Burton v. E. Ala. Lumber Co., Civil Action No. 3:14cv1238-WHA (wo)
| Decision Date | 17 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:14cv1238-WHA (wo) |
| Parties | TOMMY DAVID BURTON, Plaintiff, v. EAST ALABAMA LUMBER CO., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #23), filed by the Defendant on November 2, 2015.
The Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case on December 22, 2014, bringing claims of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I); retaliation, also in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II), and a §1981 racially-hostile work environment claim (Count III).
The court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims. 28 U.S.C. §1331.
For the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED.
Summary judgment is proper "if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," relying on submissions "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Both the party "asserting that a fact cannot be," and a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed, must support their assertions by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A),(B). Acceptable materials under Rule 56(c)(1)(A) include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials."
To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, construed in a light mostfavorable to the non-movant:
The Plaintiff, Burton, an African-American male, was employed with Defendant East Alabama Lumber Co., Inc. ("EAL"). EAL has a sawmill where trees are reduced to rough lumber. During the process of cutting trees into rough lumber, debarked logs with the edges cut off are called cants. The cants are transferred to a gang saw which cuts the cants into lumber. The gang saw machinery is called a gang transfer station. Once the pieces are cut, they are dried and sorted.
Burton was initially hired as a laborer at EAL in May of 2013. He was moved to operator in July of 2013 and received a raise. At the time of his discharge in June of 2014, he was operating the old gang transfer station.
Tommy Gaberlavage ("Gaberlavage") was the plant Manager during the relevant time and had four supervisors who reported to him. Burton believed his immediate supervisor to be Doug Ewell ("Ewell").
Burton did not experience any race-related issues or problems at EAL until January of 2014. Burton has provided evidence that between January of 2014 and June of 2014, when his employment ended, he was subjected to racial slurs. Burton has stated in his deposition that he had a run-in with James Gasaway ("Gasaway"), a supervisor, in January of 2014 in which Gasaway stated, "Sooner or later, boy, I am going to have your job." (Doc. #23-2 at p.162:22-163:1). A month later, Gasaway said, "Nigger, I am going to have your job." Gasaway called Burton that severe racial epithet two additional times. Although Gasaway was a supervisor at EAL, he stated in his deposition that he was not Burton's supervisor. (Doc. #23-4 at p. 32:14-19). Gasaway stated that Ewell and Gaberlavage were Burton's supervisors.
In another exchange with Gasaway, Gasaway told Burton that Ewell wanted Burton totrain another employee for the job, and when Burton said that Ewell had not mentioned training that employee, Gasaway stated, "Boy, you just ain't going to do right, is you?" To which Burton responded that he would not train anybody on the machine unless asked to do so by his supervisor.
Burton states in his deposition that he told Gaberlavage that Gasaway used a racial epithet and Gaberlavage told him to let it roll off his back. Burton also complained to Ewell about Gasaway.
Burton overheard Ewell say to Gasaway after Burton complained to Ewell about Gasaway, "We got to get this nigger out of here" (Doc. #23-2 at p.186:5-9). Ewell also commented, "I wish this nigger would hurry up," when Burton and another employee were working to repair a chain. (Doc. #23-2 at p.251:1-4). Ewell also walked by Burton and said, "nigger." (Doc. #23-2 at p. 202:4-16). Burton additionally states that he was exposed to racial graffiti whenever he used the bathroom stalls in the only bathroom at the mill. (Doc. #23-2 at p.242-243). Finally, Burton states that he saw an image of Ewell in a Ku Klux Klan outfit on Ewell's phone as Ewell was showing the image to Gasaway.
Burton was terminated and replaced as the operator of the old gang saw transfer station by a Hispanic man. Gaberlavage made the decision to terminate Burton's employment. Ewell was also involved in the decision to terminate Burton's employment. (Doc. #23-3at p. 5). EAL states that Burton was fired for not meeting productivity expectations, breaking machinery, and not following directions from his supervisor. Burton has testified that he was initially told that he was being laid off due to lack of work, and he disputes that he had productivity issues at EAL.
The first issue raised is whether Burton has sufficient evidence to establish a directevidence case of race discrimination in termination.
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of the fact without an inference or presumption. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581,-82 (11th Cir. 1982). Only the most blatant remarks whose intent could mean nothing other than to discrimination on the basis of an impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F3d 1087, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004). Burton points to statements made by Gasaway and Ewell as being direct evidence of race discrimination.
EAL responds that Gaberlavage was the decision maker at EAL and there is no evidence he terminated Burton because of his race. While Burton does not point to racial statements made by Gaberlavage, he does rely on a racial statement made by Ewell, and the Answers to Interrogatories provided to the court state that Ewell was also involved in the decision to terminate Burton's employment. (Doc. #23-3 at p.5). The statement attributed to Ewell, which Burton overheard Ewell make and contends is direct evidence of discrimination, is, "We got to get this nigger out of here."
"Remarks unrelated to the decisionmaking process itself are not direct evidence of discrimination." Standard v. A.B.E.L., Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Racial epithets can be considered direct evidence of discrimination when they are directed at terminated employee at the time of discharge. See Lamothe v. Bal Harbour 101 Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 316 F. App'x 844, 846 (11th Cir. 2008) ().
Ewell's statement was not directed to Burton, and was not made contemporaneously with Burton's termination. In fact, an inference must be drawn to conclude that Ewell is referring to Burton. The court concludes, therefore, that the evidence pointed to by Burton in the form of statements by decision maker Ewell are not direct evidence of discrimination.
Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to prove intentional discrimination on the basis of race under § 1981 by using circumstantial evidence of intent, the court applies the framework set out for Title VII cases by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production is placed upon the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The plaintiff may seek to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Id. at 256; Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit...
To continue reading
Request your trial