Busby v. Moore
Citation | 330 S.C. 201,498 S.E.2d 883 |
Decision Date | 13 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 24779.,24779. |
Parties | Melvin BUSBY, Bobby Blake, Danny Green, Calvin Rankin, Anthony Simpson, Lee Evans, Ronnie Sullivan, David Capps, Jerry Latimer, Sherman Rider, Rodney T. Arnold, Charles Smith, Freddie Berry, Dale Wright, Eric Sullivan, Charles Lofton, and Timothy Passmore, Applicants, Of whom Melvin Busby, Calvin Rankin, Lee Evans, Sherman W. Rider, Rodney T. Arnold, Charles Lofton are Petitioners, v. Michael MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent. and Timothy YOUNG, Norman Sherman, Ronald Jones, George Robinson, Phillip Clay, Brian Mack, Terry Collins, Claude Johnson, David F. King, Derrick Latimer, Mark Cunningham, David Case, Emmanuel Flemming, Clifton Scott, Danny Bailey, Irvin Wilson, Harold Blassingame, Andrew Lusk, George Phillips, James Allen Taylor, and Bobby Gresham, Applicants, Of whom Norman Sherman, Ronald Jones, Phillip Clay, Terry Collins, David F. King, Irvin Wilson, Andrew Lusk, James Allen Taylor, and Bobby Gresham are Petitioners, v. Michael MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent. and Michael T. REIDEL, J.B. Hardee, Clary Dillard, Willie Workman, Vincent Brown, Dennis Sullivan, William Smith, Rene Hernandez, Dean B. Hawkins, Richard D. Kidd, John A. Hagood, and Michael Earl Wilson, Applicants, Of whom Dean B. Hawkins and Richard D. Kidd are Petitioners, v. Michael MOORE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Assistant Appellate Defender M. Anne Pearce, South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for petitioners.
Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Teresa A. Knox, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Teresa N. Cosby, Columbia, for respondent.
Applicants, all inmates in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, filed individual applications for post-conviction relief (PCR). Their cases were consolidated, and after a hearing, respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted. Petitioners now seek a writ of certiorari. We grant the writ, dispense with further briefing, and affirm.
Section 24-13-210(A) of the Code states:
A prisoner convicted of an offense against this State, ..., and sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections..., whose record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules of the institution where he is confined and has not been subjected to punishment for misbehavior, is entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence beginning with the day on which the service of his sentence commences to run, computed at the rate of twenty days for each month served. When two or more consecutive sentences are to be served, the aggregate of the several sentences is the basis upon which the good conduct credit is computed.
S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-210(A) (Supp.1996). Petitioners argue the language of this statute entitles them to have credit for good conduct calculated and applied at the beginning of their sentences. The PCR judge found petitioners misinterpreted the statute. We agree.
The Court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Baker, 310 S.C. 510, 427 S.E.2d 670 (1993). A statute must receive a practical and reasonable interpretation consonant with the design of the legislature. Id. This Court will reject any interpretation that leads to an unreasonable result. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Pageland, 321 S.C. 538, 471 S.E.2d 137 (1996).
The language of the statute shows the legislature did not intend for prisoners to get credit for good behavior at the outset of their sentences. The legislature's use of the past tense shows an intent to reward inmates only after they exhibit good behavior; a prisoner may benefit from this section if he or she "has faithfully observed all the rules" and "has not been subjected to punishment for misbehavior."
Furthermore, petitioner's interpretation of the statute leads to results that could not have been intended by the legislature. The calculation advanced by petitioners reduces the time...
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