Bush v. Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1936
• Docket Number: 16191
• Citation: 165 So. 486
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: BUSH v. VICTORY INDUSTRIAL LIFE INS. CO

165 So. 486

BUSH v. VICTORY INDUSTRIAL LIFE INS. CO

No. 16191

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans.

January 27, 1936

Rehearing denied Feb. 10, 1936.

Henican & Carriere, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Chas I. Denechaud and Ernest J. Robin, both of New Orleans, for appellee.

OPINION

JANVIER Judge.

Barbara Bush applied to Victory Industrial Life Insurance Company for a policy of insurance on the life of her grandnephew, Earl Benn. The policy was issued, and in it she was named beneficiary. She paid all premiums on the policy, and now, Benn having died, claims the proceeds thereof. The insurance company refused payment of the proceeds and contends that the said Barbara Bush had no insurable interest in the life of the said Benn and maintains that, in the absence of such interest, it is against public policy that a beneficiary be permitted to recover on such a policy, and that, therefore, liability is limited to the return of the amount of all premiums which have been paid. It tenders the amount of the said premiums, but the tender has been rejected by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff concedes that the relationship which existed between her and the deceased did not in itself create in her an insurable interest in his life, but she seeks to overcome this obstacle to her claim by attempting to show three things, any one of which she contends would create in her such an insurable interest as would give her the right to recover under the policy. First. She maintains that, though the policy was solicited by her and though she has paid all the premiums, nevertheless, the said Benn had knowledge of the existence of the policy and approved it and intended to reimburse her for the amounts paid by her as premiums. Second. She avers that Benn was indebted to her for cash amounts which she had loaned to him and she maintains that this fact created in her a right to obtain such a policy as security for repayment of such sums. Third. She seeks to persuade us that she had a reasonable expectancy of receiving from Benn, had he lived, financial assistance in her later years, and that this created in her such an interest in his continued existence as gave her the right to protect that interest by a policy of insurance on his life.

The judge, a quo, felt that the facts of this case could not be distinguished from those which we considered in the matter of Washington v. Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 146 So. 766, in which we refused recovery, and, consequently, rendered judgment for defendant company dismissing plaintiff's suit.

It is conceded, as indeed, it must be, that insurable interest does not result from relationship itself. In Rombach v. Piedmont & Arlington Life Ins. Co., 35 La.Ann. 233, 48 Am. Rep. 239, the Supreme Court, after stating that insurable interest does not arise from relationship alone, and that, where the relationship is such as to create an interest, it does so only because "the relationship is such that the insurer beneficiary has a legal claim upon the insured for services or support," continues with the statement that ""Even though such legal claim does not exist, yet where from the personal relations of the two, and the kindness and good feeling displayed by the insured to the insuree, the latter has a reasonable right to expect some pecuniary advantage from the continuance of the life of the former or to fear loss from his death, an insurable interest will be held to exist." In Stringer v. National Benefit Life Ins. Co., 12 La.App. 84, 124 So. 533, our brothers of the Second Circuit adopted the view that where there is such reason to anticipate financial assistance, there is insurable interest. But in the Rombach Case it will be noted that the court held that the claimant "was in none of the categories of permissible insurers," and that the court also indicated very plainly that there must be more than a mere indefinite hope of future assistance, and in the Stringer Case it was shown that "for more than five years" the insured had been actually contributing to the support of the beneficiary "$ 50.00 a year or more."

In the case at bar the record shows that at no time had the insured contributed to the support of the beneficiary. On the contrary, she had always aided in supporting him, and the only money he had ever given to her is shown to have been intended as a partial repayment of advances she had previously made to him. Under such facts, extreme and unwarranted optimism would be required to sustain a hope that, had the deceased lived, material financial aid to the beneficiary would have resulted.

It is said that there was a debt due by the insured to the beneficiary, and that...