Buswell v. Buswell
| Decision Date | 04 June 1954 |
| Citation | 377 Pa. 487,105 A.2d 608,44 A.L.R.2d 1085 |
| Parties | , 44 A.L.R.2d 1085 BUSWELL v. BUSWELL. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Joseph D. Calhoun, Media, for appellant.
C. William Kraft, Jr., Media, for appellee.
Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
On May 18, 1940, Lucinda D. Buswell and Robert R. Buswell entered the holy bonds of matrimony. Less than four years later they shook off the bonds. In the meantime, two children had been born to the union, and, in anticipation of the contemplated divorce, the parents entered into an oral agreement which was later incorporated by the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, where the parties were living at the time, into the divorce decree handed down on April 21, 1944.
The agreement provided, inter alia, that Robert Buswell would pay to Lucinda Buswell as alimony $125 for the period from April 21, 1944 to June 1, 1944, and she would be barred from further alimony; that Robert would pay Lucinda $30 per month for each of the children until further order of the Court; that Robert would have certain visiting rights with his children; that he would also pay for reasonably necessary extraordinary medical and dental bills for the children; and that he would maintain unencumbered $8,500 insurance on his life, with the children as irrevocable beneficiaries.
Following the entry of the divorce decree, Robert agreed to send to Lucinda every two months a $25 United States War Bond, the beneficiary alternating between the two children. This agreement was appended to the divorce decree by the Cook County Court as a supplemental decree on August 1, 1945.
On July 20, 1951, the parties having in the meantime moved to Pennsylvania (Robert to Montgomery County and Lucinda to Delaware County), Lucinda filed a Complaint in Equity in Delaware County, charging her former husband with failure to maintain his promises which had been solemnized by the divorce and supplemental decree. Specifically Lucinda charged that Robert had violated the integrity of the $8,500 insurance by borrowing $1,000 on the policies and by displacing the two children-beneficiaries (to the amount of $6,500) by substituting in their place his second wife; that he neglected to make the monthly $30 payments agreed upon for the support of the children; that he did not meet the medical and dental bills incurred for the children; and that he had not delivered war bonds as promised, 34 now being due.
After Answer filed and New Matter having been replied to by the plaintiff, a hearing was held and the Chancellor entered a decree nisi which ordered the defendant to pay to his former wife $420 for past due support, $209 for medical and dental bills, and $281.25 for war bonds due up to the time of the hearing; that he was to rehabilitate the $8,500 insurance policies so that they would give to the children the protection originally intended and agreed upon; and that he would purchase and deliver United States war bonds in accordance with the stipulation recorded in the supplemental Illinois decree. With the exception of the $209 medical item (on the basis that there was no proof to support it) the court en banc approved the findings of the Chancellor and made the decree final. This appeal followed.
Although the defendant admits the oral agreement with his wife and in effect does not deny that he breached its provisions, he argues that his wife cannot sue on the agreement because it was merged in the Illinois decree. He then argues that she cannot sue on the Illinois decree either, because the parties are now living in Pennsylvania. This double-barreled defense ignores two things: one, that Pennsylvania and Illinois are both in the United States, and, therefore, both subject to the same Constitution which guarantees interstate full faith and credit; and, two, that a valid contract is enforcible anywhere that the flag of the law floats over a courthouse.
'A contract valid under its governing law will be enforced everywhere unless contrary to the positive law or public policy of the forum, unless it would work injury to the state or its citizens.' 15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, § 4g (3) page 858.
'When a contract is valid in the state in which it is made and performable, it will be enforced in our courts if it is not contrary to the public policy of this state.' In re McCurdy's Estate, 303 Pa. 453, 154 A. 707, 709.
No one can cancel out his obligations by crossing a State line. His legal obligations travel with him as baggage that he cannot leave behind.
The defendant then urges that since the order of the Illinois Court provided that it was subject to change, this made the order interlocutory and, therefore, not entitled to full faith and credit as a final judgment. Even assuming that the Illinois court retained jurisdiction to modify its decree in futuro, it could not change the permanence of what was already established in the ineradicable archives of the past. Nothing could alter the defendant's obligations for past payments which he did not honor.
The Illinois court has no power or authority to modify the payments already accrued, Shuff v. Fulte, 344 Ill.App. 157, 100 N.E.2d 502, or to forgive, cancel or set aside arrearages. Craig v. Craig, 163 Ill. 176, 45 N.E. 153. Moreover, a decree for past due installments is a money decree and draws interest at the rate of 5% per annum until satisfied. Shuff v. Fulte, supra.
Thus, with regard to support payments already accrued, the Illinois decree is a final foreign judgment entitled to full faith and credit under the United States Constitution. A Pennsylvania court of equity, having jurisdiction of the parties, will recognize and enforce that final judgment of $420 entered in the Illinois court.
It must be interjected here that when the defendant failed to make the payments order by the Illinois court, the plaintiff, in proceedings for support, entered the Court of Quarter Sessions of Delaware County and obtained an order for the support of each of the children in the amount of $15.00 weekly from the date of the order. The defendant on his part initiated habeas corpus proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County for a...
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