Burns v. Indus. Comm'n, 21951.

• Citation: 191 N.E. 225,356 Ill. 602
• Decision Date: 15 June 1934
• Docket Number: No. 21951.,21951.
• Parties: BURNS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

356 Ill. 602

191 N.E. 225

BURNS

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 21951.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 15, 1934.

Error to Circuit Court, Peoria County; Joseph E. Daily, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Frances L. Leach, claimant, against David P. Burns, employer, to recover compensation for the death of Henry P. Leach, deceased employee. The Industrial Commission granted an award for compensation and for medical and hospital services, the award was confirmed by the circuit court on certiorari, and the employer brings error.

Judgment of the circuit court reversed, and cause remanded, with directions in accordance with opinion.William Greene and H. L. Howard, both of Chicago, and Clarence W. Heyl, of Peoria, for plaintiff in error.

Henry Kneller, George W. Hunt, and Ren Thurman, all of Peoria, for defendant in error.

SHAW, Justice.

The defendant in error, Frances L. Leach, filed her application with the Industrial Commission seeking compensation on account of the death of her husband, Henry P. Leach, while employed by David P. Burns. In that application she alleged her deceased husband had suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment through the inhalation of fumes from poisonous chemicals, which was said to have caused his death. The arbitrator and the Industrial Commission granted her an award of $3,750, together with $225 for medical and hospital services, which award was confirmed by the circuit court of Peoria county on certiorari. A petition for writ of error was allowed in this court, and the case is here for review thereon.

David P. Burns, under the name of Burns Glass Company, was engaged in business in the city of Peoria, in which business, among other things, he re-silvered mirrors. This work was carried on in a factory having workrooms and a warehouse, and the deceased performed therein various duties, at times working in what was called the silvering room. This room was eighteen feet wide and thirty feet long, equipped with a steam table with four burners, which stood in the center of the room, and in which room a washing rack was at one end and a painting rack at the other. A solution of lye was ordinarily used to remove paint and slack from mirrors, and, where the lye treatment was not successful, nitric or muriatic acid was used. In those cases the mirror was ordinarily immersed in a solution of muriatic acid diluted with water, and in some cases, where old silver was to be removed, the use of nitric acid became necessary; it being applied with a swab on the end of a stick. The deceased had assisted in these processes at different times.

The defendant in error, Frances L. Leach, testified that the deceased had a sore throat in January of 1930, and it became red and inflamed, but that he did not consult a physician until some time in July, that after July 18 he was unable to work, and that the ailment continued and his rest was impaired. Various other symptoms were described by her, and she testified that he died on August 9, 1930. The only medical testimony offered was that of Dr. J. P. Jennings, who visited the deceased frequently between July 18 and August 9, and whose testimony was to the effect that the direct cause of death was acute dilation of the heart, with sclerosis of the lungs and bronchial tubes as a contributing cause. In answer to a hypothetical question, which we will discuss later, Dr. Jennings expressed the opinion that the inhalation of fumes emanating from nitric and muriatic acids caused an irritation and inflammation of Leach's throat and lungs and indirectly the weakened condition of his system.

The claim presented for our consideration is in part dependent for its determination upon a construction of section 2 of the Occupational Diseases Act. (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 48, § 74, p. 1401, Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 48, par. 186, p. 1375.) This section, in which we have inserted one word in parenthesis for convenience and brevity, is as follows: ‘Every employer in this State engaged in the carrying on of any process of manufacture or labor in which sugar of lead, white lead, lead chromate, litharge, red lead, arsenate of lead, or paris green are employed, used or handled, or the manufacture of brass or the smelting of lead or zinc which processes and employments are hereby declared to be especially dangerous to the health of the employees ( or) engaged in any process of manufacture or labor in which poisonous chemicals, minerals or other substances are used or handled by the employees therein in harmful quantities or under harmful conditions, shall provide for and place at the disposal of the employees engaged in any such process or manufacture and shall maintain in good condition and without cost to the employees, proper working clothing to be kept and used exclusively for such employees while at work, and all employees therein shall be required at all times while they are at work to use and wear such clothing; and in all processes of manufacture or labor referred to in this section which are unnecessarily productive of noxious or poisonous dusts, adequate and approved respirators shall be furnished and maintained by the employer in good condition and without cost to the employees, and such employees shall use such respirators at all times while engaged in any work necessarily productive of noxious or poisonous dusts.’

The plaintiff in error contends that the occupation of the deceased was not one of those intended to be covered by section 2; that there is no allegation or proof showing that the chemicals complained of were used and handled in harmful quantities or under harmful conditions; that there is no competent evidence in the record showing that the deceased came to his death as the result of his occupation, and that there is no causal connection between the two; and the award is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that that part of section 2 under which the award was supposedly made is unconstitutional because of its being uncertain, unintelligible, and so indefinite as to be unenforceable. We will consider first the proper construction and intended meaning of section 2.

The primary purpose of statutory construction is to arrive at the legislative intent. People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 153 N. E. 693. In order to arrive at this intent, the several provisions of the statute are to be construed together in the light of the general purpose and object of the act and so as to give effect to the main intent and plan thereof as therein expressed. State Public Utilities Comm. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 267 Ill. 528, 108 N. E. 716, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 528. If this intention can be collected from the statute, words may be modified, altered, or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with such legislative intention. Public Utilities Comm. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., supra; Krome v. Halbert, 263 Ill. 172, 104 N. E. 1066;Hoyne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 106 N. E. 341;People v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co., 328 Ill. 223, 159 N. E. 266, 62 A. L. R. 318;People v. McEldowney, 308 Ill. 575, 140 N. E. 12;Smith v. Logan County, 284 Ill. 163, 119 N. E. 932;People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 110 N. E. 26;People v. Flynn, 265 Ill. 414, 106 N. E. 961.

In enacting section 2 of the Occupational Diseases Act, the Legislature evidently intended to establish either two or three classes of occupations to which it would apply. If the word ‘or’ is read into section 2 of the act between the words ‘employees' and ‘engaged,’ as we have above indicated in parenthesis and italics, then three distinct classes are created, as follows: (1) Those who are engaged in an industry using lead derivatives or paris green; (2) the manufacture of brass or the smelting of lead or zinc; and (3) any process of manufacture in which poisonous chemicals, minerals or other substances are used or handled in harmful quantities or under harmful conditions. If we omit the word ‘or,’ we find that, after the statute creates the first two classes, it contains a jumble of words which could not have been written into it for any legislative purpose whatever. We have thus our choice between, on the one hand, assuming that the word ‘or’ was inadvertently omitted, or, on the other hand, assuming that the Legislature intended to write approximately thirty-one words into the act without any purpose in view at all. Our problem, thus stated, is, Did the Legislature inadvertently omit one word which would clarify the entire section if supplied, or did it intentionally include thirty-one words which are entirely useless without the conjunction? Recurring to our primary rule as above...