Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. State
| Decision Date | 26 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-213-A,75-213-A |
| Citation | 118 R.I. 154,372 A.2d 979 |
| Parties | BURRILLVILLE RACING ASSOCIATION v. STATE of Rhode Island. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is a civil action to enjoin the collection of the tax on admissions to certain racing events imposed by G.L. 1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 44-29-1 et seq. and to recover taxes previously collected pursuant to that statute. The plaintiff, Burrillville Racing Association (Burrillville), alleges that the statute is arbitrary and therefore in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. A Superior Court justice, sitting without a jury, upheld the statute. We affirm.
Burrillville is the owner and operator of a racetrack known as Lincoln Downs. Prior to 1969, Burrillville charged $1.50 to each patron admitted to its facility. In 1969, the Legislature enacted chapter 29 of title 44, entitled: Admissions Tax to Racing Events at which Pari-mutuel Betting is Permitted. Section 44-29-2 provides as follows:
Thereafter, Burrillville continued to charge $1.50 to enter the track, but posted signs at its ticket windows indicating that the admission fee was $1.25 and the admissions tax was 25 cents. Burrillville made regular returns to the tax administrator and between 1970 and 1975 paid admissions taxes in excess of $600,000. In January 1975, Burrillville brought this action to restrain the tax administrator from collecting the tax and to obtain a refund of all taxes previously collected.
We observe first that Burrillville may not be the proper plaintiff in this case. According to the terms of § 44-29-2, the tax is to be collected 'by the seller of any such admission at the time of the sale.' This language suggests that the tax should be viewed as one imposed on each individual patron, not on the operator of the racetrack. It is thus questionable whether Burrillville has any right to the claimed refund, or indeed whether it has any standing to object to the tax at all. See generally Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 Cal.2d 252, 23 Cal.Rptr. 589, 373 P.2d 637 (1962); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Rosenquist, 18 Ill.App.2d 16, 151 N.E.2d 462 (1958). However, the state apparently did not press this argument before the Superior Court. Moreover, whether or not Burrillville was the intended taxpayer, it appears from the fact that it paid the tax without raising its admission charge that it did in fact bear the burden of the tax. Therefore, we will proceed to consider the merits of the appeal.
Burrillville alleges that the admissions tax statute is in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because the distinction contained therein between racing events at which pari-mutuel betting is permitted and other sporting events is without any rational basis. The standard which we must apply is clear. Where, as here, the classification concerns taxation and neither impinges on a so-called fundamental right nor operates to discriminate against a class previously accorded 'suspect' status, the statute need only be supported by some rational and legitimate state interest. Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 193 (1st Cir. 1973). That is, it will not be held unconstitutional so long as the classification established, whether it be of the taxpayers affected or of the kind of property taxed, does not rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the purpose of the statute. Miniature Casting Corp. v. Norberg, R.I., 360 A.2d 105 (1976). Although no precise formula has been developed, it is clear that in this context the fourteenth amendment permits a state a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently from others. The Legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional power, and a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Imperial Car Rental Corp. v. Lussier, 97 R.I. 168, 174, 196 A.2d 728, 731 (1964). Furthermore, one who seeks a judicial veto of a legislative act on constitutional grounds...
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