Burton v. Mottolese
| Decision Date | 16 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16655). |
| Citation | 835 A.2d 998,267 Conn. 1 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | NANCY BURTON v. HONORABLE A. WILLIAM MOTTOLESE |
Sullivan, C.J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Nancy Burton, with whom was Conrad Ost Seifert, for the plaintiff in error.
Eliot D. Prescott, assistant attorney general, with whom were Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the defendant in error.
The plaintiff in error, Nancy Burton (plaintiff), an attorney, brings this writ of error claiming that the defendant in error, Honorable A. William Mottolese (trial court), improperly concluded that the plaintiff had violated several Rules of Professional Conduct and that the imposition of the sanction of disbarment violated her due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court: (1) violated her due process rights by failing to give her prior written notice of the charges against her; (2) lacked the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings because such proceedings may be instituted only by filing a formal written complaint with the statewide grievance committee; (3) violated her due process rights because the trial court displayed actual bias toward her; (4) improperly concluded that she had engaged in professional misconduct; and (5) improperly imposed the sanction of disbarment. We reject all these claims and, accordingly, dismiss the writ of error.
The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. On December 22, 1999, in response to a decision of the zoning board of appeals of the town of Monroe (board) to allow the use of a rock crusher during the construction of a new residential subdivision, two of the plaintiffs in the underlying action, Joseph Sullivan and Lenore Sullivan (Sullivans), organized a neighborhood meeting at a restaurant in Monroe. The purpose of the meeting was to recruit others to become coplaintiffs in an appeal from the decision of the board to allow the use of the rock crusher. Before the meeting, Joseph Sullivan prepared a sign-up sheet for those interested in becoming coplaintiffs in the appeal.1 Also prior to the meeting, Joseph Sullivan contacted the plaintiff, who agreed to make an oral presentation at the meeting. During the December 22 meeting, twenty people signed the sign-up sheets that had been circulated, agreeing to become coplaintiffs in the action to appeal from the board's zoning decision.
In addition to filing an appeal from the board's zoning decision, the plaintiff, on behalf of the Sullivans and the twenty additional people who had signed the signup sheets, filed the action underlying this writ of error, which sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the development of the subdivision until additional permits were obtained. Thereafter, the defendants in the action for declaratory relief, the town of Monroe and Hammertown Estates, LLC, moved to dismiss counts one and two of the complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs in that underlying action had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. On June 30, 2000, the trial court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing counts one and two of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Thereafter, on July 18, 2000, the Sullivans sent a letter to the plaintiff indicating that the Sullivans no longer wanted to pursue litigation regarding the new subdivision. The Sullivans also sent a copy of the letter to the trial court.2 Moreover, Joseph Sullivan testified that he orally had told the plaintiff on July 16, 2000, that he and Lenore Sullivan no longer were interested in pursuing declaratory and injunctive relief. Joseph Sullivan also testified that he had sent the plaintiff an e-mail, a facsimile (fax) and a certified letter asking her not to represent them in any motion for reargument or any other appeal of the trial court's decision on the motion to dismiss.
Notwithstanding these communications, the plaintiff, on July 20, 2000, moved to reargue the trial court's decision dismissing counts one and two of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion on August 16, 2000. Thereafter, on August 30, 2000, the plaintiff moved to withdraw her appearance, claiming that there had been "a complete breakdown in communications" between those listed as plaintiffs in the underlying action and the plaintiff in the present case.
Additionally, prior to the trial court's decision dismissing counts one and two of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendants in that underlying action had moved for sanctions against the plaintiff for filing motions and other pleadings subsequent to the defendants' filing of a motion to dismiss. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motions for sanctions for September 28, 2000. On September 22, 2000, the plaintiff moved, nominally on behalf of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying litigation, for a continuance of that hearing, claiming that she already was engaged in a jury trial for that day.3 Thereafter, on September 28, the plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing on the motion for sanctions. As a result, the trial court, pursuant to Practice Book § 5-104 and General Statutes § 51-84 (b),5 fined the plaintiff $100. Moreover, at the September 28, 2000 hearing, counsel for the defendants claimed that one of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying action had not authorized the plaintiff to file an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in her name. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the hearing on the motions for sanctions be rescheduled for October 31, 2000. Further, the trial court stated that the issues to be determined on that date included "all motions for sanctions; motions for allowance of counsel fees by parties appearing on September 28, 2000, including Katherine Finch; letter received by the court from Lenore and [Joseph] Sullivan; motion of [the plaintiff] to withdraw as counsel."
Thereafter, on October 31, 2000, the plaintiff moved, again nominally on behalf of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying action, to disqualify Judge Mottolese from the proceedings. In her motion, the plaintiff claimed that the judge improperly had sanctioned her for failing to appear at the September 28 hearing because she was properly engaged elsewhere, namely, jury selection for another trial. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that the sanction of $100 was "tantamount to a tax on [the plaintiff's other client] for the privilege of having his attorney attend his trial during jury selection" and that the court's sanction manifested a bias against her. The plaintiff also moved to vacate the order sanctioning her for failing to appear at the September 28, 2000 hearing. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the trial court had engaged in gender bias against her. In response to the charge of gender bias, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to submit an affidavit within that next week specifying each instance of gender bias that the plaintiff was alleging.6
Subsequently, on November 9, 2000, the trial court notified the parties in the underlying action that the hearing on all motions for sanctions was rescheduled to November 27, 2000. In that order, the court specified that "[i]f necessary, the court will adjudicate the status of each plaintiff to ascertain if they are properly plaintiffs in this case on December 12, 2000. . . ." On November 29, 2000, the plaintiff filed a second motion, on behalf of the purported plaintiffs in the underlying action, to disqualify the trial court, claiming that the sanctions ordered by the court on September 28 and October 31 were a "reflection and product of serious personal animosity, gender bias, prejudice and such orders are unconstitutional." On that same day, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for sanctions, at which it ordered the plaintiff to contact all the purported plaintiffs in the underlying action and to notify the trial court whether they wanted to pursue litigation in the declaratory judgment action.7 Also at that hearing, the trial court noted that there were two issues that remained in the case that the court felt it had the obligation to address. The first issue, the court explained, was "whether [the plaintiff] continued to participate in the litigation by filing pleadings and taking action without the consent of her clients." The second issue was the plaintiff's assertion of gender bias by the trial court.8
Subsequently, on December 12, 2000, the court began its inquiry into whether the plaintiff was authorized to bring the action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The inquiry commenced with the testimony of several of the purported plaintiffs from the underlying action, who revealed either that they were not aware that, by signing the circulated sign-up sheets, they were authorizing the plaintiff to file an action in their names, or that they had asked the plaintiff to withdraw their names from the action and that she had failed to do so.9 The plaintiff cross-examined these witnesses. After the testimony of the plaintiffs in the underlying action, the trial court continued the judicial inquiry until December 21, 2000. On that date, the plaintiff filed her third motion to disqualify Judge Mottolese, claiming that the trial court falsely accused her of having filed a complaint against it in a prior case. In addition, the plaintiff moved to suspend the proceedings, claiming that the trial court had engaged in "improper judicial intimidation of [the] plaintiffs in [the underlying case]. . . ." Notwithstanding these motions, on December 21, 2000, the trial court continued its inquiry into the plaintiff's authorization to bring the underlying action. As in the December 12 hearing, the inquiry...
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...at 349-50, 528 A.2d 774. The court was not required to, and plainly did not, credit the defendants' testimony. See Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 40, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S.Ct. 2422, 158 L.Ed.2d 983 (2004). It is axiomatic that a defendant who closes his ......
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TABLE OF CASES
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