Burton v. Tampa Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 07 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-13607,00-13607
• Citation: 271 F.3d 1274
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2001) CONNIE BURTON , Plaintiff-Appellant , v. TAMPA HOUSING AUTHORITY , UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1274

271 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)

CONNIE BURTON , Plaintiff-Appellant , v. TAMPA HOUSING AUTHORITY , UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees .

No. 00-13607

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

November 7, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON , Chief Judge, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

I. Introduction

The question presented by this appeal is whether or not a public housing authority may evict ignorant tenants, pursuant to a Congressional mandate, when the tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control engages in drug-related criminal activity on or near the public housing premises. The district court answered in the affirmative. We agree and affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural History

The facts giving rise to this case, as limited in this appeal, involve the Appellant, Connie Burton, a forty-three year-old single mother of three who has lived in Tampa Housing Authority ("THA") property for approximately sixteen years. Ms. Burton has resided at her current apartment in Robels Park for the past five years. On October 8, 1998, Ms. Burton added her adult son, Narada Burton, to her lease as a household member. This was a prerequisite to enable him to secure employment with the THA's New Beginnings program. This program was designed to employ ten first-time offenders with the THA's Department of Operations.¹ However, six months later, on April 15, 1999, Narada Burton was arrested for allegedly participating in a drug transaction on THA grounds.² It is undisputed that the transaction did not occur in Ms. Burton's apartment, nor that she was not aware of the criminal activity at the time.

Pursuant to its "One Strike" or "Zero Tolerance" policy, as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6),³ the THA commenced an action to evict Ms. Burton for breach of the terms of her Dwelling Lease Agreement. Embodied within this agreement is the understanding that it is the resident's obligation to ensure that no member of the resident's household, guest, or other person under the resident's control shall engage in any criminal activity on THA premises.⁴ Ms. Burton now appeals the district court's denial of her motion for summary judgment, and the granting of summary judgment for THA.

III. Issues Raised on Appeal

In appealing the district court's denial of her motion for summary judgment, and the granting of summary judgment for THA, Ms. Burton raises three points of alleged error concerning the district court's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). Her first ground for appeal is whether the district court erred in ruling that a local public housing authority has the right to terminate the property rights of ignorant public housing tenants when a household member engages in drug-related criminal activity on public housing authority property. Ms. Burton advocates that an "innocent party" defense should be read into the statute, while the district court held that no such defense exists. Ms. Burton's second argument is that the district court erred in holding that her due process rights were not violated by the THA. She claims that the automatic deprivation of a tenant's property interest - that is, when the property was not used in the commission of a crime and when the tenant did not know of the illegal activity - violates the due process clause. Finally, Ms. Burton alleges that the district court erred in holding that her freedom of association rights under the First Amendment were not violated. She claims that because of the one-strike policy, tenants are forced to restrict or eliminate their association with others who may potentially find themselves accused of illegal wrongdoing.

IV. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.

See Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 1998). We view all evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Korman v. HBC Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999). "Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." McCaleb v. A.O. Smith Corp., 200 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial." Clemons v. Dougherty County, Ga., 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982). A grant of summary judgment may be upheld on any basis supported by the record. SeeFitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993).

V. Discussion

In discussing this case we wish to acknowledge that we are following the lead of Judge Joseph Sneed, as set forth in his comprehensive dissent in Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3036 (U.S. Sep. 25, 2001) (No. 00-1770); 69 U.S.L.W. 3764 (No. 00-1781) (Oct. 1, 2001) (consolidated). Judge Sneed's dissenting opinion develops the arguments, analyzes the relevant cases, and sets forth the line of reasoning we find most persuasive.

In the late 1980's the drug epidemic had become corrosive in many aspects of our society. Public housing areas suffered along with many other segments of our society during the drug war. In 1988, in response to the deteriorating safety and overall quality of life due to drug-related crime and violence in public housing, Congress granted to local public housing authorities ("PHAs") a "new tool" in striking a balance between providing affordable low income housing which was also safe to live in. Id. 42 U.S.C. 1437d(l)(6) was this tool, and it mandated that every lease entered into by a PHA include a provision permitting termination of tenancy when "a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control" engaged in "drug-related criminal activity on or near public housing premises."

We believe the statutory language contained within the statute is unmistakably clear, and was based on reasonable findings that such legislation was necessary to eradicate the unsavory element that had infiltrated the public housing complexes. In assessing the validity of this statute, we find "nothing in the Constitution [which] prohibits the government from entering into reasonable lease provisions necessary to maintain the safety and structural soundness of its property." Id. "The increase in drug-related crime not only leads to murders, muggings, and other forms of violence against tenants, but also to a deterioration of the physical environment that requires substantial government expenditures." 42 U.S.C. §11901(4). The government, given its status as a landlord, must be given the authority to maintain its property at a habitable and safe standard for all of its tenants.

In answering the question of whether an ignorant tenant may be evicted based on a household members' or guests' drug use, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, ("HUD") offers guidance. HUD, the agency charged with administering public housing, concluded that the statute did authorize the eviction of these ignorant tenants. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(1)(B); Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,567 (October 11, 1991). If this interpretation is a "permissible construction of the statute," then this court may not substitute its own judgment for that of HUD. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Because we find the statute to be clear on its face, HUD's interpretation is the only permissible construction of the statute. The cardinal principle of statutory construction is that "[w]here there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction." United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 8, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (quoting United States v. Wilberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). In the instant case, the statute authorizes eviction when a "public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control" engages in "any drug related criminal activity." There is nothing ambiguous in this language.

Under § 1437d(l)(6), there are four categories of individuals whose drug-related criminal activity on or near public housing property will result in the tenant's eviction. A tenant can be terminated for his or her own criminal drug activity, a household member's,⁵ a guest's,⁶ or activity by any other person under the tenant's control. The structure of the statute suggests that all of these individuals are "per se under the tenant's control, and, therefore, the drug related criminal activity of anyone in one of these categories is cause for eviction." Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1129 (Sneed, J., dissenting). In this case, the plain meaning of the statute is obvious. The eviction of ignorant tenants due to the conduct of those associated with them is supported by a "reasonable rationale based on sound public policy." Id. at 1130.

Our interpretation and reading of the statute in question is reinforced by two related statutory provisions. The first is 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A).⁷ This statute, as it stood through 1996, mandated that PHA's fulfill three independent duties. Under subsection (i), PHA's were required to allocate available housing units based on congressionally determined "preferences." These preferences were given to those in need, such as the homeless, or those using more than 50% of their income to pay rent. Under subsection (iii), an individual or family otherwise eligible for preferential placement in available housing was disqualified from receiving a preference...