Bush v. City of Scranton
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-11-0670 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | THEODORE BUSH, and PAMELA BUSH, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF SCRANTON, et al., Defendants |
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
On April 11, 2011, Plaintiffs, Theodore Bush and his wife, Pamela Bush, filed this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs named as Defendants the following: the City of Scranton ("City"); Michael Mitchell, Deputy Director of Safety and Conservation for the City; Mark Seitzinger, Director of the Department of Licensing, Inspections, and Permits for the City; and Carl Graziano, building Inspector for the City. Plaintiffs named Mitchell, Seitzinger and Graziano as Defendants in their individual capacities.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that they owned a house and garage located at 311-313 Ferdinand Street, Scranton, Pennsylvania. On July 21, 2009, Plaintiffs' Ferdinand Street house was severely damaged by a fire. On this same day, Defendant Mitchell sent a letter to Plaintiffs' Ferdinand Street house giving Plaintiffs notice that their house was scheduled for immediate demolition since it was a public health and safety hazard. Plaintiffs averred that they did notreceive Defendant Mitchell's letter and did not receive proper notice of the demolition of their Ferdinand Street house. Plaintiffs averred that on July 22, 2009, a neighbor told Plaintiff Pamela Bush that the City was commencing the demolition of her Ferdinand Street house, and that Pamela went to the house about 8:30 a.m. and offered to have a competent demolition contractors raze the house. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants refused this offer.
Plaintiffs then claimed that on July 22, 2009, Defendant City demolished their Ferdinand Street house and that Defendant Seitzinger also ordered that Plaintiffs' garage be razed. Plaintiffs averred that their garage was razed by Defendants without providing them notice or opportunity to challenge the decision and file an appeal if necessary. Subsequently, Plaintiffs alleged that they asked the City Solicitor why their garage was demolished since it was not damaged and did not pose a safety risk to the public, and that the Solicitor told them that the City Engineer believed that their garage had to be demolished since it would be unreasonable to repair the structure.
Thus, Plaintiffs claimed that on July 22, 2009, Defendant City took their property located at 311-313 Ferdinand Street, Scranton, Pennsylvania, without providing them with just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants Mitchell, Seitzinger and Graziano deprived them of their property in violation of their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants Mitchell, Seitzinger and Graziano conspired to deprive them of their constitutional rights by unlawfully demolishing their undamaged garage. As relief, Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages against all Defendants as well as punitive damages against Defendants Mitchell, Seitzinger and Graziano.
After Defendants were served with the Summons and Plaintiffs' Complaint, they jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 20011, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 4). Defendants' motion was briefed, and on October 26, 2011, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order and denied Defendants' motion in all respects. (Doc. 10).
On November 14, 2011, Defendants City of Scranton, Mitchell, Seitzinger and Graziano filed their Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint and asserted Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. 11).
The parties then consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge for all matters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 15).
This Court has jurisdiction over this §1983 civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and §1343(a).1
The Court then allotted the parties ample time for discovery. (Docs. 18, 22 & 27). On June 17, 2013, Defendants timely filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with their Brief in Support and their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SMF"). (Docs. 30, 31 & 32). Defendants also submitted several exhibits (Doc. 32-1, pp. 1-100; Doc. 32-2, pp. 1-12; & Doc. 32-3, pp. 1-76) with their SMF. On July 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 35). Plaintiffs also filed their Counter Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("CSMF") and several Exhibits. (Docs. 37-45). On August 6, 2013, Defendants filedtheir Reply Brief with an attached Exhibit, namely, the Opinion of the Court in the recent case of Keller v. City of Scranton, Civil No. 09-2534, M.D. Pa. (April 17, 2013, Judge Mariani), in which the Court granted individual City Defendants Mitchell and Seitzinger qualified immunity and, dismissed Plaintiff's punitive damages claim against the individual City Defendants.
The Court heard oral argument in the instant case on August 27, 2013. (Docs. 48 & 49). After hearing oral argument from counsel for Plaintiffs and for Defendants regarding Defendants' pending Motion or Summary Judgment (Doc. 30), and after both counsel advised the Court that they stipulated to the dismissal of Defendant Carl Graziano from this case, the Court issued an Order on August 28, 2013, and directed that Defendant Carl Graziano, sued only in his individual capacity, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this case.2 (Doc. 50).
Currently pending before this Court is Summary Judgment Motion and the remaining Defendants (Doc. 30) with respect to the Plaintiff's claims, under § 1983, for violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The Summary Judgment Motions of both parties have been briefed and are ripe for disposition. (Docs. 28 and 34).
In a § 1983 civil rights action, the Plaintiff must prove the following two essential elements:(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct complained of deprived the Plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the law or the Constitution of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F. 3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993); Fisher v. Matthews, 792F.Supp.2d 745, 2011 WL 1982920, *23 (M.D. Pa. 2011). Further, Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights. Rather, it is a means to redress violations of federal law by state actors. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).3 See also Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498-499 (M. D. Pa. 2005).
It is well established that personal liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed upon a state official based on a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 1546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976); Parratt, supra. It is also well settled in the Third Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a requirement in a § 1983 case and that a complaint must allege such personal involvement. Id. Each named defendant must be shown, through the complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences upon which Plaintiff's claims are based. Id. As the Court stated in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998):
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . . [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledgeand acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. (Citations omitted).
See also Fisher v. Matthews, 792F.Supp.2d 745, 2011 WL 1982920, *23(citing Rode, supra).
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is "'genuine' only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the nonmoving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-694 (3d Cir. 1988)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is initially upon the movant. Forms, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 314, 320 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem. 725 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983). Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. Id. The nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file" designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In doing so, the court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id.(quoting Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985)); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
Under Rule 56 summary judgment must be entered where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that pa...
To continue reading
Request your trial