Bush v. State
| Decision Date | 01 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 167-2021,1270-2020 |
| Parties | NICHOLAS BUSH v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. C-03-CR-19-004111
Graeff, Berger, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Appellant Nicholas Bush was convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. He was sentenced to twenty-five years' incarceration without parole. Mr. Bush filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. The gravamen of Mr. Bush's motion for new trial was that there was a bona fide doubt that he was competent to stand trial, and that the circuit court failed to sua sponte determine his competency.
Mr Bush presents five questions for our review, [1] which we have rephrased, for clarity, as follows:
For the reasons explained herein, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
We set forth the pretrial and trial proceedings involving Mr. Bush to provide context for this appeal.
On August 5, 2019, the Exxon gas station at 1601 Belmont Avenue was robbed. Mr. Bush was arrested for the Exxon robbery after his involvement in a subsequent robbery in Baltimore City. The State charged Mr. Bush with nine armed robbery charges for his role in the Exxon robbery. After bail review in the District Court, Mr. Bush was held without bail. A bail review hearing was held in the circuit court and the Office of the Public Defender assigned Thomas Rafter, Esq. -- a panel attorney -- to represent Mr. Bush. Sometime later, however, Andrea Jaskulsky, Esq. -- another panel attorney -- entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Bush, thereby striking Mr. Rafter's appearance. The circuit court held another bail review hearing, and addressed, and subsequently denied, Mr. Bush's request to discharge Ms. Jaskulsky. Mr. Bush was remanded to the Baltimore County Detention Center to be held without bail pending trial.
Mr. Bush filed another request for bail review, which was again denied. Trial was initially scheduled for August 27, 2020 but was rescheduled for January 21, 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mr. Bush moved to vacate the order rescheduling the trial and requested an immediate bench trial.
The circuit court conducted another hearing on Mr. Bush's request to discharge Ms. Jaskulsky, and again determined that there was no meritorious reason to discharge counsel. The circuit court did, however, grant Ms. Jaskulsky's own motion to strike her appearance. The circuit court re-arraigned Mr. Bush and advised him of his right to counsel. At rearraignment, Mr. Bush decided to proceed pro se, waived his right to a jury trial, and requested a bench trial. The circuit court granted the State's motion requesting that the trial be scheduled for November 19, 2020. Just prior to trial, Mr. Bush sent a letter to the circuit court on November 4, 2020, informing the court that he was currently being housed at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center ("Perkins").
On November 19, 2020 the case proceeded to trial before Judge Dennis M. Robinson. At the outset of the trial proceedings, Judge Robinson asked Mr. Bush why he was transferred from the Baltimore County Detention Center to Perkins. Mr. Bush's response was meandering and non-responsive. Judge Robinson then asked Mr. Bush questions to confirm whether he knew where he was, whether he knew that a trial was occurring, and whether he understood the charges filed against him resulting from the robbery of the Exxon gas station. Mr. Bush was responsive and answered all the trial court's questions affirmatively. The trial court determined that Mr. Bush understood the charges against him. The trial court further determined that Mr. Bush's responses did not indicate that there were any potential competency issues, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.
The trial proceedings began and, after a recess to consider evidence and testimony presented at trial, Judge Robinson found Mr. Bush guilty of armed robbery. At this point, Mr. Bush unequivocally expressed his desire to proceed to sentencing. Judge Robinson sentenced Mr. Bush to twenty-five years' incarceration without the possibility of parole.
Thereafter, Mr. Bush was represented by the Office of the Public Defender, which filed post-sentencing motions and a motion for a new trial on Mr. Bush's behalf. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, counsel presented a competency evaluation prepared by the Maryland Department of Health in connection with a separate criminal case against Mr. Bush in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County (the "District Court"). The competency evaluation noted that Mr. Bush suffered from "psychotic symptoms" that "would impair his ability to consult with his attorney and comport his behavior to meet courtroom standards." The evaluation concluded that Mr. Bush "lack[ed] a factual and rational understanding of the nature of his charges or courtroom proceedings." Unbeknownst to Judge Robinson, the District Court -- in that case -- found that Mr. Bush was incompetent to stand trial while the case in the circuit court was pending. Counsel for Mr. Bush argued that Mr. Bush's behavior in the circuit court, coupled with the indication of the District Court's previous determination of incompetency, should have triggered the circuit court's sua sponte obligation to determine his competency in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
Judge Robinson denied the motion for a new trial and issued a comprehensive Decision and Order (the "Order") explaining why the court denied Mr. Bush's motion. Judge Robinson announced that Mr. Bush's motion for a new trial was considered "against the backdrop of several pre-trial proceedings and how Mr. Bush conducted himself at the trial." Judge Robinson explained that Mr. Bush's correspondence and communications throughout the pre-trial proceedings "did not raise any issues regarding Mr. Bush's competency prior to trial." Judge Robinson stated: "Mr. Bush's behavior before the trial began was indicative of someone who was purposefully being uncooperative in an attempt to derail the trial, not someone who was unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings or to provide his defense." Judge Robinson emphasized that he had "an opportunity to observe Mr. Bush and his conduct" during trial, and that "it did not appear to the court that Mr. Bush was exhibiting signs of being incompetent."
In its thorough Order, the trial court specifically addressed why the District Court's determination of incompetency did not require the circuit court to sua sponte determine Mr. Bush's competency in the current case. Furthermore, Judge Robinson determined that the court's sua sponte obligation to evaluate Mr. Bush's competency was not triggered by Mr. Bush's conduct and demeanor as he appeared before the court at trial. The trial court denied Mr. Bush's motion for a new trial finding that the evidence did not create a bona fide doubt that Mr. Bush was competent to stand trial. Mr. Bush filed this timely appeal.
The principles of due process prohibit the prosecution of a criminal defendant who is incompetent to stand trial. Peaks v. State, 419 Md. 239, 251 (2011). There is a presumption, however, that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless it appears "that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, [or] to assist in preparing his defense." Drope v Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). "[I]ncompetent to stand trial" is defined as being unable to "understand the nature or object of the proceeding[]" or "assist in one's defense." Md. Code ( § 3-101(f) of the Criminal Procedure Article. Additionally, competency to stand trial "is much more a function of rationality than of mental health generally." Muhammad v. State, 177 Md.App. 188, 259-60 (2007).
A court will be required to determine the competency of a criminal defendant in one of three ways: "(1) upon motion of the accused; (2) upon motion of the defense counsel; or (3) upon a sua sponte determination by the court that the defendant may not be competent to stand trial." Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 85 (1993). If at any point, "before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case . . . appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial . . . the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial." Md. Code ( , § 3-104(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
There are several factors that are relevant to determining if a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. "[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient." Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 180. Competency to stand trial is a factual determination by the court, and a court's decision regarding competency will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Maggio v. Fulford, ...
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