Burns v. Koellmer

• Citation: 527 A.2d 1210,11 Conn.App. 375
• Decision Date: 30 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 4732,4732
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Nanci L. BURNS v. William E. KOELLMER et al.

Page 1210

527 A.2d 1210

11 Conn.App. 375

Nanci L. BURNS v. William E. KOELLMER et al.

No. 4732.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 3, 1987.

Decided June 30, 1987.

Jules Lang, with whom, on the brief, was Beverly M. Krieger, Norwalk, for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew B. Woods, with whom, on the brief, was Louis I. Gladstone, Bridgeport, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and BORDEN and DALY, JJ.

DUPONT, Chief Judge.

This appeal is brought by the named defendant ¹ from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, after a jury trial. The defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict, in charging the jury on theories of implied contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, and in failing to submit interrogatories to the jury. We find no error.

The relevant facts which could reasonably have been found by the jury are as follows. The defendant operated a tennis club. The plaintiff, who played tennis at the club, began a social relationship with him. At times, she would help him at the club by answering the telephone and performing other light tasks. As their relationship developed, the parties began to live together in a condominium near the club. The plaintiff then began, at the request of the defendant, to perform all of the managerial functions at the club. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff divorced her husband, while the defendant remained married to his estranged wife. The plaintiff worked for a period of six years as the manager of the club, during which time the defendant remunerated her with some payments by cash and check. The plaintiff expected to be remunerated in excess of those payments, the defendant benefited from the plaintiff's service, the defendant had assured the plaintiff that she would receive additional compensation, and the plaintiff's expectation of payment ceased when her employment did. After those six years as manager, the plaintiff was discharged and the parties' personal relationship came to an end.

The first and second counts of the plaintiff's complaint as amended, contain nearly identical allegations. One count is against the individual defendant and the other against the corporation club. ² According to the allegations, the defendant requested that the plaintiff assume the managerial duties of the club; the plaintiff undertook those duties with the expectation of payment for her services; the defendant knew of that expectation and accepted the services rendered; the defendant remunerated her from time to time as partial payment for her services; the defendant represented that she would be fully compensated in the future; and the defendant terminated her as manager without having fully compensated her for the services which she performed as manager.

The defendant answered the complaint, admitting that he knew the work was being done by the plaintiff, admitting making payments to her, but denying that they were partial payments for her services, and admitting that she was terminated as manager. The defendant asserted special defenses of the statute of frauds, the statute of limitations, and a public policy against adultery, as barring the plaintiff from any recovery. The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff.

The trial court filed a memorandum of decision upon its denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict. ³ The court reviewed some of the facts which the jury could reasonably have found, and also discussed its charge in response to the defendant's objection to it. The court gave no charge on the special defense of the statute of limitations because it ruled that the plaintiff's cause of action arose when her expectation of remuneration was defeated by her replacement as manager of the tennis club and, therefore, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that time. Since the complaint in both counts one and two alleged the facts necessary to prove the necessary elements of a recovery on the principles of restitution, the court stated that it was proper to give a charge on quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and implied contract. Finally, the court held that the defendant's request for interrogatories was properly denied because they related solely to the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of an express contract, and could not have protected the defendant from a general verdict.

The defendant claims that any agreement which might have existed between the parties should not be enforced because it is contrary to the public policy of this state. The public policy he relies upon is that the state will not condone a relationship which has the effect of destroying a marriage. The defendant seeks to buttress his argument by relying upon the cases of Tator v. Valden, 124 Conn. 96, 198 A. 169 (1938), and Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948), as well as the criminal proscription against adultery. General Statutes § 53a-81. The cases upon which he relies did not directly involve any allegedly adulterous relationship, but are instructive of the general principles which militate against enforcing contracts which are contrary to public policy.

"A court will not grant any relief to a plaintiff who rests his claim upon an agreement which is against public policy, for that would be to lend its aid to an illegal transaction. Smith v. David B. Crockett Co., 85 Conn. 282, 287, 82 A. 569 [1912]; Roberts v. Criss, 266 F. 296, 301 [1920]; 2 Page, Contracts (2d Ed.) § 1026." Beit v. Beit, supra, 198, 63 A.2d 161. The defendant seeks to avoid any obligation he may have incurred by relying upon the premise that whatever agreement the parties entered into was part and parcel of their adulterous cohabitation. ⁴

In this case, the alleged contract was not made for or about the parties' living arrangements or sexual behavior. The agreement of the parties as pleaded and proved did not involve prohibited acts. The plaintiff's claim for restitution rests upon neither an illegal agreement nor an agreement the object of which is illegal. The recognition of her claim cannot lend any aid to an illegal transaction. Claims of a contractual or quasi-contractural nature between parties in illicit relationships but which do not involve payment for prohibited sexual behavior are enforceable in courts of law. "A bargain between two persons is not made illegal by the mere fact of an illicit relationship between them, so long as that relationship constitutes no part of the consideration bargained for and no promise in the bargain is conditional upon it." ⁵ 6A, A. Corbin, Contracts § 1476 (1962). " 'The courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services.... In the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case.' " Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 340-41, 521 A.2d 142 (1987), quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 665, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976). Thus, a contract, express or implied, or some other tacit understanding between persons who are not married to one another which does not rely upon their sexual behavior is enforceable in the courts of this state. See 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts §§ 197-98.

The defendant next argues, in support of his claim of error in the denial of his motion for a directed verdict, that the alleged oral contract was unenforceable because of its vagueness and because it was prohibited by the statute of frauds, General Statutes § 52-550. ⁶ The defendant also argues that the plaintiff pleaded a cause of action in express contract only, thereby prohibiting the jury from finding the defendant liable on theories of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment and implied contract. He thus raises the corollary argument that the trial court erred by charging the jury on those theories of recovery.

Of these claims, we first address the argument that the trial court erred in charging the jury on theories of restitution. If this claim fails, then the statute of frauds defense falls with it. The defendant asserts that counts one and two of the complaint allege an express contract and that the plaintiff is, therefore, precluded from recovery on a restitutionary theory. The pleadings of the plaintiff's complaint must be examined to determine whether she alleged these theories. See, e.g., Lombardi v. J.A. Bergren Dairy Farms, Inc., 153 Conn. 19, 22-23, 213 A.2d 449 (1965); Practice Book § 322.

The defendant hinges his claim that the complaint alleges only a theory of express contract on the complaint's allegation that the defendant represented to the plaintiff "that she would be fully compensated for her work, labor and services at a subsequent time from assets of [the defendant]." The defendant argues that this allegation limits the plaintiff's cause of action to one sounding in express contract.

The allegations of the complaint must be given " 'such reasonable construction as will give effect to [it] in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties.' " (Emphasis on original). Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 236, 502 A.2d 410 (1985).

The first and second counts of the complaint both consist of fourteen paragraphs. Paragraphs seven and twelve of each count allege, respectively, that the defendant requested that the plaintiff assume the managerial duties at the tennis club, and that she accepted partial payment for her services upon his representation that she would be...