Burstyn v. City of Miami Beach
| Decision Date | 12 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-515-Civ.,84-515-Civ. |
| Parties | Judah BURSTYN, Efraim Burstyn, Adele Burstyn, and Sam Burstyn, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Peter M. Siegel, and Randall C. Berg, Jr., Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs.
Greg M. Gaebe, Gaebe & Murphy, Coral Gables, Fla., for defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At issue in this non-jury trial are five provisions of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance that regulate adult congregate living facilities (ACLFs). The plaintiffs allege that the provisions are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and that they violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The court bifurcated the damages issues and initially considered only the validity of the ordinance.
1. ACLFs are defined in Fla.Stat. § 400.402(2) as places that undertake "to provide, for a period exceeding 24 hours, housing, food service, and one or more personal services for four or more adults, not related to the owner or administrator by blood or marriage, who require such services." Virtually the same definition appears in Miami Beach City Ordinance 83-2381.
2. Personal services are defined in Fla. Stat. § 400.402(8) as including "individual assistance with or supervision of essential activities of daily living, such as eating, bathing, grooming, dressing, and ambulating; supervision of self-administered medication; and other similar services which the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services may define." Virtually the same definition appears in Miami Beach City Ordinance 83-2381.
3. ACLF residents tend to be elderly and/or to have physical or mental impairments.
4. The Burstyns challenge five provisions of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance, which were adopted June 15, 1983, in City Ordinance 83-2381, and which are codified as Sections 28-2-A-1, 28-2-A-2, 28-2-A-3, 28-2-A-4, and 28-3-B-8. Section 28-2-A-1 limits ACLFs to buildings of no more than four stories in height; Section 28-2-A-2 prohibits ACLFs on bayfront or oceanfront property; Section 28-2-A-3 prohibits ACLFs on Ocean Drive, Collins Avenue, Ocean Terrace, Indian Creek Drive, 41st Street, Lincoln Road, and Washington Avenue; Section 28-2-A-4 places a cap of 2,000 on the number of ACLF residents in Miami Beach; and Section 28-3-B-8 provides that there should be a minimum of 1,500 foot separation between ACLFs.
5. The plaintiffs, Judah Burstyn, Efraim Burstyn, Adele Burstyn, Eileen Burstyn, and Sam Burstyn, are partners who own and operate the Blackstone Hotel and the Charles Hotel.
6. The Blackstone Hotel is located at 800 Washington Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida.
7. The Charles Hotel is located at 1475 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida.
8. The Blackstone Hotel is a twelve-story structure.
9. The Charles Hotel is a five-story structure.
10. Neither the Blackstone Hotel nor the Charles Hotel is located on bayfront or oceanfront property.
11. The present number of ACLF beds on Miami Beach is substantially less than 2,000.
12. In 1985, the Blackstone Hotel was provisionally licensed as an ACLF by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
13. ACLFs, in compliance with the restrictions set out above, as well as with the other restrictions contained in Section 28 of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance, may be located in the following zoning districts as conditional uses: The Planned United Residential Development District; RM-060, RM-100, and RM-125 Multifamily Residential Districts; and C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, and C-5 Commercial Districts.
14. Special use permits are to be granted for ACLFs on Miami Beach only if the mandatory requirements of Zoning Ordinance Section 28 are met, and only upon unanimous vote of the City Commission.
15. ACLFs are the only type of structures that are allowed on Miami Beach only if a special use permit is granted. All other types of structures can exist in some type of zoning district as of right.
16. The purpose the city asserts for the four-story height restriction on ACLFs is fire safety. It asserts the limitation is necessary to ensure that persons who are not fully ambulatory will be able to leave the ACLFs in the event of fire.
17. The Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance does not impose height restrictions on any types of structures other than ACLFs.
18. Neither national nor Florida fire safety standards impose any height restrictions on the basis of the ambulatoriness of the structure's residents. Indeed, height restrictions are not imposed on hospitals and nursing homes. Instead, taller buildings are simply required to have increased fire suppression mechanisms.
19. The purposes the city asserts for the oceanfront and bayfront restrictions and the named streets restrictions are (1) increasing tourism and encouraging related commercial and economic development through proper utilization of property and by removing sick and elderly people from areas frequented by tourists; (2) providing safe, pleasant surroundings for ACLF residents; and (3) furthering the desires of potential ACLF residents to be in quiet, secluded places.
20. ACLFs are the only type of residential structure expressly banned from oceanfront and bayfront areas in Miami Beach on the basis of the nature of their residents.
21. ACLFs are the only type of residential structures expressly banned from named streets in Miami Beach.
22. Only a small proportion of the elderly or ill population living on Miami Beach resides in ACLFs.
23. None of the restricted areas are zoned for tourist uses only. Other types of residential structures are allowed on oceanfront and bayfront property and on the streets named in Section 28 of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance.
24. Many elderly persons who, like ACLF residents, need some assistance in daily living, live in older hotels in Miami Beach. Many of these structures, which are in compliance with zoning provisions relating to hotels, are located on the streets named in the ACLF provision or on the oceanfront or bayfront. Many of those structures also exceed four stories in height.
25. Some streets where ACLFs are permitted have traffic patterns similar to streets where ACLFs are banned. For example, traffic patterns on Harding Avenue, where ACLFs are allowed, are similar to traffic patterns on Collins Avenue, where ACLFs are banned.
26. Where any finding of fact, in whole or in part, can be deemed a conclusion of law, it shall. Where any conclusion of law, in whole or in part, can be deemed a finding of fact, it shall.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since this action arises under the Constitution of the United States.
In reviewing the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance, the court will presume its validity. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32, 83 S.Ct. 594, 597, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963).
Section 28 of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance absolutely bars the use of the Blackstone Hotel or the Charles Hotel as ACLFs because both exceed four stories in height and both are located on prohibited streets. Under these circumstances, a use permit cannot be granted, pursuant to Section 28 of the Miami Beach Zoning Ordinance.
The equal protection clause is essentially a directive to the state that persons similarly situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). This constitutional directive is met when the challenged ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439, 105 S.Ct. at 3254.
The close factual similarity between Cleburne and the instant case mandates that this court follow Cleburne. In Cleburne, a corporation that wished to operate a group home for the mentally retarded challenged the validity of a zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for that use. Special use permits were not required for other uses. The plaintiffs argued that the mentally retarded were a suspect class, and discriminating against the group home and its potential residents though the ordinance violated their equal protection rights.
The Supreme Court held in Cleburne that the mentally retarded have distinguishing characteristics relevant to some state interests and, thus, they did not form a suspect or quasi-suspect class. The court held, however, that the difference between the retarded and the general population did not support the conclusion that the city's legitimate interests were served by requiring a special use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded. The record in Cleburne did not support the notion that a group home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests. Instead, the court concluded that the city's decision to require a special use permit was based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.
Just as the state can legitimately pass legislation dealing with and providing for the mentally retarded, thereby distinguishing them from others, the state also can legitimately pass statutes that recognize and deal with the differences between ACLF residents and others. Indeed, the State of Florida did just that in Fla.Stat. §§ 400.401, et seq., which define ACLFs and provides for regulation of them. Thus, heightened scrutiny of Miami Beach Zoning Code § 28 is not called for in this case, and the court will apply the rational basis test.
"To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between one group and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." C...
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