Burrell v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 12 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-4516.,04-4516.
• Citation: 434 F.3d 826
• Parties: Teresa F. BURRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Margaret HENDERSON et al., Defendants, Communication Workers of America, Local 4310, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

434 F.3d 826

Teresa F. BURRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Margaret HENDERSON et al., DefendantsCommunication Workers of America, Local 4310, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-4516.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: December 7, 2005.

Decided and Filed: January 12, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED:

Grant D. Shoub, Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub & Byard, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.David K. Greer, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Grant D. Shoub, Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub & Byard, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.David K. Greer, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: MARTIN, COLE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

Communication Workers of America, Local 4310 (the Local) appeals the district court's denial of its motion for relief from a default judgment.The Local claims that the judgment in favor of Teresa Burrell should be vacated under Rules 60(b)(1), (4), or (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to mistake, excusable neglect, lack of jurisdiction, and/or for extraordinary circumstances.After considering all three subsections of Rule 60(b), the district court held that the Local was not entitled to relief from the $637,584.00 default judgment.For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.BACKGROUND

A.Underlying claim

In February of 1997, Burrell began her employment at Ameritech Corporation in Columbus, Ohio.She was suspended in August of 2001 because of a poor attendance record.At a review board hearing held as part of the company's grievance process, Burrell attributed her absences to a car accident, but she failed to furnish any documentation to corroborate her excuse.Ameritech subsequently informed the Local, the union that represented Burrell, that Ameritech was terminating her employment due to excessive absences.

The Local reviewed Burrell's records and determined that there was no reasonable basis to believe that arbitration would reverse Burrell's termination.As a result, the Local decided not to request arbitration with Ameritech on Burrell's behalf.Margaret Henderson, president of the Local, informed Burrell of this decision in September of 2001.

B.Subsequent proceedings

In April of 2002, Burrell filed a charge of discrimination against "Communication Workers of America (CWA Local # 4310)" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(EEOC).After being notified by the EEOC of her right to sue under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Burrell filed a pro se complaint in November of 2002.The caption of her complaint showed the following as the parties to the suit: "Teresa F. Burrell v. Margaret Henderson(President) of Communication Workers of America."Burrell's complaint in its entirety reads as follows:

This charge is being filed against the Union/ and President for failure to provide representation in arbitration to keep my job.I was terminated after disability.I was given misinformation by Union Steward Arlington Guy, as to the procedure for obtaining time off, I was told that if I go out on long term disability this would allow for me to by pass date of satisfaction, therefore, termination would not probably happen, because this is what happen[ed] to him.When I took his advice I was terminated after we had the meeting with Human Resource.Margaret Henderson sent me a letter stating that the Union did not feel that arbitration would get the decision reversed, she also called me on the telephone to inform me that the case would be closed and they were unable to help me.The reason that I feel wronged is that when I filed the case with the Civil Right Commission there I was told that the other people I mentioned in the charge[s] had also been dismissed for going over the disability threshold which means more than three disabilities in a rolling year, but was returned after the Union fought for their jobs.I was not given the same opportunity to possibly winning my job back.All of the other employees were younger that myself and did not have as much time vested in the company as.I had, therefore, I feel age and company years had a lot to do with the decision.

(All letters capitalized in original.)

At least one copy of the summons and complaint was sent to the Local's business address in Columbus, Ohio.The district court found that the records of the clerk of the court indicate that Henderson and the Local were separately served with process, but the Local disputes this.Written on the summons, under the heading "To: (Name and address of defendant)" is "CWA/Communication Workers of America/ 2991 Sullivant Ave/ Columbus, OH."Henderson received the summons and complaint at the Local's office on December 12, 2002.

In June of 2003, over 16 months later, the magistrate judge assigned to the case issued a show-cause order requiring Burrell to explain why her case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.The show-cause order stated that "[n]o response to the complaint has been made by defendant and plaintiff has taken no additional action" since service of process was completed.Burrell's response to the show-cause order reiterated her claim, but did not address her failure to prosecute.The magistrate judge then issued an order explaining that, to prevent the case from being dismissed, Burrell had to seek an entry of default and subsequently move for entry of a default judgment.

The clerk of the district court filed an entry of default against "Margaret Henderson, President and Communication Workers of America" on October 3, 2003.On October 22, 2003, Burrell's motion for a default judgment was granted.After a hearing the following month, damages were awarded against "Communication Workers of America" in the amount of $637,584.00, plus interest.The order also provided that no liability attached to Margaret Henderson, despite the fact that she had failed to answer the complaint on her own behalf.There were no representatives present for either Henderson or the Local at the damages hearing, although the district court stated that "the defendant[was] . . . given due notice of the time and place of the hearing."The Local, however, claims that it was never notified of the application for entry of default, the motion for a default judgment, or the date of the November hearing.

Burrell moved for execution on the judgment entered against the "Communication Workers of America" in April of 2004.The Communication Workers of America (the National) moved to set aside the judgment the following month insofar as it applied to the National, asserting that "the record reflects ambiguity as to whether the judgment was intended to be entered against CWA [the National] or CWA, Local 4310 [the Local]."Burrell did not oppose the National's motion.The district court declared the motion moot because "entry and judgment of default were entered as to the Local Union only."

In May of 2004, the Local also moved to set aside the default judgment.This was the first time that counsel had appeared on behalf of the Local and the first time that a motion was filed on its behalf.But Henderson had written a letter to Kenneth Murphy, the clerk of the district court, on December 17, 2003.Henderson claimed in the letter that she had answered the complaint for the Local within 20 days of receipt, and she additionally tried to contact the office of the clerk several times to inquire if additional information was needed.The letter stated that Henderson "assumed that [the clerk] didn't need any additional information since I did not hear from you."

According to an affidavit submitted by Henderson, she did not realize that hiring a lawyer for herself or the Local was necessary because she thought that the complaint was an extension of the EEOC proceedings.Henderson further claims that she did not realize that the letter she sent to Murphy in January of 2003, within 20 days of receiving the complaint, was not an appropriate response.Her affidavit also asserts that she sent another letter to Murphy in March of 2003 and again received no response.This letter was attached to her affidavit.Henderson did not place a case number on these letters, however, which may explain why they were not filed by the clerk until February of 2004.

Henderson also stated in her affidavit that she was unaware of Burrell's motion for a default judgment until she received the court's order granting the same, and she did not attend the damages hearing because she did not know about it.Finally, Henderson explained that, although the district court informed her by a letter in February of 2004 that she should hire an attorney, she"missed a substantial amount of work due to the illness of [her]mother," who died in April of that year.Henderson apologized for any confusion that she may have caused, attesting that "I did my best to comply with what the processes were or what I perceived them to be."

Despite Henderson's explanation, the district court denied the motion filed by the Local for relief from the default judgment.This timely appeal followed.

II.ANALYSIS

A.Standard of review

When relief from a default judgment is sought pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1)and60(b)(6), we review the district court's decision under the "abuse of discretion" standard.In re Walter,282 F.3d 434, 440(6th Cir.2002)."Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment."Amernational Indus., Inc. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc.,925 F.2d 970, 975(6th Cir.1991)(citation and quotation marks omitted).A clear example of an abuse of discretion occurs where the district court fails to consider relevant "facts upon which the exercise of its discretionary judgment is based."Walter,282 F.3d at 440(citation omitted).

When relief from a default judgment is sought under Rule 60(b)(4...