Plaintiff's claims stem from the fact that many prisoners are now required to conduct legal research using the ELL instead of hard copy materials. According to Plaintiff, prisoners access the ELL through computer workstations in the law library. A prisoner must "sign in" to a workstation before using it. (Am. Compl., Page ID#90.) After signing in, the prisoner is able to access a Lexis-Nexis database using a browser. (Id.) Prisoners are then able to "retrieve law and read cases, statutes [and] constitutional provisions," but they are not able to take notes on the workstation or create documents. (Id. at Page ID##93-94.) Indeed, prisoners cannot "cut-and-paste, highlight and print, or print any case law." (Id. at Page ID#94.) If a prisoner wishes to take notes, he must do so "manually . . . with pen and paper, same as hard copy publication research[.]" (Id.)
Because the ELL workstations are connected to a network, Plaintiff contends that activity on the workstation can be monitored and/or tracked from a remote location by prison officials, the database vendor, or third parties. (Id. at Page ID##88, 94.) According to Plaintiff, usage of the workstation generates "clickstream data," which is information showing "the time, order and duration the computer spent on each web page as well as which files were accessed and/or downloaded . . . i.e., Shepardized." (Id. at Page ID#88.) Plaintiff states that it is the "local policy"of library staff to monitor prisoners' activity on the workstations. (Id. at Page ID#90.) Plaintiff notes that signs on the workstations state that "ELL computers are ONLY for conducting legal research . . . ANY misuse will result in a misconduct and/or privileges will be restricted or terminated." (Id. at Page ID#74.) Plaintiff suspects that library staff have the ability to view the clickstream data at any given time from computers in their offices, in order to monitor usage of the ELL.
Plaintiff claims that DOM 2014-31 (now replaced by DOM 2015-23) is facially invalid and invalid as applied to him. Plaintiff's action challenges both the fact that the DOM reduces the minimum hourly requirements for access to the law library and the fact that it authorizes a transition from hard copy materials to an electronic library system. Plaintiff claims that the reduction in access to the law library deprives him of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment (). He also contends that the requirement to use a monitored, electronic system violates his rights under the Fourth Amendment (), the Fifth Amendment (), the Sixth Amendment (), the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment (). He also claims that the DOM, on its face and as implemented by Defendants, violates his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, Title II of the ECPA (the Stored Communications Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2701et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and state law. As relief, he seeks damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
Plaintiff asks the Court to certify the case as a class action filed on behalf of an unidentified class of individuals (docket #11). For a case to proceed as a class action, the court must be satisfied on a number of grounds, including the adequacy of class representation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). It is well established that pro se litigants are...
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