Burt v. Staffeld

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MONTGOMERY, J.
• Citation: Burt v. Staffeld, 121 Mich. 390, 80 N.W. 236 (Mich. 1899)
• Decision Date: 27 September 1899
• Parties: BURT v. STAFFELD et al.

80 N.W. 236

121 Mich. 390

BURT v. STAFFELD et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

September 27, 1899

Error to circuit court, Ionia county; Frank D. M. Davis, Judge.

Action by Theresa M. Burt against Paul Staffeld and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

R. A. Hawley, for appellant.

V. H. &amp H. H. Smith, for appellees.

MONTGOMERY J.

The plaintiff, while crossing Yeomans street, in the city of Ionia, on the 15th day of February, 1897, was injured by collision with a coasting sled on which defendants were coasting. She brings this action, alleging that the defendants were guilty of negligence. At the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff the circuit judge directed a verdict for defendants on the ground that the plaintiff was not herself in the exercise of due care. The plaintiff brings error.

In Burford v. City of Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98, 18 N.W 571, it was held that it was not negligence per se to coast on a public Street; that the sport is not entirely foreign to the purpose for which public ways are established. It was also said in the case that: 'Any person making use of the public highways must use them with care, and must have due regard to the rights of others. Those having occasion to use them for the customary purposes of travel and passage have the first right, and their use must not be obstructed, except under circumstances that are quite exceptional, and that work out a clear excuse.' In the present case we think it was clearly a question for the jury as to whether the defendants were negligent in coasting at such a rate of speed as prevented their having their sleds under such control as to prevent collision with pedestrians, and as to whether they gave timely warning. There was evidence that the coaster had attained a very high rate of speed, and it was a fair question for the jury as to whether proper control of the same was possible.

The question of plaintiff's care is one of more difficulty but we are all of the opinion that under the proofs this was also a question for the jury. It appears that the plaintiff knew that coasting had been and was being practiced on the street, and undoubtedly this fact may and should be considered by the jury in determining whether she was duly careful in approaching the place where she received her injuries. The evidence does not show that she looked up the hill, and if is fairly inferable that, had she...