Burruss v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Frederick Cnty.
| Decision Date | 25 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Sept. Term, 2011.,No. 99,99 |
| Citation | 46 A.3d 1182,427 Md. 231 |
| Parties | Ellis C. BURRUSS, et al. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FREDERICK COUNTY, et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John L. Thompson, Jr., Walkersville, MD, for appellants.
Daniel B. Loftus (Daniel B. Loftus, P.C., Frederick, MD), on brief, for appellees.
John S. Mathias, Co. Atty. (Michael J. Chomel, Sr., Asst. Co. Atty., Frederick, MD), on brief, for appellees.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA, WILNER, and ALAN M. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
On March 10, 2011, the Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County (BOCC) appointed a nine-member charter board, in accordance with the provisions of Md. Const. art. XI–A, § 1A.1Article XI–A, section 1A of the Maryland Constitution provides that, upon satisfaction of certain requirements, the board of county commissioners shall hold a special election for consideration of additional nominated charter board members. To request a special election under this provision, a petition must be submitted to the board of county commissioners containing the signatures of three percent of the registeredvoters in the county or two thousand registered voters, whichever is less. Md. Const. art. XI–A, § 1A. Ellis C. Burruss and other individuals who sought membership on the charter board (collectively, Petitioners) 2 circulated a petition in support of nominating candidates for consideration at a special election. On May 9, 2011, Petitioners submitted to the BOCC a petition purporting to contain 2,915 signatures of registered voters in Frederick County. The Frederick County Board of Elections (the Board) thereafter engaged in the process of validating, verifying, and counting the petition entries. Upon review of the petition submitted by Petitioners, and the signatures contained therein, the Board determined that Petitioners did not satisfy the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for the BOCC to call a special election. Specifically, the Board determined that many of the submitted petition signatures were invalid under Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6–203 of the Election Law Article,3 as interpreted by this Court in Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire–Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 15 A.3d 798 (2011) [hereinafter Fire–Rescue]. Stuart Harvey, Election Director and Chief Election Official, notified the BOCC of the Board's determination.4
Pursuant to Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6–209 of the Election Law Article, Petitioners filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Frederick County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board incorrectly applied the law regarding validation of petition signatures and that the applicable law was whether there was “sufficient cumulative information,” a phrase appearing in Fire–Rescue, from which the Board could identify a signatory on a petition as a registered voter in Frederick County. Petitioners also claimed that the doctrine of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion bound Respondents to the determinations of law made by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in Libertarian Party, et al. v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, et al.5 In their alternative argument, Petitioners contended that if the court did not adopt their suggested “sufficient cumulative information” standard for validation of petition signatures, § 6–203(a) and COMAR § 33.06.03.06B(1)6 should be declared unconstitutional.
Following a hearing on the various issues, the Circuit Court judge affirmed the determination made by the Board that the petition contained an insufficient number of valid signatures to require the BOCC to hold a special election. The judge stated, in open court, essentially that the signature validation requirements in § 6–203(a) were mandatory and that Fire–Rescue did not establish a “sufficient cumulative information” standard. The judge further determined that the doctrine of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion did not apply because the parties in the instant case were not parties in the Anne Arundel County case and because the issues in each case were different. Finally, the judge reasoned that no matter what level of scrutiny applied to the enactments at issue, the enactments were not unconstitutional.
Petitioners noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Around the same time, Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and Respondents filed a cross-petition and a Motion to Dismiss.7 Prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider the issues presented in Petitioners' petition. We declined, however, to grant certiorari to consider the cross-petition, and we denied the Motion to Dismiss. Burruss v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Frederick Cnty., 424 Md. 54, 33 A.3d 981 (2011). We have rephrased the following questions 8 posed by Petitioners:
1. Did the Frederick County Board of Elections apply the correct standard for reviewing and validating petition signaturesunder Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6–203(a) of the Election Law Article, as interpreted by the Court in Fire–Rescue?
2. In light of the declaratory judgment issued in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, in the case of Libertarian Party, et al. v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, et al., that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard is the correct standard to apply when validating and counting petition signatures, does the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel apply to preclude Respondents in the present case from relitigating that issue?
3. Do the signature validation requirements in § 6–203(a) and COMAR § 33.06.03.06B(1) violate the Maryland Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights?
In accordance with our recent opinion in Md. State Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party, 426 Md. 488, 44 A.3d 1002 (2012), we shall hold that the Board applied the correct standard for reviewing and validating petition signatures under § 6–203(a) of the Election Law Article, as interpreted by this Court in Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 962 A.2d 342 (2008) and Fire–Rescue. Furthermore, we hold that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable to the circumstances of this case. Lastly, we hold that the mandatory petition signature requirements in § 6–203(a) and COMAR § 33.06.03.06B(1) are not unconstitutional.
Article XI–A, § 1A of the Maryland Constitution provides that the board of county commissioners may appoint a charter board for the purpose of drafting and presenting a charter to the voters of the county. After appointing the charter board,
[i]f additional charter board members are nominated by petitions signed by three percent of the registered voters of the county or by two thousand registered voters, whichever is the lesser number, delivered to the board of county commissioners within sixty days after the charter board is appointed, the board of county commissioners shall call a special election not less than thirty or more than ninety days after receiving petitions, unless a regular election falls within the designated period.
Md. Const. art. XI–A, § 1A. Article XI–A, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution defines “petition” and grants the General Assembly certain powers in connection with petitions:
The word “Petition” as used in this Article means one or more sheets written or printed, or partly written and partly printed. There shall be attached to each paper of signatures filed with a petition an affidavit of the person procuring those signatures that the signatures were affixed in his presence and that, based upon the person's best knowledge and belief, every signature on the paper is genuine and bona fide and that the signers are registered voters at the address set opposite or below their names. The General Assembly shall prescribe by law the form of the petition, the manner for verifying its authenticity, and other administrative procedures which facilitate the petition process and which are not in conflict with this Article. The false signing of any name, or the signing of any fictitious name to said petition shall be forgery, and the making of any false affidavit in connection with said petition shall be perjury.
In accordance with the provisions of Article XI–A, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution, Title 6 of the Election Law Article provides a two-step process, involving validation and verification, for counting signatures on a petition. 9 The signature validation procedure is outlined in Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6–203 of the Election Law Article:
(a) In general.—To sign a petition, an individual shall:
(1) sign the individual's name as it appears on the statewide voter registration list or the individual's surname of registration and at least one full given name and the initials of any other names; and (2) include the following information, printed or typed, in the spaces provided:
(i) the signer's name as it was signed;
(ii) the signer's address;
(iii) the date of signing; and
(iv) other information required by regulations adopted by the State Board.
(b) Validation and counting.—The signature of an individual shall be validated and counted if:
(1) the requirements of subsection (a) of this section have been satisfied;
(2) the individual is a registered voter assigned to the county specified on the signature page and, if applicable, in a particular geographic area of the county;
(3) the individual has not previously signed the same petition;
(4) the signature is attested by an affidavit appearing on the page on which the signature appears;
(5) the date accompanying the signature is not later than the date of the affidavit on the page; and
(6) if applicable, the signature was affixed within the requisite period of time, as specified by law.
COMAR § 33.06.03.06B was enacted for the purpose of implementing the petition...
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