Burt v. Volkswagen Grp. Am., Inc.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: R. DAVID PROCTOR, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Burt v. Volkswagen Grp. Am., Inc., 790 F.Supp.3d 1309 (N.D. Ala. 2025)
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:24-cv-01693-RDP
• Decision Date: 11 June 2025
• Parties: Dagney Johnson BURT, Plaintiff, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. et al., Defendants.

790 F.Supp.3d 1309

Dagney Johnson BURT, Plaintiff, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 2:24-cv-01693-RDP

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

Signed June 11, 2025

Mark Randall Ekonen, W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., Taylor C. Bartlett, Heninger Garrison Davis LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Brian T. Carr, Michael B. Gallub, Pro Hac Vice, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, New York, NY, Jonathan R. Hirsch, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Morgan Melissa Turner, Thomas E. Bazemore, III, Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Class Action Complaint. (Doc. # 26). The Motion has been full briefed (Docs. # 29, 31), and is ripe for decision. After careful review and for the following reasons, the Motion is due to be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff Dagney Johnson Burt is an Alabama resident who, in November 2022, purchased new a Volkswagen Atlas (2.0L), Vehicle Identification No. 1V2DP2CAXPC518766 ("Vehicle" or "Putative Class Vehicle") from an authorized Volkswagen dealership in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. # 16 at ¶¶ 1, 16, 40).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. provided an express warranty on Plaintiff's vehicle for a period of 4 years or 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first. (Id. at ¶ 111). Plaintiff claims that in the Warranty booklet, Defendant represented that her Putative Class Vehicle was free of defects. (Id. at ¶ 49).

One of the main and important reasons for Plaintiff selecting her Vehicle was its 2.0L Petrol Engine which was advertised by Defendant as efficient, safe, and reliable. (Id. at ¶ 42). Before her purchase, Plaintiff saw Volkswagen's newspaper, magazine, social media, in store, and television ads touting that the new, certified pre-owned, and used Putative Class Vehicles were reliable, durable, safe, efficient, fit, and exceptional in quality, and that they were premium products. (Id. at ¶ 44). Plaintiff relied on Defendant's representations in making her purchase. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle she purchased in Alabama in November 2022 contained a latently defective Oil Separator. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 43). Plaintiff filed this case asserting individual and class claims related to the allegedly defective Oil Separator (sometimes referred to as the PCV Valve) in certain cars manufactured by Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3). For ease of reference, the court refers to this mechanical issue as the "Oil Separator Defect."

Plaintiff asserts that she first became aware of the Oil Separator Defect on or about November 6, 2024 when she was quoted a cost of more than $2,100 to repair and replace it. (Id. at ¶ 50). In making this allegation, Plaintiff referred to an "Exh. A." (Docs. # 1, 16). However, no "Exh. A" was attached to either the Complaint or the FAC. (Docs. # 1, 16).

Defendant denied Plaintiff's request to repair and replace the defective Oil Separator at their expense or at no cost to Plaintiff (i.e., a Warranty repair). (Id. at ¶ 51).

Two documents central to Plaintiff's Complaint and later-filed First Amended Complaint ("FAC") that were not attached to those pleadings are (1) the Warranty on which she bases her breach of warranty claim (Id. at ¶ 31) ("For each Putative Class Vehicle, Defendant issued an express warranty which covered the vehicle"), and (2) the document evincing her notice about the allegedly defective Oil Separator (Id. at ¶ 50) ("Ms. Burt first became aware of the Oil Separator Defect on or about November 6, 2024 when she was quoted more than $2,100 to repair and replace the defective Oil Separator. See Exh. A."). Nevertheless, Defendant filed those documents as exhibits to its Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. # 26-2, 26-3, 26-4).

"When a court deciding a motion to dismiss considers documents beyond the complaint, the motion is typically converted to one for summary judgment." Thornton v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 2023 WL 4612697, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 4611807 (M.D. Ala. July 18, 2023) (citing Finn v. Gunter, 722 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1984)). "However, under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, a court may consider evidence attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if (1) the plaintiff refers to the document in the complaint, (2) the document is "central to the plaintiff's claim," and (3) the document's contents are undisputed." Thornton, 2023 WL 4612697, at *3 (citing Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023) (in turn citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002) and Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997))). "Evidence is 'undisputed' in this context if its authenticity is unchallenged." Id. (citing Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1134). Plaintiff has not challenged the authenticity of these documents, nor has she objected to those documents, and she has conceded that she sought repair for the alleged defect at issue after the term of the warranty expired. (Docs. # 26-4, # 29 at 8).

The dealer record dated November 6, 2024, which is the date when Plaintiff alleges she was put on notice of the allegedly defective Oil Separator, shows that the mileage on her car at that time was 57,243 miles, well over the 50,000 mile mark when the express warranty expired. (Doc. # 16 at ¶ 111).

As a result of the Oil Separator Defect, Plaintiff's vehicle began to leak oil, which has resulted in Plaintiff having to purchase oil in between service trips, and oil leaking from the vehicle has stained her driveway. (Id. at ¶ 52). The leaking oil has also damaged the streets and other parking areas within the community where Plaintiff resides, and Plaintiff has been made aware by her homeowners association that she is responsible for remediating the oil stains caused by the oil leaking from her vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 53).

Plaintiff alleges that each Putative Class Vehicle is a premium vehicle that comes with a relatively high price tag, purportedly in exchange for a vehicle that is superior to others in quality, safety, looks, drivability, efficiency, fit, and finish. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff alleges she sought out and purchased her vehicle intentionally after seeing and relying on Defendant's ads. (Id.).

Plaintiff also contends Defendant manufactured and sold the Putative Class Vehicles with the Oil Separator Defect while concealing that defect. (Id. at ¶ 55). Defendant directly markets the Putative Class Vehicles to consumers via extensive nationwide, multimedia advertising campaigns on television, the Internet, billboards, print publications, mailings, and through other mass media that advertised the Class Vehicle's 2.0L engine as one that "balances efficiency and power." (Id. at ¶¶ 55-57). In its advertising, Defendant also touted its engine as "lightweight" and containing "modern technology." (Id. at ¶ 57).

Due to the Oil Separator Defect, Plaintiff alleges that the Putative Class Vehicles fail to adhere to Defendant's own standards and are neither efficient, safe, nor reliable. (Id. at ¶ 24). The Oil Separator Defect has affected the resale and buyback value of the Putative Class Vehicles. (Id. at ¶ 25).

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant knew or should have known, before marketing and selling the Putative Class Vehicles to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, about the Oil Separator Defect. Yet, Defendant continued to sell the Putative Class Vehicles with the hope that Putative Class Members would not experience the Oil Separator Defect within the applicable warranty period. (Id. at ¶ 27).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated its duty to engineer, manufacture, develop, construct, inspect, and test the Putative Class Vehicles to make them suitable for the ordinary purposes of their use. (Id. at ¶ 32). She further alleges that Defendant breached its warranties for the Putative Class Vehicles because of the latent defect with the Oil Separator and by failing to repair the Oil Separator, and otherwise continuing to use a defective Oil Separator on their vehicles. (Id. at ¶ 33).

Plaintiff has also alleged the following. As a result of Defendant's affirmative marketing and failure to disclose the known defect, Plaintiff and Putative Class Members formed a reasonable belief and expectation that the 2.0L Petrol Engine in the Putative Class Vehicles was of high quality, would endure, was safe, was reliable, and would positively impact resale value of the vehicles and would not fail under normal circumstances. (Id. at ¶ 62). Plaintiff and Putative Class Members justifiably and reasonably relied on this reasonable belief and Defendant's misleading marking that concealed the Oil Separator Defect when they purchased or leased their Putative Class Vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 62, 63). Defendant's failure to inform Plaintiff and Putative Class Members of the defect caused Plaintiff and Putative Class Members harm. (Id. at ¶ 65). Because of the disparity between the quality of the Putative Class Vehicles negotiated for and the Putative Class Vehicles actually received, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members suffered economic harm. (Id. at ¶ 86).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant concealed material information regarding the true nature of the Oil Separator Defect in every communication they had with Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members and made contrary representations about the quality and durability of the Putative Class Vehicles. (Id. at ¶ 104).

II. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, the complaint...