Burress v. Livingston Circuit Court Judge (In re Burress)
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 356653 |
| Parties | In re BURRESS and KIZER. v. LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE and 53RD DISTRICT COURT, Defendants-Appellees. DANIEL A. BURRESS and THOMAS KIZER, JR., Plaintiffs-Appellants, |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Livingston Circuit Court LC No. 19-000121-AS
Before: Boonstra, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Swartzle, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal by right the circuit court's order dismissing their petition for superintending control. We affirm.
This motion was not associated with an existing case or case number.
On the day in question, Judge William Hultgren had been assigned by the State Court Administrative Office (SCAO) to serve as a visiting judge and assist with the docket, and was the only judge working at the courthouse that day, [1] which was the Friday before the New Year's holiday weekend. Upon arrival, plaintiffs attempted to file their motion along with proposed criminal complaints. These were returned by the court clerk for being defective because they did not indicate that they had been endorsed by the Livingston County prosecuting attorney. Plaintiffs told the clerk that they did not require the prosecuting attorney's approval, and the clerk returned to Judge Hultgren with the documents. After several hours, the clerk returned and informed plaintiffs that the documents would be accepted after plaintiffs posted a security bond in the amount of $150, 000, $75, 000 for each proposed criminal complaint. Plaintiffs were unable to post the bond, and they asked for a written order reflecting that the court would only accept the documents for filing upon the posting of a security bond, which Judge Hultgren entered.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed their petition for superintending control, requesting that the circuit court vacate Judge Hultgren's order, disqualify Chief Judge Miriam Cavanaugh[2] from "involving herself in this or any other way" with plaintiffs and their filings, disqualify Judge Hultgren from further related proceedings on the basis of "the improper direction and assistance" he had allegedly received from Chief Judge Cavanaugh regarding this matter, and order the district court to accept their filings without a security bond. Although the specifics are disputed by the parties, it appears that Judge Hultgren consulted at least briefly with Chief Judge Cavanaugh when first confronted with plaintiffs' documents. The Chief Judge had previously recused herself from a grand jury proceeding involving plaintiffs and former Judge Brennan because of potential bias or the appearance of impropriety. Therefore, plaintiffs argued, the Chief Judge should not have involved herself in any way with their motion, even to the extent of advising Judge Hultgren. Plaintiffs also claimed that the $150, 000 security bond "as a precondition to the filing of their submissions" was "unreasonable, punitive, obstructive, and an unconstitutional denial of [their] right to access to the courts." Finally, plaintiffs contended that Judge Hultgren lacked jurisdiction to issue his order because he was not assigned to handle disqualifications and because the blind-draw system needed to be utilized to select a judge.
The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs' petition, holding that plaintiffs' emergency motion effectively sought to file a citizen criminal complaint and, accordingly, MCL 764.1(1) and MCR 6.101(C) controlled and required that a security bond be posted in the absence of a prosecutor's endorsement, which plaintiffs indisputably did not have. The court determined that the security bond was not an unconstitutional filing fee but, rather, a requirement for the filing of a citizen's criminal complaint as required by statute. Without the bond, there was no duty to accept the filing. The circuit court also ruled that plaintiffs had failed to show that the amount was unreasonable. Regarding disqualification, the circuit court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because, ultimately, the Chief Judge did not handle the issue but allowed it to be resolved by Judge Hultgren.
Moreover, the circuit court noted that plaintiffs were aware at the courthouse that Judge Hultgren had spoken to the Chief Judge but failed to raise any concerns regarding disqualification until the filing of the petition for superintending control; in other words, plaintiffs never asked Judge Hultgren or Chief Judge Cavanaugh to disqualify themselves. Finally, regarding plaintiffs' jurisdictional challenges, the circuit court held that the blind-draw system was inapplicable because no case had been filed; plaintiffs did not file the security bond and, accordingly, their documents were not accepted. The circuit court also noted that Judge Hultgren was not assigned plaintiff's case as part of his docket; rather, he decided only whether the documents would be accepted and filed that day.
This appeal followed.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a circuit court's decision to deny a request for superintending control. In re Grant, 250 Mich.App. 13, 14; 645 N.W.2d 79 (2002). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is "outside the range of principled outcomes." People v Watkins, 491 Mich. 450, 467; 818 N.W.2d 296 (2012). We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, as well as the construction and application of the court rules, Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich.App. 406, 416; 789 N.W.2d 211 (2010), constitutional issues, Barrow v Detroit Election Comm, 301 Mich.App. 404, 411; 836 N.W.2d 498 (2013), and jurisdictional challenges, Forest Hills Cooperative v Ann Arbor, 305 Mich.App. 572, 615; 854 N.W.2d 172 (2014).
"When interpreting a statute, [this Court] must ascertain the Legislature's intent," which is accomplished "by giving the words selected by the Legislature their plain and ordinary meanings, and by enforcing the statute as written." Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich.App. 110, 120; 916 N.W.2d 292 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If a statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as plainly written. McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich. 276, 286; 971 N.W.2d 584 (2018). This Court may not read something into the statute "that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred by dismissing their petition for superintending control. We disagree.
"A superintending control order enforces the superintending control of a court over lower courts or tribunals." Beer v City of Fraser Civil Service Com'n, 127 Mich.App. 239, 242; 338 N.W.2d 197 (1983). The process of seeking an order of superintending control is not an appeal; rather, a petitioner seeking an order of superintending control requests that a higher court order a lower court or tribunal to perform a clear legal duty it has refused to perform. People v Yeotis (Flint Municipal Judge), 383 Mich. 429, 432; 175 N.W.2d 750 (1970); Michigan Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v Wayne Co Probate Judge, 79 Mich.App. 487, 492; 261 N.W.2d 60 (1977). This Court has previously set forth the general principles governing the issuance of an order of superintending control:
Superintending control is an extraordinary remedy generally limited to determining whether a lower court exceeded its jurisdiction, acted in a manner inconsistent with its jurisdiction, or failed to proceed according to law. Superintending control is the proper method to challenge the general practices of an inferior court. For superintending control to lie, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has failed to perform a clear legal duty and that plaintiff is otherwise without an adequate legal remedy. [In re Credit Acceptance Corp, 273 Mich.App. 594, 598; 733 N.W.2d 65 (2007), aff d sub nom Credit Acceptance Corp v 46th Dist Court, 481 Mich. 833 (2008) (citations omitted).]
MCL 764.1(1), 2014 PA 389, which was the version in effect at the time of this action and the circuit court's decision, provided:
For the apprehension of persons charged with a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation, a judge or district court magistrate may issue processes to implement this chapter, except that a judge or district court magistrate shall not issue a warrant for other than a minor offense unless an authorization in writing allowing the issuance of the warrant is filed with the judge or district court magistrate and, except as otherwise provided in this act, the authorization is signed by the prosecuting attorney, or unless security for costs is filed with the judge or district court magistrate. [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, MCR 6.101(C) (emphasis added) provides: "A complaint may not be filed without a prosecutor's written approval endorsed on the complaint or attached to it, or unless security for costs is filed with the court."
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