Burrill v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: RUGG
• Citation: Burrill v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 270 Mass. 316, 170 N.E. 65 (Mass. 1930)
• Decision Date: 30 January 1930
• Parties: BURRILL v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.

270 Mass. 316

170 N.E. 65

BURRILL

v.BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 30, 1930.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; J. H. Sick, Judge.

Action by Blanche Burrill against the Boston Elevated Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff. On defendant's exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

D. J. Lyne and D. E. Murphy, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

J. E. Hannigan, of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

[1] This is an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while a pedestrian on a public way, through the negligence of the motorman of a trolley car operated by the defendant. There was testimony tending to show that the plaintiff, intending to cross from the northerly to the southerly side of Broadway, a wide and busy street in Somerville, in the forenoon of a March day, looked for traffic, which was moving in both directions as she left the sidewalk, and, after burrying between automobiles, reached a safety zone adjacent to the nearer or northerly of the two tracks of the defendant near the middle of the street, which was marked at either end by a post; that she stopped in the safety zone and looked to her left for trolley cars approaching from that direction, but saw none; that then she looked to her right for about half a minute for traffic approaching from that direction, standing at a place where she thought she was safe, when she was struck and injured by a trolley car of the defendant coming from her left at an estimated speed of 25 miles an hour without any gong or other warning of approach being sounded. There was other testimony of a different and contradictory nature, but the plaintiff is entitled to have the evidence considered in its aspect most favorable to her. There was evidence that by city ordinance no trolley car was allowed near the place in question to attain a speed in excess of 10 miles an hour. There was also in evidence a rule of the defendant for guidance of its motormen to the effect that the gong must be sounded on approaching where persons may be expected to be and at all other places where to do so would avoid an accident.

[2] Manifestly there was evidence sufficient to support a finding of negligence of the defendant's motorman. The contrary has not been argued.

It could not rightly have been ruled as matter of law that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care. Being within a safety zone, the plaintiff might reasonably assume that, although on a busy thoroughfare in the midst of much travel, observation and plans as to her future conduct might be made in comparative security. She formed a judgment that she was in a safe place. Jeddrey v. Boston & Northern Street Railway, 198 Mass. 232, 235, 84 N. E. 316. She might also have relied to some extent on the presumption that the defendant would not run one of its cars at an excessive rate of sped, or without giving the customary signals of its approach. She had just looked in the direction from which came the car causing her injury and, although the street was visible for a considerable distance, had seen no car approaching. In all these circumstances her due care was a question of fact to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions. Magner v. Boston Elevated...