Burns v. Levy
| Decision Date | 02 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-898 (CKK) |
| Parties | ANTOINETTE BURNS, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW D. LEVY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Lt. Col. Antoinette Burns sued Defendants MedStar Georgetown University Hospital and Matthew D. Levy, M.D., and former Defendant Georgetown University Medical Center, on various grounds relating to her participation in and exit from the MGUH Community Pediatrics and Child Advocacy Fellowship Program. Lt. Col. Burns originally alleged various claims against the Defendants, including breach of contract and defamation claims. This Court previously granted summary judgment to the Hospital and Dr. Levy on the breach of contract claims, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals, however, did not affirm the Court's grant of summary judgment on Lt. Col. Burns's defamation claims and remanded at least a subset of those claims. Consequently, at issue between the parties now is the scope of the mandate on remand from the Court of Appeals. Also pending before the Court are the parties' other pretrial filings. How the Court rules on a few major objections and motions in limine may significantly impact the parties' positions with respect to numerous others. Accordingly, the Court considers several categories of disputes between the parties in this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order by ruling on the Defendants' motions in limine and on Lt. Col. Burns's objection to Defendants' invocation of the common interest privilege.
This Memorandum Opinion considers six broad categories of issues raised by the parties' pretrial briefing. First, upon consideration of the relevant briefing,1 legal authorities, and record, the Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART, and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Proposed Testimony and Evidence on Subjects that Are Not Relevant and Would Be Confusing, Irrelevant, Misleading, and Unfairly Prejudicial. In their motion, Defendants argue that two broad categories of evidence should be excluded. The Court concludes that the findings of the Court of Appeals, and its affirmation of this Court's grant of summary judgment on the contract claims, limits the evidence that Lt. Col. Burns can introduce at trial. However, the Court disagrees that the Court of Appeals limited its remand of the defamation claims as narrowly as Defendants contend. Still, much of the evidence that Lt. Col. Burns wants to offer should be excluded, as the Court outlines below.
Second, the Court DENIES Lt. Col. Burns's request that the Court find that the common interest privilege does not apply to the communications at issue.2 Under the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule, the Court follows its prior conclusion from the first round of summary judgment briefing that the common interest privilege applies. Even if the Court were not obligated to follow its prior ruling, the common interest privilege still applies. This, however, does not preclude Lt. Col. Burns from arguing at trial that the privilege was abused, such as by a showing of malice (including falsity).
Third, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Witnesses Not Disclosed or Identified as Such by Plaintiff in Her Rule 26 Disclosures or Discovery.3 The parties have provided insufficient information regarding whether there has been a violation of the relevant rules, whether any violation was harmless, and as to which particular remedy is warranted. Consequently, the Court will require the parties to file supplemental briefing on the issues outlined below and in the accompanying Order.
Fourth, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Proposed Testimony and Reports of Plaintiff's Expert Witness, Dr. Gregory Scott Blaschke.4 In accordance with the Court's conclusions elsewhere in the Memorandum Opinion that certain evidence related to Lt. Col. Burns's dismissed contract claims should be excluded, the Court finds that certain of Dr. Blaschke's testimony should similarly be excluded. The parties' submissions, however, are not sufficient for the Court to determine whether any of Dr. Blaschke's anticipated testimony should be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. The Court will accordingly require the parties to file supplemental briefing on the issues outlined below and in the accompanying Order.
Fifth, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Damages Evidence for Loss of Income and Attorneys' Fees, and to Strike Plaintiff's Claim for Attorneys' Fees.5 The Court agrees with Defendants that evidence relating to lost income damages should be excluded and grants that portion of its Motion. The Court further grants Defendants' request to strike Lt. Col. Burns's request for attorneys' fees, as she cannot recover them in this case, but it denies Defendants' Motion to the extent that it seeks to exclude all evidence of attorneys' fees. Lt. Col. Burns is not precluded from introducing, at the appropriate juncture, limited evidence regarding attorneys' fees because it is relevant to computing punitive damages under District of Columbia law. The Court, however, limits the scope of attorneys' fees for which evidence may be introduced.
Lastly, the Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART, and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Documents Not Identified as Required by the Court's Pretrial Scheduling and Procedures Order or Previously Produced During Discovery.6 The Court denies Defendants' request to completely exclude fifteen exhibits, grants the portion of their Motion seeking to exclude ten exhibits relating to Lt. Col. Burns's damages, and denies without prejudice their Motion to the extent that it seeks to exclude Exhibit 65. If Defendants want to move to exclude Exhibit 65 again, the Court will require additional submissions from the parties as outlined below and in the accompanying Order.
This Court examined the facts of this case in its prior summary judgment rulings, to which it refers the reader. See Burns v. Levy, 373 F. Supp. 3d 149, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2019) ("Burns III"); see Burns v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., Civil Action No. 13-898 (CKK), 2016 WL 4275585, at *2-*6 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2016) ("Burns I"). In short, in this lawsuit, Lt. Col. Burns pursued contract-based claims, defamation claims, and a claim of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against a combination of the Hospital, the University, and Dr. Levy. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 26. The Court granted summary judgment for all three Defendants as to all claims and dismissed Plaintiff's case. See Burns I, 2016 WL 4275585. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of all but the defamation claims, as to which it reversed and remanded to this Court for certain further determinations. See Burns v. Levy, 873 F.3d 289 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("Burns II"). The parties now dispute the scope of the D.C. Circuit's remand and the impact that its findings have on what evidence may be introduced at trial.
Although neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly authorize motions in limine, "the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). In fact, under Federal Rule of Evidence 103, the court must "conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means" to the extent practicable. Fed. R. Evid. 103(d). "Pretrial motions in limine are an important mechanism to effectuate this goal of insulating the jury from inadmissible evidence," United States v. Bikundi, No. 14-CR-030 (BAH), 2015 WL 5915481, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2015), and are "designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions," Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990). See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ().
Motions in limine are therefore understandably intended to deal with discrete evidentiary issues and are not another opportunity to file disguised dispositive motions. Dunn ex rel. Albery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 F.R.D. 266, 274 (E.D. Mich. 2009). In light of this limited purpose, motions in limine "should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence," which remains the "function of a motion for summary judgment, with its accompanying and crucial procedural safeguards." C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2008). Factual questions, in other words, "should not be resolved through motions in limine," Goldman v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 853, 871 (W.D. Mich. 2008), nor is a motion in limine a "vehicle for a party to ask the Court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence," Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 563 F. Supp. 2d 508, 532 (D.N.J. 2008).
Due to the trial court's "familiarity with the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters," it is "'accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.'" Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984)). When a motion in limine relates to the admissibility of evidence on relevance grounds, the court must determine whether the evidence is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 or otherwise inadmissible under Rule 403. This assessment of "the probative value" of the evidence and "weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the...
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