Burns v. State, 1D13–0033.
Citation | 170 So.3d 90 |
Decision Date | 22 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 1D13–0033.,1D13–0033. |
Parties | Robert BURNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
On direct appeal, Robert Burns contends his convictions for carjacking, in violation of section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), and attempted voluntary manslaughter, in violation of sections 782.07(1) and 777.04, Florida Statutes (2011), should be reversed on grounds jury instructions, which were not objected to below, were erroneous.1 Persuaded the erroneous instructions did not mislead the jury on anything genuinely in issue, we affirm.
The jury heard evidence that Gary Canada and the appellant collected scrap metal on the day in question, and sold it at a recycling center, before arriving at Mr. Canada's home. There Mr. Canada locked his truck, he testified, then placed the keys to the truck on a computer desk, once they were both inside. He told the jury he refused, when appellant asked to use his computer, and both men went back outside. Mr. Canada testified he then went into his “shop” some distance from the residence, not knowing what appellant did at that point, but came back from the shop when he heard the truck make a chirping sound, as if someone had locked or unlocked it electronically. He discovered that the back door of his house was open, that a briefcase had been removed from his truck, that its contents had been dumped on the ground, and that, all according to his uncontroverted testimony, over $1,700 was missing.
Mr. Canada further testified: Once inside the home, he noticed his keys were not on the computer desk, and turned to go outside, when he saw appellant standing between him and the door. He threatened to call the police if the appellant did not surrender the keys, whereupon, saying, “I'm going to kill you,” the appellant attacked him. In the ensuing struggle Mr. Canada deployed a Taser and Mr. Burns fled, at which point Mr. Canada called 911. A law enforcement officer dispatched as a result saw Mr. Burns driving Mr. Canada's truck, and apprehended him after he crashed the vehicle.
Mr. Burns was charged with, and found guilty at trial of, among other things,2 carjacking in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2011), which provides, in part:
In moving for judgment of acquittal on the charge of carjacking, defense counsel argued that the truck “was, if anything, taken after the fact as an escape.” But this argument was not made to the jury, which was instructed:
Despite trial counsel's failure to object,3 Mr. Burns argues he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that taking Mr. Canada's vehicle would not be carjacking if taking the truck was an afterthought, unrelated to the force used in perpetrating the attempted manslaughter.
When moving for judgment of acquittal in the trial court, defense counsel argued to the trial judge that taking the truck was not proven to be the motive for the use of force. Inexplicably, however, defense counsel neither argued to the jury another motive for the use of force nor requested any jury instruction requiring the jury, in order to convict on the carjacking count, to find appellant's use of force was motivated, at least in part, by a desire for possession of the truck. Defense counsel's argument with regard to the carjacking charge instead was:
In rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
As a factual matter, the testimony was that the appellant had already taken the keys and had them in his possession when the affray began.
But issue was joined, not on whether force was employed to acquire or retain the truck keys, but on whether employing force to effect possession of the truck keys before driving off amounted to carjacking. Defense counsel's argument implied that the real issue for the jury was whether taking vehicle keys by force constituted taking the truck by use of force. As a matter of law, it clearly does. See Young v. State, 141 So.3d 161, 173 (Fla.2013) ( ); Baptiste–Jean v. State, 979 So.2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ( ); Law v. State, 824 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ( ); James v. State, 745 So.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ( ).
Where obtaining property is not a motive for using force, taking property after a (murder or other) use of force does not transform mere theft into robbery or carjacking. See Beasley v. State, 774 So.2d 649, 662 (Fla.2000) (); Davis v. State, 922 So.2d 438, 443–44 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) ( ); Perkins v. State, 814 So.2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ().
Carjacking is a species of robbery, see Cruller v. State, 808 So.2d 201, 204 (Fla.2002) () , and the same rule applies. See Mahn v. State, 714 So.2d 391, 397 (Fla.1998) ( ).
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