Burns v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 14 April 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 12442.,12442. |
Parties | BURNS v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Wm. C. Green, of St. Paul, Minn. (Elizabeth L. Bonham, of St. Paul, Minn., and William P. Horan, of Wells, Minn., on the brief), for appellant.
Conrad Olson, of St. Paul, Minn. (L. B. daPonte and Frederic D. McCarthy, both of St. Paul, Minn., oh the brief), for appellee.
Before GARDNER, SANBORN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff in the district court from a judgment entered upon a directed verdict for the defendant.
Prior to July, 1938, the plaintiff Burns was employed by the defendant Railway Company as a steward in its Dining Car Department. For some time he had been assigned to duty on a train running between Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon. His home terminal was Seattle. His salary was $205.20 a month. He was a member in good standing of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an unincorporated association, national in scope, of railroad employees including dining car stewards. The association, in conformity with the Act of Congress of May 20, 1926, as amended, entitled the Railway Labor Act, c. 347, § 1 et seq., 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., is the recognized and exclusive collective bargaining agent for its members with the defendant. At the times material to this controversy a written contract containing rules covering the employment of stewards was in force and effect between the association and the defendant.
This suit was brought by plaintiff in August, 1941, against the defendant to recover damages for his alleged wrongful discharge in 1938 in violation of the terms of the contract referred to. As one of its defenses the defendant alleged that on April 3, 1940, plaintiff in consideration of the payment to him of the sum of $225 released the defendant in writing from the claim sued upon. The receipt of payment of the $225 and the execution of the written release, a copy of which was attached to the answer, were admitted.
The plaintiff contended that the release was invalid for the reasons: (1) That there was an entire want of consideration for the release of plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful discharge; (2) that if there were any consideration it was inadequate to bar the present action; (3) that the release was the result of mistakes of law amounting to a mistake of fact on the part of the plaintiff; (4) that there was fraud in the procurement of the release; and (5) that there was mutual mistake of both parties to the release.
The case was tried to a jury. Prior to the trial the court entered an order, to which the plaintiff excepted, providing that the validity of the release pleaded in the answer be tried and determined in the first instance. At the close of the evidence on this issue the defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor on the ground that the evidence showed conclusively that the release is a complete bar to plaintiff's cause of action. The motion was sustained by the court, a verdict was directed, and a judgment was entered decreeing the validity of the release, denying recovery, and taxing costs to the plaintiff.
Upon this appeal the plaintiff contends that the court erred (1) in directing the issue of the validity of the release to be first tried and determined; (2) in certain adverse rulings on the admission of evidence; and (3) in sustaining the motion for a directed verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff contends that the evidence establishes beyond dispute each and every defense to the general release urged in the trial court.
In oral argument before this court counsel for plaintiff conceded that the court did not commit prejudicial error in directing the issue of the validity of the release to be first tried. Since we have reached the conclusion that the court did err in holding that there was consideration for the release of plaintiff's claim and cause of action for damages for wrongful discharge, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other contentions of the parties. This point is decisive of the propriety of directing a verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of the evidence.
The release pleaded by the defendant as a bar to plaintiff's cause of action is in the form of a letter from M. J. Byrnes, assistant to defendant's vice president, addressed to the plaintiff, Thomas W. Burns, at St. Paul, Minnesota, under date of April 3, 1940. It reads:
The voucher for $225 delivered to plaintiff by the defendant at the time the release was signed contained the following statement of the account for which it was given: "Payment for loss of time between June 22, 1938, and July 14, 1938, and expenses incurred at St. Paul from June 25, 1938, to July 14, 1938, as per letter of April 3, 1940, from Mr. M. J. Byrnes, Asst. to Vice President, addressed to and accepted by Thomas W. Burns."
The facts recited in the letter prepared by Mr. M. J. Byrnes are not in dispute. More concretely, and in further detail, these facts are that on June 22, 1938, A. W. Thomson, defendant's dining car superintendent, having his office in St. Paul, ordered the plaintiff by telegram to deadhead on pass from Seattle to St. Paul. The telegram did not state the purpose for which the trip was to be made nor suspend or terminate plaintiff's employment. Upon his arrival in St. Paul in the early morning of June 25, 1938, a letter signed by Mr. Thomson and dated June 24, 1938, was handed to him. The letter directed him to appear at Mr. Thomson's office at 9:30 A.M. on June 25th for a formal investigation of his conduct. He appeared as directed and a short hearing was held, at which he had no witnesses and introduced no evidence. No decision was announced at that time, and no order and no instructions were given plaintiff by any officer of defendant. The first notice given him was on July 14, 1938, on which date a letter was given him signed by Mr. Thomson, the pertinent part of which reads, ...
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