Burris v. Dresser-Rand Co.
| Decision Date | 28 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16–CV–0198–CVE–FHM |
| Citation | 222 F.Supp.3d 1067 |
| Parties | Benita K. BURRIS, Plaintiff, v. DRESSER–RAND COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
Kris Ted Ledford, Ledford Law Firm, Owasso, OK, for Plaintiff.
Charles Sumner Plumb, III, McAfee & Taft (Tulsa), Tulsa, OK, Emily Samantha Borna, Eric Russell Magnus, Jackson Lewis PC (Atlanta), Atlanta, GA, Oscar John Norris, III, Jackson Lewis PC (Memphis), Memphis, TN, for Defendant.
Now before the Court is Defendant Dresser–Rand Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support (Dkt. # 26). Plaintiff brought this suit to collect overtime compensation to which plaintiff alleges she is entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (FLSA). Dkt. # 2, at 4. Defendant admits that plaintiff is not exempt from the FLSA overtime compensation requirement and that she is entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. Dkt. # 10, at 4. Defendant now presents two issues for consideration: (1) whether plaintiff's damages should be calculated using the "half-time" or "time-and-a-half" method; and (2) whether the applicable statute of limitations is two or three years. Dkt. # 26, at 6. Defendant moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that (1) damages should be calculated using the "half-time" method, and (2) that the applicable statute of limitations is two years. Id. Plaintiff responds that both issues should be decided by a jury. Dkt. # 30, at 23, 26.
Plaintiff is currently an employee of defendant, working in defendant's Tulsa office. Plaintiff began working for defendant's predecessor company in March 1977. Dkt. # 26, at 8; Dkt. # 30, at 9. Plaintiff began her career as a nonexempt1 employee. Dkt. # 26–1, at 5. By 1996, plaintiff was classified as an exempt employee.2 Plaintiff's scheduled hours of work are 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. with a one hour lunch break. Dkt. # 26, at 9; Dkt. # 30, at 11. At all times plaintiff was classified as an exempt employee, she understood that the hours she would actually work would sometimes exceed her scheduled hours. Id. Plaintiff's actual hours worked often exceeded forty hours a week. Id. When plaintiff worked more than forty hours in a week, her salary remained the same, and plaintiff did not expect additional payment for working additional hours. Id. Plaintiff's bi-weekly earning statements included an hours line that listed "80.00" by default. Dkt. # 26, at 11; Dkt. # 30, at 14.
In October 2015, defendant's compensation manager discovered that plaintiff's exempt classification was inconsistent with her position and notified Jeanne Foster, defendant's human resources manager, of the potential classification error. Dkt. # 26, at 13; Dkt. # 30, at 16. Foster began an investigation into plaintiff's classification. Id. In November or December 2015, Foster called plaintiff's supervisor, Kyle Smith, to ask him about plaintiff's job duties. Id. Based on her conversation with Smith, Foster determined that plaintiff should not be classified as an exempt employee. Dkt. # 26–2, at 9, 17. Foster then contacted defendant's in-house legal counsel regarding plaintiff's exemption classification. Dkt. # 26, at 14; Dkt. # 30, at 17. In January 2016, defendant officially changed plaintiff's classification from exempt to nonexempt. Dkt. # 26, at 14.
After reclassifying plaintiff, Foster asked plaintiff to submit a record of her overtime hours for the preceding two years so that defendant could make an overtime back payment to plaintiff. Dkt. # 26, at 14; Dkt # 30, at 18. Defendant offered to pay plaintiff for the overtime hours she submitted at "half-time" her usual rate. Dkt. # 26, at 15; Dkt. # 30, at 19. Defendant filed suit in this Court in April 2016, alleging that defendant failed to pay her overtime compensation to which she was entitled under the FLSA. Dkt. # 2, at 4. Defendant admits that it misclassified plaintiff as exempt, but denies the amount of damages to which plaintiff alleges she is entitled. Dkt. # 10, at 3–4.
Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Kendall v. Watkins , 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ " Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In essence, the inquiry for the Court is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that the party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In its review, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Garratt v. Walker , 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
Congress passed the FLSA in 1938 to protect workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours, which it found to be detrimental to the "health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers."
Barrentine v. Ark.–Best Freight Sys., Inc. , 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) ). The FLSA is designed to ensure each employee receives "[a] fair day's pay for a fair day's work." Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel , 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682 (1942) (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. 4983 (1937) (message of President Roosevelt)) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston , 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). The FLSA "established a comprehensive remedial scheme requiring a minimum wage and limiting the maximum number of hours worked, absent payment of an overtime wage for all hours worked in excess of the specified maximum number." Lamon v. City of Shawnee , 972 F.2d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 1992). Under § 207, employers are required to compensate employees for time worked in a week in excess of forty hours at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the employee's regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). However, certain employees are exempt from the overtime compensation requirement. See id. § 213.
Here, defendant admits that it misclassified plaintiff as an exempt employee, and that plaintiff is entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. Dkt. # 10, at 4. However, the parties disagree on the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled. Defendant moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that damages should be calculated using the "half-time" method, and that the applicable statute of limitations is two years. Dkt. # 26, at 6.
The Court first considers the method by which plaintiff's overtime damages should be calculated. The FLSA requires employers to compensate nonexempt employees at one and one-half times the employee's regular rate for time worked beyond forty hours. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). For hourly employees, their regular rate is simply their hourly rate. Thus, they are due overtime pay at one and one-half times their hourly rate. However, determining the regular rate and overtime compensation of an employee who works variable hours but receives a flat salary is less straightforward.
In Overnight Motor , the Supreme Court addressed the regular rate issue as applied to a salaried employee who worked variable hours. Missel was a rate clerk for Overnight Motor. Overnight Motor , 316 U.S. at 574, 62 S.Ct. 1216. He worked up to eighty hours a week, with an average workweek of sixty-five hours, and was paid a flat salary no matter the number of hours worked. Id. Missel brought a suit to recover unpaid overtime compensation. Id. Overnight Motor argued that even though Missel worked long hours, his salary was high enough that he was paid more than if he were paid the minimum wage for his regular hours and one and one-half times the minimum wage for his overtime hours. Id. at 575, 62 S.Ct. 1216. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the overtime compensation requirement is separate from the minimum wage requirement, and that the FLSA requires employers to pay employees overtime at one and one-half times their regular rate, not the minimum wage. Id. at 577, 62 S.Ct. 1216. The Court was then faced with determining the meaning of "the regular rate at which he is employed." Id. at 579, 62 S.Ct. 1216. The Court found:
No problem is presented in assimilating the computation of overtime for employees...
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