Busby v. Steadfast Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-2225 |
| Citation | 420 F.Supp.3d 289 |
| Parties | Robin BUSBY v. STEADFAST INSURANCE CO., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Gabriel Z. Levin, Levin & Zeiger, Philadelphia, PA, for Robin Busby.
Allison Perry, Jeffrey H. Quinn, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Steadfast Insurance Company.
Christine P. Busch, James H. Cole, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, for USAA Casualty Insurance Company.
Plaintiff Robin Busby ("Busby") brings this diversity action against defendants Steadfast Insurance Co. ("Steadfast") and USAA Casualty Insurance Co. ("USAA") for breach of contract and for bad faith under Pennsylvania law for failure to pay certain claims of Busby arising out of serious injuries she suffered as a passenger in a motor vehicle on the Schuylkill Expressway in Philadelphia.
Before the court are the cross-motions of the parties for partial summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We view the facts and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004).
Summary judgment is granted where there is insufficient record evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmovant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party]'s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [that party]." Id. In addition, Rule 56(e)(2) provides "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
The parties have stipulated to the relevant facts. On October 29, 2016, Busby was a passenger in the backseat of a 2013 Nissan Altima driven by Thomas Curtain, who Busby had hired as a driver through Lyft, Inc. ("Lyft"). Curtain was traveling eastbound on the Schuylkill Expressway in the left-hand lane near mile marker 334.3. The traffic came to a stop in front of Curtain's vehicle. Curtain drove his vehicle into the rear of the car in front of him which was stopped in traffic.
After Curtain hit the car in front of him, a 2005 Dodge Grand Caravan driven by Gerald Crossley collided with the rear of Curtain's vehicle. Curtain's vehicle was equipped with an event data recorder which recorded "two separate events." The data was retrieved and analyzed by plaintiff's and defendants' respective experts. The data established that approximately one second had passed between the two crashes. The data also demonstrated that Curtain had been travelling in the left lane for at least six seconds before Crossley hit the rear of Curtain's car. Curtain's car was not moving and had come to a complete stop at the time it was rear-ended by Crossley.
As a result of the first impact, Busby had a delta force of 18 applied to her, that is, the vehicle's speed was abruptly reduced by 18 miles per hour due to the impact.1 As a result of the second impact, the delta force applied to her was 13, that is, the speed of Curtain's vehicle was accelerated forward by 13 miles per hour due to the impact. To date, Busby's treating physicians have attributed her injuries to "the incident" or "the accident" and have not opined as to which injuries were caused by the first as opposed to the second impact.
At the time in question, the Steadfast policy provided liability coverage for Lyft drivers like Curtain as well as uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits for passengers such as Busby using Lyft. The limits of coverage were an aggregate one million dollars for both liability and uninsured or underinsured motorist ("UIM") claims for "each accident." The Steadfast policy defines "accident" as follows: "Accident includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’ " The policy further states that "[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos,’ ‘insureds,’ premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, [sic] the most we will pay for the total of all damages ... combined resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Covered Autos Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations."
The "Pennsylvania Underinsured Motorists Coverage" endorsement to the Steadfast policy similarly provides that "[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘motor vehicles,’ ‘insureds,’ premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident,’ the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Underinsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or Declarations."
In addition to the benefits under the Steadfast policy, Busby had UIM coverage under her personal automobile policy with USAA. The USAA policy provides UIM coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per "accident" with stacking on Busby's two covered vehicles for a total of $200,000 in UIM coverage per person and $600,000 per accident. The USAA policy does not define "accident." In the "LIMIT OF LIABILITY" section related to UIM benefits, the USAA policy states that for bodily injury sustained by the insured or a family member:
The "LIMITS OF LIABILITY" section further reads that "these limits are the most we will pay regardless of the number of: (1) Covered persons; (2) Claims made; (3) Vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations; or (4) Vehicles involved in the accident." The section also states that "[n]o one will be entitled to receive duplicate payments for the same elements of loss."
Busby filed a personal injury action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against Curtain and Crossley. Busby settled her claims with them and the lawsuit was thereafter dismissed. While the terms of the settlements are confidential, it is undisputed that Steadfast paid to Busby the policy limit for an "accident," that is, one million dollars. Crossley's insurer tendered to Busby the limits of Crossley's liability coverage, which was $300,000 in liability coverage. USAA thereafter paid Busby the $200,000 stacked per person UIM limit available under her personal insurance policy.
Busby now seeks in this action an additional one million dollars in UIM coverage from Steadfast and an additional $200,000 in UIM coverage from USAA for what she terms as the "second accident involving the Crossley vehicle."2 Defendants counter that the events of October 29, 2016 constitute one accident and thus there is no coverage remaining.
The narrow question before the court is whether under the undisputed facts, plaintiff was involved in one or two motor vehicle accidents for purposes of insurance coverage.
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that is properly decided by the court.3 Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999). The primary goal in interpreting an insurance policy, as with any contract, is to ascertain the parties' intentions as manifested by the policy's terms. 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Grp., 583 Pa. 445, 879 A.2d 166, 171 (2005). "When the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language." Id. Alternatively, when a term in the policy is ambiguous, "the policy is to be construed in favor of the insured to further the contract's prime purpose of indemnification and against the insurer, as the insurer drafts the policy, and controls coverage." Id.
As noted above, the Steadfast policy provides an aggregate limit of one million dollars in liability and UIM coverage for each "accident." It defines accident as "continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’ " The USAA policy does not define "accident." However, under Pennsylvania law, "the term ‘accident’ within insurance policies refers to an unexpected and undesirable event occurring unintentionally."
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 595 Pa. 147, 938 A.2d 286, 292 (2007). In interpreting insurance contracts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed "accident" and "occurrence" synonymously. See id. at 293.
There are two key competing approaches used by courts to determine the number of accidents for purposes of insurance coverage: the "cause" approach and the "effects" approach. Pennsylvania, like the majority of jurisdictions, has adopted the "cause" approach. See id. at 293-94. Under this approach, ...
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