Bush v. State
| Decision Date | 21 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC04-2306.,SC04-2306. |
| Citation | 945 So.2d 1207 |
| Parties | Corbblin BUSH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Hunter W. Carroll of Carlton and Carroll, P.A., Bradenton, FL and Christine R. Davis of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.
Corbblin Bush seeks review of the district court decision in Bush v. State, 886 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), based on express and direct conflict with Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve in part and quash in part the decision below as explained herein.
Bush pled guilty to a criminal offense and was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. He subsequently filed a prisoner grievance, claiming that he was entitled to additional provisional release credits that would shorten his prison time. His grievance was denied and he filed a mandamus petition in circuit court in the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon County, where the Department of Corrections ("Department") is located. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, citing Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361, 361-62 (Fla.2003) (). The circuit court stated: "This Court does not have jurisdiction over collateral criminal proceedings stemming from a conviction and sentence rendered by another circuit court."
Bush then filed a new mandamus petition in circuit court in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in Seminole County, where he had been convicted and sentenced; he filed the petition against the Department, and he filed it under the case number of his original criminal case. That court too dismissed his petition, stating: The district court affirmed, ruling that "[a] petition for writ of mandamus is a civil action" and that venue properly lies in Leon County, where the Department is located. Bush v. State, 886 So.2d 339, 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (emphasis added). This Court granted review based on apparent conflict with Schmidt, wherein the Court held that "an inmate's petition for writ of mandamus challenging a loss of gain time is . . . not a civil lawsuit." Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 361 (emphasis added). Bush claims that the district court below erred in affirming the dismissal of his petition; he contends that his petition should have been transferred to the proper circuit court. The State, on the other hand, contends that Schmidt should be overruled because it has created confusion concerning both the proper remedy and the proper venue for adjudicating such claims.
When challenging a sentence-reducing credit determination by the Department, such as a gain time or provisional release credit determination, once a prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies, he or she generally may seek relief in an original proceeding filed in circuit court as an extraordinary writ petition.1 In such a case, if the prisoner alleges entitlement to immediate release, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy2; whereas if the prisoner does not allege entitlement to immediate release, a petition for writ of mandamus is the proper remedy.3
In the present case, the State contends that the Court should overrule Schmidt because language in the decision may be read as authorizing prisoners to challenge sentence-reducing credit determinations via collateral remedies rather than extraordinary writ petitions. We disagree. Specifically, the Court in Schmidt did not hold that a challenge to a sentence-reducing credit determination is actually a collateral challenge that must be pursued via a postconviction remedy.4 First, although the Court in Schmidt did state that "a gain time challenge is analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because the end result is the same—the inmate's time in prison is directly affected," 878 So.2d at 367, the Court used the term "analogous" and did not state that a gain time challenge is a collateral challenge.5 And second, although the Court stated that "[this] gain time challenge should be considered a `collateral criminal proceeding,'" id., the Court did so in the context of the prisoner indigency statute, and the statement is limited to that context.6 To clarify this matter, we hold that the proper remedy for a prisoner to pursue in challenging a sentence-reducing credit determination by the Department, where the prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies and is not alleging entitlement to immediate release, continues to be a mandamus petition filed in circuit court.
As for the proper venue for filing a challenge to a sentence-reducing credit determination by the Department, the question is one of venue, not jurisdiction: Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Although all circuit courts in the state have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, see art. V, § 5(a), Fla. Const., the question here is where in the state a party should be held to answer such a petition, which is a question of venue.
Before a court can determine where a petition should be filed, however, the court first must determine against whom it should be filed. The First District Court of Appeal addressed this matter in the context of a prisoner's challenge to a sentence-reducing credit determination by the Department:
The Florida Department of Corrections is charged with calculating an inmate's sentence and administering the award and forfeiture of gain time for, among other things, revocation of conditional release and prison disciplinary proceedings. In contrast, the Florida Parole Commission is the agency authorized to set presumptive parole release dates and to determine whether to admit an inmate to conditional release or whether an inmate who violates parole or conditional release should be returned to incarceration.
Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217, 219 n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The district court explained further:
While issues concerning jail time credit are logically brought to the attention of the sentencing court, a proceeding which challenges the revocation of conditional release and the subsequent forfeiture of gain time . . . has to do with the inmate's behavior on release and the penalty imposed by forfeiture of gain time after the revocation. In such a case, the Florida Parole Commission and the Department of Corrections, rather than the prosecuting authority, would be the appropriate respondents. Similarly, a prison disciplinary action which results in the forfeiture of gain time has to do with the inmate's behavior in prison, not the original offense for which the inmate was sentenced. The Department of Corrections is the appropriate respondent in such a case. Likewise, Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-601.101 allows the Department to make incentive gain time awards so that inmates may be recognized for their individual effort in work, vocational, educational and self-betterment programs. This . . . concerns an inmate's behavior in prison and does not necessarily concern the original offense for which the inmate was sentenced or the court which conducted those proceedings.
Burgess, 870 So.2d at 220 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Department is the proper respondent in a mandamus proceeding challenging a sentence-reducing credit determination rendered by the Department. As to where in the state the Department should be held to answer such a petition, Florida's district courts are in disagreement.7
Because no specific venue statute addresses mandamus petitions,8 the general venue statute is applicable in such cases: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." § 47.011, Fla. Stat. (2005). This statute is consonant with the common law "home venue privilege," which governs suits against government entities in Florida:
It has long been the established common law of Florida that venue in civil actions brought against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions, absent waiver or exception, properly lies in the county where the state, agency, or subdivision, maintains it principal headquarters. Such a rule promotes orderly and uniform handling of state litigation and helps to minimize expenditure of public funds and manpower.
Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362, 363-64 (Fla.1977) (citations omitted). "Absent waiver or application of an identified exception, the home venue privilege appears to be an absolute right." Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Clay County Util. Auth., 802 So.2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); see also Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So.2d 1278 (Fla.2004).
The Department, which is the "defendant" in sentence-reducing credit cases, is headquartered, or "resides," in Leon County for purposes of the general venue statute. Further, it is the Department that calculates inmates' sentence-reducing credits and applies them to their sentences,9 and because the final sentence-reducing decision and act are made by the Department, the "cause of action" under the statute reasonably may be said to "accrue" in Leon County. And finally, to the extent that...
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