Burton v. Reed City Hosp. Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 124928. |
| Citation | 691 N.W.2d 424,471 Mich. 745 |
| Parties | Jack BURTON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dale Burton, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REED CITY HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Dr. Christopher J. Johnson, and Dr. James Johnson, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Charfoos & Christensen, P.C. (by David R. Parker), Detroit, and Richard A. Lenter, P.C. (by Richard A. Lenter), Southfield, for the plaintiff.
Aardema, Whitelaw & Sears-Ewald PLLC (by Brian W. Whitelaw), Ada, for the defendants.
This case presents the question whether a complaint alleging medical malpractice that is filed before the expiration of the notice period provided by MCL 600.2912b tolls the period of limitations. The Court of Appeals held that a prematurely filed complaint invokes the tolling provisions of MCL 600.5856(a). We disagree. MCL 600.2912b(1) unambiguously states that a person "shall not" commence an action alleging medical malpractice until the expiration of the statutory notice period. A complaint filed before the expiration of the notice period violates MCL 600.2912b and is ineffective to toll the limitations period. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the Osceola Circuit Court's grant of summary disposition for the defendants.
On January 17, 1998, plaintiff1 went to the emergency room of defendant Reed City Hospital complaining of abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. Tests revealed the presence of an ulcer. Plaintiff was hospitalized and treated with medications until January 23, 1998. On January 26, 1998, the individually named defendants performed stomach and gall bladder surgery on plaintiff.
On February 10, 2000, plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint, alleging that his common bile duct and pancreatic duct were negligently transected during the surgery and that corrective surgery had to be performed in November 1998. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered residual, permanent damage as a result of the individual defendants' negligence.
The alleged malpractice occurred on January 26, 1998. The period of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). Absent tolling, the statutory period of limitations would therefore have expired on January 26, 2000.
Plaintiff's counsel sent defendants a notice of intent to file a claim on October 18, 1999. Under MCL 600.5856(d), if the period of limitations would expire during the notice period, the period of limitations is tolled for 182 days and then resumes running after the 182-day period. In this case, the limitations period was tolled until April 17, 2000, and then resumed running, expiring on July 26, 2000.
Plaintiff filed a complaint and an affidavit of merit under MCL 600.2912d on February 10, 2000, 115 days after he provided his notice of intent. After receiving from plaintiff's counsel two extensions of time in which to answer, defendants filed an answer to the complaint on May 8, 2000. Defendants' affirmative defenses included the following:
A pretrial status conference was held on June 29, 2000. The summary of that conference provides that "Counsel stated that the status of the pleadings is satisfactory, pending discovery."
On August 24, 2000, defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10), alleging that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice provisions of MCL 600.2912 et seq.2 Defendants' motion pointed out that plaintiff's complaint was filed only 115 days after the date the notice of intent was sent. Defendants' motion alleged that the prematurely filed complaint did not toll the limitations period, which expired on July 26, 2000.
Plaintiff acknowledged that the complaint was filed before the expiration of the notice period, but argued that the filing of the complaint nevertheless tolled the period of limitations, such that the proper remedy was dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiff also asserted that defense counsel had engaged in misconduct by expressing satisfaction with the state of the pleadings at the pretrial conference and by waiting until after the limitations period had run to bring the motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that defense counsel's misconduct resulted in a waiver, or that defendants were estopped from challenging the premature filing of the complaint.
The trial court initially denied the motion for summary disposition. Although the trial court rejected the plaintiff's argument that defendants' expression of satisfaction with the state of the pleadings at the pretrial conference waived the premature filing defense, it held that defendants' failure to bring their motion for summary disposition before the expiration of the limitations period resulted in a waiver. The court therefore denied defendants' motion for summary disposition.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. On reconsideration, the trial court reversed its prior decision and granted summary disposition to defendants. The trial court concluded that the affirmative defenses were sufficiently pleaded to place plaintiff on notice of a problem before the expiration of the limitations period.
Plaintiff appealed the trial court's order to the Court of Appeals, which reversed in a published opinion. 259 Mich.App. 74, 673 N.W.2d 135 (2003). While acknowledging that dismissal is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance with the provisions of MCL 600.2912b and that when a case is dismissed the plaintiff must still comply with the applicable statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that MCL 600.5856(a) operated to toll the period of limitations. Burton, supra at 85, 673 N.W.2d 135.
The Court of Appeals distinguished the present case from Scarsella v. Pollak, 461 Mich. 547, 607 N.W.2d 711 (2000), in which the plaintiff filed the complaint without also filing the affidavit of merit. The Court of Appeals determined that because the affidavit of merit was filed with the complaint in this case, the filing tolled the period of limitations. Burton, supra at 85-86, 673 N.W.2d 135. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that tolling is permissible where a complaint is filed prematurely because it does not result in unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 87-89, 673 N.W.2d 135. It thus reversed the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition.
Defendants filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court.
We review the trial court's grant of summary disposition de novo. Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 62, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002) (Roberts I). This case involves questions of statutory interpretation, which are also reviewed de novo. Id. The cardinal principle of statutory construction is that courts must give effect to legislative intent. Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (After Remand), 469 Mich. 487, 490, 672 N.W.2d 849 (2003). When reviewing a statute, courts necessarily must first examine the text of the statute. Dressel v. Ameribank, 468 Mich. 557, 562, 664 N.W.2d 151 (2003). If the Legislature's intent is clearly expressed by the language of the statute, no further construction is permitted. Helder v. Sruba, 462 Mich. 92, 99, 611 N.W.2d 309 (2000).
MCL 600.2912b(1) precludes a medical malpractice claimant from commencing suit against a health professional or health facility unless written notice is provided to that professional or facility before the action is commenced. Section 2912b(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. [Emphasis supplied.]
After providing the written notice, the claimant is required to wait for the applicable notice period to pass before filing suit. The claimant generally must wait 182 days after providing the notice of intent before commencing an action alleging medical malpractice. MCL 600.2912b(1). A claimant may file an action after 154 days if no response to the notice is received as contemplated by MCL 600.2912b(7).
MCL 600.5856(d) provides that the two-year period of limitations for medical malpractice actions is tolled during the notice period if notice is given in compliance with MCL 600.2912b. Defendants do not dispute that the notice given in this case tolled the period of limitations during the statutory notice period, so that the limitations period was extended through July 26, 2000.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the period of limitations was further tolled by plaintiff's prematurely filed complaint. It relied on MCL 600.5856(a), which states that the period of limitations is also tolled "[a]t the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant."
Section 2912b(1) unequivocally provides that a person "shall not" commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility until the expiration of the statutory notice period. This Court has previously construed other such imperative language in the statutes governing medical malpractice actions. For example, in Scarsella, we held that a complaint alleging medical malpractice that is not accompanied by the statutorily required affidavit of merit is not effective to toll the limitations period because the Legislature clearly intended that an affidavit of merit "shall" be...
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