Burns v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 284
| Decision Date | 12 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 21-638 (DWF/HB) |
| Citation | 554 F.Supp.3d 993 |
| Parties | Pollyanna BURNS, Rhonda Tomoson, and Diane Gooding, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 284 and Independent School District 191, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Douglas P. Seaton, Esq., and James V.F. Dickey, Esq., Upper Midwest Law Center, counsel for Plaintiffs.
Brendan D. Cummins, Esq., Cummins & Cummins, LLP, and Patrick C. Pitts, Esq., and Scott A. Kronland, Esq., Altshuler Berzon LLP, counsel for Service Employees International, Local 284.
Kari Marie Dahlin, Esq., and Sally J. Ferguson, Arthur Chapman Kettering Smetak & Pikala, P.A., counsel for Independent School District 191.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Service Employees International Union, Local 284's ("Local 284") and Independent School District 191's ("ISD 191") (together, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 16). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion.
Plaintiffs Pollyanna Burns, Rhonda Tomoson, and Diane Gooding ("Plaintiffs") are food-service managers employed by ISD 191 in a bargaining unit represented by Local 284. 1 Each plaintiff executed an agreement with Local 284, in which they requested membership with Local 284 and authorized Local 284 to represent them in collective bargaining. ("I request membership with and authorize [Local 284] to represent me for the purpose of collective bargaining with my employer ..."); Ex. C ("I hereby request and voluntarily accept membership in [Local 284] ... [and] authorize [Local 284] to act as my exclusive representative in collective bargaining over wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment[.]"). In addition, Plaintiffs agreed to pay their union membership dues via payroll deduction ("check-off authorization"). The agreements signed by Burns and Tomoson stated:
I hereby request and voluntarily authorize my employer to deduct from my wages my initiation fee and an amount equal to the regular monthly dues uniformly applicable to members of [Local 284] or monthly service fee, and further that such amount so deducted be sent to such Local Union for and on my behalf. This authorization shall remain in effect and shall be irrevocable unless I revoke it by sending written notice to both my employer and the Local Union during the period not less than thirty (30) and not more than forty-five (45) days before the annual anniversary date of this authorization or the date of termination of the applicable contract between my employer and the Local Union, whichever occurs sooner. This authorization shall be automatically renewed as an irrevocable check-off from year to year unless I revoke it in writing during the above-described window period, irrespective of my membership in the Union.
.) The language in Gooding's agreement contains similar provisions:
I recognize the need for a strong union and believe everyone represented by our union should pay their fair share to support our union's activities. I hereby request and voluntarily authorize my employer to deduct from my earnings and to pay over to [Local 284] an amount equal to the regular monthly dues uniformly applicable to members of [Local 284]. This authorization shall remain in effect and shall be irrevocable unless I revoke it by sending written notice via U.S. mail to both the employer and [Local 284] during the period not less than thirty (30) days and not more than forty-five (45) days before the annual anniversary date of this agreement or the date of termination of the applicable contract between the employer and [Local 284] whichever occurs sooner. This authorization shall be automatically renewed as an irrevocable check-off from year to year unless I revoke it in writing during the window period, even if I have resigned my membership in [Local 284].
(Gibbons Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C; see also Compl. ¶¶ 24, 30.)
On March 5, 2020, Plaintiffs notified Local 284 that they terminated their membership and demanded the stoppage of dues deductions. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 20, 25.) Because Plaintiffs’ notifications fell outside of the termination periods specified in the authorizations in their respective agreements, amounts equal to the regular monthly dues continued to be deducted from their pay and transmitted to Local 284 for a period following their resignations. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 21, 27; Gibbons Decl. ¶ 13.) Burns’ and Tomoson's deductions continued through July 2020, and Gooding's continued through December 2020. (Id. ) These dates corresponded with the "anniversary date" of their respective agreements.
Plaintiffs filed the present action on March 5, 2021. In Counts One and Two, Plaintiffs submit that the deductions from their paychecks pursuant to the terms of their dues deduction authorization agreements, both before and after they resigned from Local 284, violate the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 39-54.) In Counts Three through Seven, Plaintiffs assert state-law claims for conversion, money had and received/unjust enrichment, civil theft, tortious interference with contractual relations, and unlawful wage deductions. (Id. ¶¶ 55-78.) Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims with prejudice and ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker , 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens , 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v. City of Omaha , 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint. See Porous Media Corp. , 186 F.3d at 1079.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. As the Supreme Court reiterated, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," will not pass muster under Twombly . Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In sum, this standard "calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim]." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
In Counts One and Two, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the First Amendment by taking deductions from Plaintiffs’ pay both before and after their resignations from Local 284. (Compl. ¶¶ 39-54.) Defendants move to dismiss these claims, arguing that the dues were deducted based on Plaintiffs’ dues checkoff agreements with Local 284 and, therefore, do not violate the First Amendment.2
Under the Minnesota Public Employee Labor Relations Act ("PERLA"), Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01, et seq. , public-school employees may vote to form a union for purposes of collective bargaining. Employees are not required to join the union, and Minnesota law requires unions to represent fairly the interests of all bargaining unit members regardless of membership status. § 179A.06, subd. 2. PERLA authorized public employers and unions to enter into collective-bargaining agreements that require all represented employees to pay their proportionate share of the costs of representation regardless of union membership (referred to as a "fair-share" or "agency" fee). Id. § 179A.06, subd. 3. Until 2018, it was constitutionally permissible to charge non-union members such fair-share or agency fees. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S. 209, 235-36, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) (). In 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled Abood . See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018).3 In Janus , the Supreme Court held that requiring non-union members to pay union fees as a condition of public employment violates the First Amendment. Id. at 2464, 2486 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court stated:
Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember's wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed.
Plaintiffs rely on Janus in arguing that Defendants have violated their First Amendment rights and, in particular, that Janus applies to...
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