Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 87 (Conn. 12/16/2003)
| Decision Date | 16 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16655) |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | NANCY BURTON <I>v.</I> HONORABLE A. WILLIAM MOTTOLESE. |
The plaintiff in error brought a writ of error from the order of the trial court disbarring her from the practice of law, claiming that that court had denied her due process in the disciplinary proceeding it had conducted in connection with her representation of several individuals in an action to prevent the development of a subdivision in the town of Monroe. Held:
1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court failed to give her adequate notice of the charges against her; that court's written orders concerning the subject matter of the hearings it had scheduled to investigate allegations of misconduct and its oral notification to the plaintiff, prior to the adjudicatory phase of those proceedings, that the issues that would be considered were her authority to represent the plaintiffs in the underlying action, her continued activity in that action after her clients had directed her to take no further action and the division of her loyalty between her interests and the interests of her clients sufficiently apprised the plaintiff of the transactions that formed the basis of the allegations of misconduct.
2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court lacked the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against her because such proceedings may be instituted only by filing a formal written complaint with the statewide grievance committee was unavailing; the Superior Court has inherent authority to discipline members of the bar, and the creation of the statewide grievance committee was not intended to provide an exclusive mode of attorney discipline, but, rather, the rules of practice (§ 2-45) provide that the statewide grievance committee and its grievance panels shall defer to the court if the court chooses to exercise its jurisdiction.
3. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court displayed actual bias toward her in violation of her right to due process of law; the actions and statements of the trial court relied on by the plaintiff to support her claim of bias did not show actual bias against her, nor did they raise a reasonable question as to the trial court's impartiality.
4. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in professional misconduct, the evidence presented having been sufficient to support that court's findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff's conduct was in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; the plaintiff engaged in the unauthorized representation of eighteen of the twenty-two plaintiffs in the underlying case, the plaintiff's conduct in the underlying litigation resulted in a conflict between her interest in pursuing the litigation and the interests of the plaintiffs in that action in ceasing it, the plaintiff made misrepresentations to the court and engaged in inappropriate conduct in connection with her allegations of gender bias that were wholly conclusory and without factual support, and the plaintiff's professional performance during the underlying proceedings fell below the acceptable standard of competence.
5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the plaintiff's disbarment; under the circumstances here, the sanction of disbarment was not disproportionate to the violations found.
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Procedural History
Writ of error from an order of the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Mottolese, J., disbarring the plaintiff in error from the practice of law; thereafter, this court granted the defendant in error's motion to dismiss a portion of the writ of error. Writ of error dismissed.
Nancy Burton, with whom was Conrad Ost Seifert, for the plaintiff in error.
Eliot D. Prescott, assistant attorney general, with whom were Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the defendant in error.
The plaintiff in error, Nancy Burton (plaintiff), an attorney, brings this writ of error claiming that the defendant in error, Honorable A. William Mottolese (trial court), improperly concluded that the plaintiff had violated several Rules of Professional Conduct and that the imposition of the sanction of disbarment violated her due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court: (1) violated her due process rights by failing to give her prior written notice of the charges against her; (2) lacked the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings because such proceedings may be instituted only by filing a formal written complaint with the statewide grievance committee; (3) violated her due process rights because the trial court displayed actual bias toward her; (4) improperly concluded that she had engaged in professional misconduct; and (5) improperly imposed the sanction of disbarment. We reject all these claims and, accordingly, dismiss the writ of error.
The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. On December 22, 1999, in response to a decision of the zoning board of appeals of the town of Monroe (board) to allow the use of a rock crusher during the construction of a new residential subdivision, two of the plaintiffs in the underlying action, Joseph Sullivan and Lenore Sullivan (Sullivans), organized a neighborhood meeting at a restaurant in Monroe. The purpose of the meeting was to recruit others to become coplaintiffs in an appeal from the decision of the board to allow the use of the rock crusher. Before the meeting, Joseph Sullivan prepared a sign-up sheet for those interested in becoming coplaintiffs in the appeal.1 Also prior to the meeting, Joseph Sullivan contacted the plaintiff, who agreed to make an oral presentation at the meeting. During the December 22 meeting, twenty people signed the sign-up sheets that had been circulated, agreeing to become coplaintiffs in the action to appeal from the board's zoning decision.
In addition to filing an appeal from the board's zoning decision, the plaintiff, on behalf of the Sullivans and the twenty additional people who had signed the sign-up sheets, filed the action underlying this writ of error, which sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the development of the subdivision until additional permits were obtained. Thereafter, the defendants in the action for declaratory relief, the town of Monroe and Hammertown Estates, LLC, moved to dismiss counts one and two of the complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs in that underlying action had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. On June 30, 2000, the trial court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing counts one and two of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Thereafter, on July 18, 2000, the Sullivans sent a letter to the plaintiff indicating that the Sullivans no longer wanted to pursue litigation regarding the new subdivision. The Sullivans also sent a copy of the letter to the trial court.2 Moreover, Joseph Sullivan testified that he orally had told the plaintiff on July 16, 2000, that he and Lenore Sullivan no longer were interested in pursuing declaratory and injunctive relief. Joseph Sullivan also testified that he had sent the plaintiff an e-mail, a facsimile (fax) and a certified letter asking her not to represent them in any motion for reargument or any other appeal of the trial court's decision on the motion to dismiss.
Notwithstanding these communications, the plaintiff, on July 20, 2000, moved to reargue the trial court's decision dismissing counts one and two of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion on August 16, 2000. Thereafter, on August 30, 2000, the plaintiff moved to withdraw her appearance, claiming that there had been "a complete breakdown in communications" between those listed as plaintiffs in the underlying action and the plaintiff in the present case.
Additionally, prior to the trial court's decision dismissing counts one and two of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendants in that underlying action had moved for sanctions against the plaintiff for filing motions and other pleadings subsequent to the defendants' filing of a motion to dismiss. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motions for sanctions for September 28, 2000. On September 22, 2000, the plaintiff moved, nominally on behalf of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying litigation, for a continuance of that hearing, claiming that she already was engaged in a jury trial for that day.3 Thereafter, on September 28, the plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing on the motion for sanctions. As a result, the trial court, pursuant to Practice Book § 5-104 and General Statutes § 51-84 (b),5 fined the plaintiff $100. Moreover, at the September 28, 2000 hearing, counsel for the defendants claimed that one of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying action had not authorized the plaintiff to file an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in her name. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the hearing on the motions for sanctions be rescheduled for October 31, 2000. Further, the trial court stated that the issues to be determined on that date included "all motions for sanctions; motions for allowance of counsel fees by parties appearing on September 28, 2000, including Katherine Finch; letter received by the court from Lenore and [Joseph] Sullivan; motion of [the plaintiff] to withdraw as counsel."
Thereafter, on October 31, 2000, the plaintiff moved, again nominally on behalf of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying action, to disqualify Judge Mottolese from the proceedings. In her motion, the plaintiff claimed...
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