Burton v. State, 885S310

Citation497 N.E.2d 535
Decision Date15 September 1986
Docket NumberNo. 885S310,885S310
PartiesRobert BURTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, June D. Oldham, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Robert Burton was convicted of attempted murder at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Elkhart Superior Court, and was further found to be an habitual offender. He was sentenced to fifty (50) years for attempted murder, enhanced by thirty (30) years for being an habitual offender, for a total of eighty (80) years. On direct appeal, he raises the following issues:

1. sufficiency of the evidence;

2. admission of certain evidence; and

3. sentencing.

During the early morning of February 18, 1984, Appellant and the victim were drinking and gambling at an after-hours establishment. An altercation ensued, after which both men left, but eventually returned. Appellant had a shotgun concealed under his jacket, and told the victim, "It's not over." The victim fled and Appellant chased him. Eyewitness Tom Howell testified he saw Appellant shoot the victim. Evanuel Pratcher testified he saw Appellant shoot, and although he could not see at whom Appellant was shooting, he next saw the victim standing by his car, bleeding.

I

Appellant first claims there is insufficient evidence to find that he attempted to murder the victim. He bases this claim on the fact that the victim did not actually see Appellant shoot him, that Witness Pratcher did not actually see him shoot the victim, and that Witness Howell is inherently incredible because he had been drinking prior to the shooting.

Where sufficiency of evidence is challenged on review, this Court will neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses; rather, we look to the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact might infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Harris v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 932, 937. The evidence set forth above clearly supports the jury's verdict. Appellant's claims go merely to the weight of the evidence, and we find no error in the jury's original weighing of such evidence.

Appellant also maintains there was insufficient evidence to find him an habitual offender because the documents used to prove two prior convictions were not order book entries.

While Appellant is correct in stating that a court speaks only through its order book, we have further held that in an habitual offender proceeding, prior felony convictions may be proven in a variety of ways. Here, the prior felonies were shown via court orders, charging informations and court minute entries, all of which Appellant concedes were certified documents. Furthermore, witnesses testified Appellant was the same defendant as in the prior felony cases, and Appellant was even further linked to the prior felonies by the testimony of a fingerprint expert. Such evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Appellant was an habitual offender.

II

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibits Nos. 13-22. State's Exhibits Nos. 13-18 were photographs of the victim taken at the hospital. He argues they were inadmissible because their relevancy was established only through hearsay evidence. State's Exhibits Nos. 19-22 consisted of parts of a watch which were found at the crime scene, and shotgun shot and a watchband link taken from the victim's jacket. At trial, Appellant stated no grounds for his objection. He now argues that preliminary questions reveal the basis for the objection to have been a lack of relevancy to the case.

The actual issue concerning State's Exhibits Nos. 13-18 is whether or not the subject in the photographs was sufficiently identified as the victim; if he was, then the evidence is obviously relevant. Arguably, when the exhibits were first introduced, their foundation was comprised only of hearsay evidence. However, subsequent testimony rendered any...

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9 cases
  • Simmons v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • March 2, 1987
    ...In order for this Court to review alleged errors, a defendant must make specific arguments in his allegation. See Burton v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 535, 538. Arguments that evidence should not have been admitted because it was "incriminating" or "immaterial" give this Court nothing t......
  • Dausch v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1993
    ...of his ruling. A questionable foundation for the admissibility of evidence may be cured by the subsequent testimony. Burton v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 535, 537-38. Errors in the admission of evidence may be rendered harmless by the introduction of subsequent evidence. Hooper v. State......
  • Kelley v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 27, 1989
    ...Subsequent testimony which establishes a proper foundation for an exhibit renders harmless any error in admission. Burton v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 535, 537-38. Thus, the trial court properly admitted State's Exhibit 32. ISSUE V: Kelley claims the trial court erred in admitting Stat......
  • Wolfe v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1990
    ...to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which lie within the exclusive province of the jury. Burton v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 535. There clearly exists sufficient evidence of probative value for the jury to find that appellant was the person who attempted......
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