Bushey v. NORTHERN ASSURANCE
| Decision Date | 03 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 16,16 |
| Citation | 130 Md. App. 169,745 A.2d 444 |
| Parties | William B. BUSHEY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Miranda L. Bushey, et al. v. NORTHERN ASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, et al. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Michael J. Schreyer (Donahue, Seidman & Schreyer on the brief), Waldorf, for appellants.
Mark T. Mixter (John M. Oliveri on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before HOLLANDER, SONNER, and JOHN F. McAULIFFE (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
On January 25, 1997, a tragic head-on car accident caused the deaths of two sisters, Miranda and Susan Bushey. Susan was a high school senior when she was driving her grandfather's 1983 Cadillac on the day of the accident; Miranda was a high school sophomore. She attempted to pass a slower vehicle by crossing a double yellow line and was struck head-on by an oncoming vehicle. Susan died on that day and Miranda died from her injuries on January 30, 1997.
At the time of the accident, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company had issued an insurance policy for the grandfather, Earl T. Weeks, under which Susan was a named insured. The policy limited liability coverage to $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident for bodily injuries, the statutory minimum in Maryland.
Appellants, William and Linda Bushey, the girls' parents, sued Northern Assurance Company of America ("Northern") and St. Paul Insurance Company in the Circuit Court for Charles County, individually and as personal representative of Miranda Bushey's estate, for underinsured motorist coverage. Northern has a commercial insurance policy for Mr. Bushey's automotive repair business.1 Appellants sought a declaratory judgment that the Northern policy provided uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist ("UM/UIM") benefits. The circuit court found that the automobile was not a "covered vehicle" under Northern's policy and granted Northern's motion for summary judgment.
The appellants argue that Northern's insurance policy is not limited to covered vehicles and raise three issues on appeal, which we have reworded:
1. Did the circuit court misconstrue the uninsured motorist statute in determining that insureds may be excluded from coverage when not occupying a "covered vehicle"?
2. Did the circuit court misconstrue the personal and comprehensive coverage of the UM endorsement in determining that insureds may be excluded from coverage when not occupying a "covered vehicle"?
3. Did the circuit court err in concluding that the doctrine of parent/child immunity barred appellants' individual wrongful death claims?2
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.
Northern issued a commercial insurance policy to "William B. Bushey t/a Bushey's Automotive"3 that provides comprehensive coverage for appellant's automotive repair business. The policy is divided into numerous "sections," such as a property section that insures the automotive repair business's building, a crime section that insures against employee dishonesty, and a garage and dealers section. The garage and dealers section of the commercial policy is the section at issue.
In the garage and dealers section, using numerical codes, there is a "Coverages/Limits" section that allows uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverage to be elected for five types of cars:
26 = owned autos subject to a compulsory UM law, and
27 = specifically described autos.
For UM coverage, appellant checked number 26 (owned autos subject to a compulsory UM law). For UIM coverage, appellant checked number 26 and wrote in number 32, which covers "company use" vehicles with transportation tags.
The insurance policy has a "Maryland Uninsured Motorist Coverage" endorsement, which states:
B. WHO IS AN INSURED
1. You.
2. If you are an individual, any "family member".
3. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" or a temporary substitute for a covered "auto"....
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of "bodily injury" sustained by another "insured".
The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 Md.App. 216, 221, 706 A.2d 650 (1998). We find that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to Northern.
Appellants' first argument is that Maryland's UM statute does not permit an insured to be excluded from coverage if the insured is not in a "covered vehicle." Appellants contend that the statute applies to Northern's policy, even though it is a commercial insurance policy. Therefore, appellants argue the trial court erred in concluding that UM/UIM benefits cover only vehicles owned by Bushey Automotive or vehicles used in the business with transportation tags.
Appellee contends UM/UIM coverage under the policy extends only to owned vehicles subject to Maryland compulsory uninsured motorists law, i.e. the three vehicles listed in the policy, and vehicles used in the business with transportation tags. Appellee argues the insurance policy should be interpreted according to the parties' intentions at the time of contracting and that Mr. Bushey had the opportunity to purchase UM/UIM coverage for vehicles not owned by the business or otherwise used in the business, but he declined.
Appellants correctly state that the primary purpose of Maryland's UM statute, Insurance Article § 19-509, is to compensate innocent victims of automobile accidents who are unable to recover from uninsured or underinsured motorists. MD.CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509(1997); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 A.2d 734 (1980); Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 Md.App. 216, 222, 706 A.2d 650 (1998). Appellants also correctly state that the statute lists two specific exclusions and the Court of Appeals has consistently held that additional exclusions are not permitted.4 West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa et al., 352 Md. 455, 474-75, 723 A.2d 1 (1998)(citing ten decisions by the Maryland Court of Appeals). However, appellants rely on cases that deal with personal, rather than commercial, insurance policies. Under appellants' contentions, the garage policy at issue would expose Northern to UM/UIM liability for all of Mr. Bushey's family members in any automobile accident, a result that would ignore the intention of the parties as well as the clear language of the policy.
The primary purpose in construing an insurance contract is to effectuate the intention of the parties. Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch. et al., 81 Md.App. 499, 505, 568 A.2d 873 (1990). "Where there is no ambiguity in an insurance contract the court has no alternative but to enforce the policy's terms." Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 348 Md. 157, 171, 702 A.2d 767 (1997) (citing Howell v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 305 Md. 435, 443, 505 A.2d 109 (1986)).
In this case, the parties' clear intention was to contract for a garage policy that insured covered autos only. We can see that from several unambiguous terms in the contract. First, in the "Coverages/Limits" section of the Garage and Dealers Section, appellant clearly understood that only those vehicles that were checked were covered for underinsured motorist coverage because not only did he check number 26 (owned autos subject to UM law), but he wrote in number 32 (company use). Second, the UM endorsement emphasizes that UM coverage exists only for covered autos by explicitly stating that it modifies the Garage Coverage Form "[f]or a covered `auto' licensed or principally garaged in, or `garage operations' conducted in Maryland." Finally, it is clear the insurance was for business purposes. Under the "Driver Information" section of the Garage and Dealers Section, the insurance application states, "List all drivers, including family members that will drive company vehicles, and employees who drive own vehicles on company business." Only Mr. Bushey and two of his employees are listed.
Furthermore, appellants had the option to purchase insurance coverage that covered vehicles not owned by the automotive repair business, but opted not to purchase it. As the Court of Appeals stated:
The fundamental problem with the Petitioners' arguments is that they are asking this Court to declare that they are entitled to something they did not elect to purchase.... [I]nsureds are only entitled to the coverage that they pay for, and no more.... The Petitioners had the option of purchasing higher uninsured/underinsured limits of coverage for each vehicle by paying the associated higher premiums. They chose not to do this for two of the three vehicles insured under the same policy, and now they seek the benefits of a bargain they did not make.
Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 348 Md. 157, 172, 174, 702 A.2d 767 (1997).
In a similar case, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., et al., 81 Md.App. 499, 504, 568 A.2d 873 (1990), this court considered whether the injured party, the spouse of the owner of a car insured by the owner's employer, was an insured under the commercial insurance policy at issue for purposes of UM and personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. The insurance company argued that only covered vehicles involved in accidents were insured under the policy, whereas the injured party argued that the owners of the cars and their spouses and relatives were covered despite the fact that the employer paid for the insurance. Id. at 502, 568 A.2d 873. A plain reading of the parties' insurance policy led this Court to conclude that the injured spouse was not an insured under the policy. Id. at 508, 568 A.2d 873. However, this Court also rejected the insurance company's argument that only covered vehicles were insured because the language of the policy did not so...
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Bushey v. Northern Assurance
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