Bustos v. Gilroy, 9429

Citation751 P.2d 188,106 N.M. 808,1988 NMCA 12
Decision Date02 February 1988
Docket NumberNo. 9429,9429
PartiesEusebio BUSTOS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Rose Mary GILROY (Bustos), Respondent-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

This appeal concerns a domestic relations dispute. Petitioner, Eusebio Bustos (husband) sought a dissolution of marriage, custody of two minor children and child support. Respondent, Rose Mary Gilroy (wife) counter-petitioned also seeking a dissolution of marriage, custody, support, and an equitable division of the parties' property and indebtedness. The major dispute in this appeal concerns wife's attorney fees and legal costs incurred as a result of the divorce. At trial, wife sought to have the parties' attorney fees and costs declared a community debt and equally divided. In the alternative, she requested an award of her own attorney fees alleging that economic disparity justified a fee award.

The trial court entered a partial decree dissolving the marriage, awarding wife exclusive custody of the children, awarding husband specific visitation rights and ordering him to pay child support. Judgment was reserved on the remaining property, debt and attorney fee issues. In a subsequent letter decision, the trial court determined that the community debts equaled the stipulated value of the communal assets. The assets and corresponding debts were awarded to husband.

The trial court rejected wife's argument that the parties' aggregate attorney fees be considered community debts and divided between them. Instead, the court directed that each side pay his or her own attorney fees and costs. The trial court further denied wife's request for attorney fees based on its determination that there was no economic disparity between the parties and that a fee award was not necessary for the efficient preparation and presentation of wife's case.

Wife's appeal raises numerous issues. Many of the claimed errors overlap and concern the trial court's determinations and rulings on attorney fees. We discuss these issues separately. Additionally, wife contends that the trial court erred in finding that a $2,000 loan was a community debt and lastly, that the court erred in denying wife's motion for a new trial.

I. Attorney Fees
a. Whether the parties legal expenses incurred pursuant to their divorce are presumed a community debt.

Principally, wife argues that the parties' legal expenses relating to their divorce were presumptively community debts under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.1986) and in the absence of a showing by husband sufficient to overcome the presumption, the court should have declared these costs and expenses community debts and should have divided them equally between the parties.

Wife argues that we are faced with a threshold determination of whether NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-7 (Repl.1986) (expenses of divorce proceedings) or Section 40-3-9 (separate or community debts) is the statute applicable to this proceeding. We disagree that one statute must be considered to the exclusion of the other. Rather, we see the law relating to domestic relations as a mosaic. While composed of separate and distinct pieces, it should be viewed in total, and construed, if possible, so as to produce a harmonious whole. See Mathieson v. Hubler, 92 N.M. 381, 588 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App.1978). Statutes should be construed so that no word and no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous. Katz v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs. Income Support Div., 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39 (1981). A review of the proceedings here, including the record proper, the trial court's decision letter, and findings and conclusions indicate that the trial court considered both Sections 40-3-9 and 40-4-7 in arriving at its final decision.

Wife relies on Christiansen v. Christiansen, 100 N.M. 102, 666 P.2d 781 (1983) to support her argument that legal expenses must be treated as community debts. Wife's reliance on Christiansen, however, is misplaced. In Christiansen, the trial court treated both husband's and wife's litigation expenses as communal debts. Wife challenged the trial court's refusal to award her attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings concerning the legal fees.

Christiansen neither compels the result wife seeks in the present case nor applies a presumption of community indebtedness. Under the facts of Christiansen, the supreme court simply indicated that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating legal expenses as community debts or in denying wife's request for a fee award.

Although we disagree with wife that legal expenses incurred pursuant to the parties' divorce are presumptively community debts, we agree with her argument, that the trial court erred in concluding that no portion of her attorney fees constitute a communal expense. Section 40-3-9(B) provides that a community debt means a debt contracted or incurred by either spouse during marriage which is not a separate debt. NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-10.1 (Repl.1986) provides that "[t]he court, at the time of the final decree of dissolution of marriage, may declare, as between the parties, a debt to be unreasonable if it was incurred by a spouse while the spouse was living apart and the debt did not contribute to the benefit of both spouses or their dependents." (Emphasis added.) It is clear that both conditions must be satisfied before a debt may be considered "unreasonable." Thus, a debt incurred while the parties were living apart which did not benefit both parties or their dependents may be deemed unreasonable and considered the separate debt of the party incurring such expense.

It is undisputed that wife's attorney fees were incurred during marriage but while the parties were living apart. Thus, the first portion of the statutory test is satisfied. The trial court further refused to find that wife's attorney fees contributed in part to the benefit of the children. Accordingly, the trial court found and concluded that wife's attorney fees were unreasonable under Section 40-3-10.1 and, thus, wife was solely responsible for their payment. It is this finding that causes us pause. We can locate no evidence to support the court's determination that wife's attorney fees did not, in any respect, benefit the parties' dependents. To the contrary, the court specifically determined that it was in the best interest of the children that wife retain exclusive legal and physical custody of the children. Thus, the trial court determined both that wife's expenditures for attorney fees did not benefit the children, but that the settlement negotiated by wife's New Mexico attorney was in the best interest of the children. Wife argues, and we agree, that there is an inherent conflict in these findings.

Shortly after moving to New York in May 1985, wife retained New York attorney David Kagan (Kagan) to give her legal advice as to the parties' separation and probable divorce. A week later, husband filed for divorce and sought custody of the children and child support. Wife counterclaimed for custody and child support. Shortly thereafter, but during the pendency of the New Mexico proceeding, Kagan obtained a temporary custody order on behalf of wife.

In late June or early July, Kagan spoke with husband's attorney concerning contact between husband and wife, the children, and the possibility of a reconciliation or settlement between the parties. Kagan also aided mother in obtaining the services of New Mexico attorney Thomas Patrick Whelan (Whelan).

Husband actively sought custody from June 1985, when his complaint was filed, until approximately March 1986, when Whelan successfully negotiated a favorable settlement whereby husband finally agreed to settle the child custody issue and stipulate that the childrens' custody should be placed with wife. Moreover, Whelan also helped effect a stipulation and settlement of the thorny issue of child visitation. Unable to agree on the issue of child support, however, wife was required to litigate that matter before the court. Wife succeeded in obtaining an award of child support.

Resolving issues of child custody, visitation and support necessarily require a determination of what is in the best interest of the children. The trial court's finding that none of wife's attorney fees, including that portion expended towards resolving issues involving the children, benefited the children, is contrary to the evidence.

A judgment cannot be sustained on appeal unless the conclusion upon which it is based finds support in the findings of fact. Worland v. Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981 (1976). A finding of fact, however, will not be upheld on appeal unless it can be sustained by the evidence or inferences made therefrom. Barber's Super Markets, Inc. v. Stryker, 84 N.M. 181, 500 P.2d 1304 (Ct.App.1972).

Although arguably wife was the primary beneficiary of her legal services, in light of the court's findings that the custodial arrangements were in the children's best interest, we hold that those legal fees wife incurred by seeking settlement of child custody and visitation constitute community debts under Section 40-3-10.1. Moreover, those attorney fees wife incurred as a result of litigating the issue of child support likewise constitute a communal expense. Thus, finding nos. 10 and 11 are error. Accordingly, the trial court's finding and ultimate conclusion that all wife's attorney fees are excessive and unreasonable is likewise error. Hence, we reverse the court's determination that no portion of wife's attorney fees constitute community debts.

We remand this matter to the trial court in order that the court determine what portion of wife's attorney fees benefited the parties' dependents. Those fees shall be declared...

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